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	SUMMARY 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) 
gives everyone the right to just administrative action.  Administrative law gives content 
to, and protects, this right.  Administrative law’s primary corrective mechanism is 
judicial review.  This is a procedure through which administrative action may be 
scrutinised and invalidated by a court. 
 
A court can review administrative action directly or indirectly. In direct-review 
proceedings the validity of administrative action is the court’s main subject of 
adjudication.  In indirect-review proceedings, by contrast, the validity of administrative 
action is incidental to the court’s main subject of adjudication.  While the law on direct 
review is well developed, the law on indirect review is comparatively obscure and 
unexplored. 
 
The thesis attempts to provide a critical analysis of the South African law on indirect 
review.  After reviewing this body of law, I will argue that it is in need of doctrinal reform. 
I will propose, in conclusion, that section 36 of the Constitution should be the point of 









Artikel 33 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, 1996 (“die Grondwet”) 
gee elkeen die reg op regverdige administratiewe optrede.  Die administratiefreg gee 
inhoud aan, en beskerm, dié reg.  Geregtelike hersiening is die administratiefreg se 
primêre korrektiewe meganisme.  Howe gebruik geregtelike hersiening om 
onregmatige administratiewe optrede te identifiseer en ongeldig te verklaar. 
 
Geregtelike hersiening kan op beide direkte en indirekte wyse geskied.  By direkte 
geregtelike hersiening is die geldigheid van administratiewe optrede die fokus van die 
geding.  By indirekte geregtelike hersiening is die hof se fokus elders gerig, en die 
geldigheid van administratiewe optrede is insidenteel tot die hoofpunt in geskil.  
Direkte geregtelike hersiening is bekend en goed ontwikkel.  Indirekte geregtelike 
hersiening, aan die ander hand, is relatief obskuur. 
 
Hierdie tesis poog om ‘n kritiese analise van die reg op indirekte geregtelike 
hiersiening te verskaf.  Ek betoog dat dié corpus reg hervorming benodig.  Ten slotte 
doen ek aan die hand dat artikel 36 van die Grondwet die vertrekpunt vir sulke 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Introduction  
 
Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) 
grants everyone the right to just administrative action.1  This right is protected by 
administrative law and is given effect by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 (“PAJA”).2  Administrative law’s primary diagnostic and corrective mechanism 
is judicial review,3 a procedure through which administrative action may be scrutinised 
and invalidated by a court.4 
A court can review administrative action directly or indirectly.5  In direct-review 
proceedings the validity of administrative action is the court’s main subject of 
adjudication.  Such proceedings are initiated by a litigant whose purpose in 
approaching a court is to impugn the administrative action in question.  In indirect-
review proceedings, by contrast, the validity of administrative action is incidental to the 
court’s main subject of adjudication.  As this thesis will demonstrate, indirect review 
may arise in a variety of legal proceedings.  It is most often initiated by a respondent 
or a defendant in the form of a defence.  While direct review is ubiquitous, clearly 
regulated and well-known, indirect review is comparatively obscure and unexplored. 
Indirect review is best illustrated by way of an example.6  Assume that one Mr Smit 
drives his car on a national road (the N4) between Nelspruit and Komatipoort.  He 
																																																						
1 The Constitutional Court has recently held that, while the state is obliged to respect 
everyone’s right to just administrative action, it cannot rely on that right to invalidate its own 
prior administrative action.  See State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 23 (CC); chapter 7 part 7 7 6 3 below. 
2 S 33(3) of the Constitution read with PAJA’s long title. 
3 Although judicial review is the primary mechanism for detecting and correcting invalid 
administrative action, there are a number of other ways in which administrative action is 
controlled.  These include internal appeals and investigations by independent institutions such 
as the Public Protector.  See C Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed (2012) 58-102.   
4 C Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed (2012) 113. 
5 518-519. 
6 This example is based on the facts of S v Smit 2007 2 SACR 335 (T).  This judgment is 
analysed in chapter 3 part 3 2 below. 
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reaches the Nkomazi toll plaza on the N4.  But instead of stopping to pay the 
prescribed tollgate fee, he drives through the toll plaza and continues his journey. 
Mr Smit is later charged with the offence of refusing or failing to pay tollgate fees.7  
In his trial Mr Smit admits that he intentionally passed through the toll plaza without 
paying the fees.  Curiously, he nonetheless pleads not-guilty to the charge against 
him. 
The crux of Mr Smit’s defence is that the N4 was not validly declared a toll road.  
Therefore, argues Mr Smit, the state was not entitled to require him to pay a tollgate 
fee to use the road, and he was accordingly entitled to refuse to pay the fee.  Hence 
Mr Smit mounts what has come to be known as a “collateral challenge”8 to the 
declaration of the toll road. 
Assume further that the court entertains Mr Smit’s collateral challenge.  The court 
will then have to consider whether the N4 was validly declared a toll road.  It will, in 
other words, indirectly review the declaration.  The review is indirect because it is 
incidental to the determination of the main question in Mr Smit’s case: whether he is 
guilty of the offence or not. 
When should a court allow a litigant to challenge administrative action indirectly by 
way of a collateral challenge?  These question is not only relevant to Mr Smit’s case, 
but often arise before our courts.  Yet the question has no consistent answer, 
provoking uncertainty among the public, litigants, and the judiciary.  The central aim 
of the thesis is to address this questions in a critical and systematic way. 
 
																																																						
7 This is a criminal offence under the South African National Roads Agency Limited and 
National Roads Act 7 of 1998. 
8 See, for example, Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 
222 (SCA) para 32 n 22; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 
23. 
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1 2 The rationale for this thesis 
 
South Africa is founded on the rule of law.9  Though the concept “the rule of law” is 
multi-faceted and escapes conclusive definition,10 it entails at least two ideals. 
The first ideal is that public power must be exercised within the ambit of the law and 
should, in principle, be invalid to the extent that it is ultra vires.  This ideal, which is 
arguably the cornerstone of administrative law,11 finds expression in the principle of 
legality.12 
The second ideal, which may be called the principle of certainty,13 is that the law 
should indicate with reasonable certainty what those bound by the law should do or 
not do.14  The delay rule is one manifestation of this principle.  It provides that judicial 
review proceedings must be instituted without unreasonable delay.15  One rationale 
for the rule is that the state and the public organise their activities on the assumption 
that administrative acts are legally binding, and that they will suffer prejudice if this 
assumption is suddenly upset.16 
Like the rule of law, the law on indirect review entails a confluence of twin ideals.  
																																																						
9 S 1(c) of the Constitution. 
10 See, for instance, F Michaelman “The Rule of Law” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 11-24. 
11 See C Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed (2012) 255. 
12 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1991 
1 SA 374 (CC) paras 56-58. 
13 A Price & D Freund “On the Legal Effects of Unlawful Administrative Action” (2017) 134 
SALJ 184 184. 
14 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 
(CC) para 108 (emphasis added). 
15 The delay rule is of common-law origin (Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit 
van Kaapstad 1978 1 SA 13 (A) at 41E-F).  It is now codified in s 7(1) of the PAJA, which 
provides that any proceedings for judicial review in terms of s 6(1) of the PAJA must be 
instituted without unreasonable delay and no later than 180 days after internal remedies have 
been concluded; or, where no internal remedies exist, 180 days after the date on which the 
applicant was informed of the administrative action, became aware of the action and the 
reasons for it, or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action 
and its reasons.  In terms of s 9 of the PAJA, the 180-day period may be extend by agreement 
between the litigants; or, failing such agreement, by a court “where the interests of justice so 
requires”. 
16 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 
3 SA 481 (CC) para 104. 
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The first ideal is that administrative action should be treated as valid until a court 
determines otherwise.17  For reasons that are explained in the next chapter, this ideal 
has come to be known as “the Oudekraal principle”. 
The second ideal is that a subject may be entitled to disregard apparently invalid 
administrative action, should the action form the basis of coercion by the state.  In 
these circumstances the delay rule finds no application and the law permits a litigant 
to challenge the administrative action indirectly once the state seeks to enforce it upon 
him, whenever that may be.18  This ideal may be called “the collateral-challenge 
exception”. 
The Oudekraal principle advances the rule of law’s principle of certainty.  By clothing 
administrative action with legal effectiveness, the Oudekraal principle fixes the legal 
position, which in turn facilitates societal harmony and promotes efficient 
administration.19  When the Oudekraal principle is elided, “it invites a vortex of 
uncertainty, unpredictability and irrationality”.20  This is because we rely on “[t]he clarity 
and certainty of governmental conduct” to organise our lives.21 
The collateral-challenge exception, on the other hand, promotes the principle of 
legality.22  It demands that public power be exercised within the boundaries of the law 
and that ultra vires conduct be denuded from legal force.23 
																																																						
17 Comair Ltd v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 1 SA 1 (GP) para 15; Hanekom v Voight 
2016 1 SA 416 (WCC) para 15; Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre 2016 3 SA 317 (SCA) para 43; Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen 
Iron Ore 2014 2 SA 603 (CC) para 38; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 
(CC) para 43; Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) paras 87-93. 
18 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 32, 36; A 
Price & D Freund “On the legal effects of unlawful administrative action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 
190.   But see chapter 4 part 4 6 2 below. 
19 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
26; Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 220; A Price & D Freund “On the Legal Effects of Unlawful 
Administrative Action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 185. 
20 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 
3 SA 481 (CC) para 103. 
21 Para 104. 
22 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 31; Oudekraal Estates 
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 26; A Price & D Freund 
“On the Legal Effects of Unlawful Administrative Action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 185. 
23 See, for instance, Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
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The Oudekraal principle and the collateral-challenge exception therefore hold 
competing aspects of the rule of law in fragile equipoise.24  When judges apply the 
Oudekraal principle, the principle of legality is subordinated to the principle of certainty.  
And when judges apply the collateral challenge exception, the principle of certainty is 
subordinated to the principle legality.25 
Because the rule of law is “a complex political ideal”,26 it is unavoidable that these 
trade-offs should happen on occasion.27  But given that the Constitution does not, on 
the face of it, prioritise one aspect of the rule of law above another,28 there should be 
coherent justifications for upsetting the parity that theoretically exists between the rule 
																																																						
24 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 
31-32, 37; A Price & D Freund “On the Legal Effects of Unlawful Administrative Action” (2017) 
134 SALJ 184 184-186, 189-191; L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional 
Court’s Procedural Drama” (2015) 7 CCR 1 2. 
25 Jafta J appears to favour this hierarchy as a matter of course, as demonstrated by his 
minority judgment in MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & 
Lazer Institute 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) paras 1-63.  Boonzaier criticises this judgment for 
favouring the principle of legality without due regard for the implications this has for the 
principle of certainty.  See L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s 
Procedural Drama” (2015) 7 CCR 1 11. 
Jafta J reiterated his preference for the principle of legality in his minority judgments in both 
Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 95-96, 107-108 and 
Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC).  In the latter case, both Khampepe 
J, for a majority of the Constitutional Court, and Froneman J, in a separate concurring 
judgment, held Jafta J’s views to be misguided.  In a separate minority judgment, Zondo J 
concurred with Jafta J’s views and criticised Froneman J’s treatment of a range of cases.  See 
Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) paras 143-149, 209-223, 225. 
Commentators have noted that this disagreement between the judges of the Constitutional 
Court was, at times, clearly belligerent.  See D Brand, M Murcott & W van der Westhuizen 
“Administrative Law” (2016) 4 JQR 2.4.1.  Although this antagonism may disturb the 
Constitutional Court’s esprit de corps, it serves, at least, to underscore the importance of the 
issue in debate, and to show that the debate is far from resolved.  On the unresolved nature 
of the debate, see G Quinot “Public Procurement” (2017) 2 JQR 2.5. 
26 A Price & D Freund “On the Legal Effects of Unlawful Administrative Action” (2017) 134 
SALJ 184 184; L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s 
Procedural Drama” (2015) 7 CCR 1 2. 
27 184. 
28 S 1(c) of the Constitution, the only section of the Constitution that explicitly refers to the rule 
of law, states that South Africa is founded on, among other things, the “[s]upremacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law”.  See further, Van der Walt v Metacash Trading Ltd 2002 4 
SA 317 (CC) paras 65-67. 
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of law’s different components.29 
This thesis seeks to make a modest contribution to that task.  It seeks to do so by 
articulating a coherent methodology for determining the competence of a collateral 
challenge. 
 
1 3 Hypothesis and research aims 
 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that, unlike the law on the direct review of 
administrative action, the law on indirect review lacks coherent organising principles.  
As such, the law on indirect review is unclear, unpredictable and in need of doctrinal 
reform. 
The thesis’s two research aims flow from this hypothesis.  The first aim is to 
demonstrate that the law on indirect review is indeed incoherent.  The second aim is 
to propose a way in which this area of the law may be organised congruently with the 
Constitution. 
 
1 4 Delineation 
 
This thesis is concerned with the way in which a court should determine the 
competence of a collateral challenge.  In other words, the thesis attempts to prescribe 
how a court should decide whether a litigant may challenge administrative action 
indirectly.  But this thesis is not concerned with how a court should decide whether a 
competent collateral challenge should succeed. 
The difference between these two topics is best illustrated with reference to the 
example of Mr Smit’s case.  The first question the court in that case would have to 
answer is whether Mr Smit should be allowed to raise a collateral challenge at all.  To 
answer that question, the court will have to grapple with the tension between the 
Oudekraal principle and the collateral challenge exception: on the one hand it seems 
dangerous to condone Mr Smit’s rebellious insouciance; on the other hand it seems 
unfair to deprive him of a seemingly cogent defence to a criminal conviction.  How 
																																																						
29 A Price & D Freund “On the Legal Effects of Unlawful Administrative Action” (2017) 134 
SALJ 184 186. 
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should a court resolve this tension?  That is the question this thesis attempts to 
answer. 
But assume that the court decides Mr Smit may indeed raise the collateral 
challenge.  It will then have to decide whether the collateral challenge should prevail, 
ie whether it is a complete defence to the charge against Mr Smit.  Which branch of 
the law should the court apply to resolve this question? 
Given that the proceedings centre on Mr Smit’s guilt or innocence, the court may 
clearly apply criminal law.  In that case the state must prove all the elements of the 
offence beyond reasonable doubt30 and Mr Smit need only create a reasonable doubt 
to avoid conviction.  In considering the validity of Mr Smit’s defence (ie that the toll-
road declaration was invalid), the Court will accordingly consider whether that defence 
creates a reasonable doubt that the state has discharged its burden of proof. 
But Mr Smit’s defence apparently compels the court to consider whether a ground 
of review in administrative law, such as unlawfulness, unreasonableness or fairness,31 
has been established.  The court may therefore require Mr Smit to prove his defence 
on the much stricter standard of a balance of probabilities, as that is the standard a 
litigant must ordinarily discharge to prove that administrative action is reviewable.32 
The latter question is as perplexing and important as the first.  But it is sufficiently 
complex that it demands treatment in a separate thesis.  As such, it will not be 
considered in any detail here. 
 
1 5 Methodology 
 
The central methodology of this thesis is a critical analysis of the South African 
jurisprudence on the indirect review of administrative action.  While this jurisprudence 
consists mainly of judgments, the academic treatment of indirect review is also 
considered.  In analysing the law on indirect review, the theoretical framework of 
transformative adjudication is explained and applied. 
While this thesis includes comparisons between the law of South Africa and the law 
of the United Kingdom, it does not intend to be a comparative study.  This is not 
																																																						
30 S v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369. 
31 See s 6 of the PAJA. 
32 C Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed (2012) 543-545. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		 8	
because comparative legal analysis cannot contribute to the development of the law 
on indirect review, but simply because such comparative analysis falls beyond this 
thesis’s focus and scope.  The reason the thesis considers the law of the United 
Kingdom is because “the theory of the second actor”, which underlies much of the 
early South African law on indirect review (and which is analysed in detail in chapter 
2), originated from that jurisdiction. 
 
1 6 Overview of chapters 
 
The locus classicus on the indirect review of administrative action in South African law 
is the judgment of Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 
(“Oudekraal”).33  The aim of the chapter 2 is to analyse this judgment closely, to assess 
the theory underlying the court’s reasoning, and to consider the judgment’s legacy in 
broad terms. 
While judges have invoked Oudekraal in almost every reported judgment that has 
subsequently dealt with indirect review, they have generally not applied Oudekraal’s 
reasoning.  The aim of chapter 3 is to explain the disparate modes of reasoning that 
judges have used instead. It will be suggested that our courts have mainly used two 
other distinct modes of reasoning, or judicial methods, which I call “the categorical 
method” and the “flexible method” respectively for ease of reference. Each of these 
methods will be critically considered. 
In chapter 4 the focus shifts from Oudekraal to arguably the most authoritative 
contemporary judgment on indirect review, Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 
(“Merafong City”).34  It will be argued that this judgment has notionally given the flexible 
method primacy, but has still failed to harmonise the law on indirect review and has, 
instead, underscored the need for doctrinal reform. 
Chapter 5 attempts to lay the foundation for such doctrinal reform.  It does this by 
proposing transformative adjudication as the ideal judicial method, and explaining, in 
detail, what this method entails. 
																																																						
33 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA). 
34 2017 2 SA 211 (CC). 
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Chapter 6 then considers how the current law on indirect review compares with the 
ideal of transformative adjudication.  It will be concluded that our courts have not yet 
adjudicated indirect-review cases congruently with this ideal. 
Chapter 7 proposes a new method for the adjudication of indirect-review cases. It 
will be argued that a judicial method grounded on section 36 of the Constitution would 
be most congruent with the ideal of transformative adjudication. Briefly put, the 
argument in Chapter 7 is that: 
 
(i) The doctrine of precedent obliges courts to use the flexible method as the 
point of departure. 
(ii) Whenever a court uses the flexible method to adjudicate an indirect-review 
case, it will develop the common law of indirect review. 
(iii) When a court develops the common law of indirect review, it must, in terms 
of section 39 of the Constitution, promote “the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights”.35 
(iv) A litigant that seeks to raise a collateral challenge seeks to exercise the right 
of access to courts. 
(v) Should a court preclude a litigant from raising a collateral challenge, the court 
will limit the litigant’s right of access to courts. 
(vi) It order to promote the “spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”, a court 
should only preclude a litigant from raising a collateral challenge if it would, 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, be reasonable and justifiable to 
limit that litigant’s right of access to courts. 
(vii) Courts should accordingly use a limitations analysis under section 36 of the 
Constitution to determine the competence of a collateral challenge. 
(viii) A judicial method based on section 36 of the Constitution is potentially 
congruent with the ideal of transformative adjudication. 
 
1 7 Qualifications 
 
Before commencing the substantive portion of this thesis, two qualifications are 
necessary. The first is that the thesis considers the law as at 30 June 2018.  The 
																																																						
35 S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
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second is that, where I critique judgments and academic contributions, I do so with 
respect and with the sole aim of attempting to contribute to the development of the 
law. 
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CHAPTER 2: OUDEKRAAL AND ITS LEGACY 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
In South African law, the locus classicus on the indirect review of administrative action 
is the judgment of Oudekraal.36  Although this is not the first judgment in our law to 
deal with indirect review, it has certainly been the most influential judgment on the 
topic.37 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Oudekraal closely.  After explaining the 
background to the dispute, the theoretical basis of the court’s ratio – Forsyth’s theory 
of the second actor – is critically examined.  The chapter then considers Oudekraal’s 
legacy.  It is demonstrated that the judgment has been misunderstood in two main 
ways, notwithstanding its venerated status in our law. 
 
2 2 The background to Oudekraal 
 
Oudekraal was a dispute about a valuable property on Cape Town’s Atlantic 
Seaboard.  This property was located on the slopes of the iconic Twelve Apostles 
mountain range, between the affluent suburbs of Llandudno and Camps Bay.38 
In 1957, the Administrator of the Cape Province, acting in terms of the Townships 
Ordinance 1933 of 1934 (“the Ordinance”),39 gave the owner of the property 
permission to develop what came to be known as “Oudekraal Township” on the site.40 
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd (“Estates”) acquired the site in 1965.41  For decades it 
took no steps to develop it.  Eventually, in 1996, it asked the local authority, the Cape 
Metropolitan Council, to approve the proposed township’s engineering services plan 
– an important step in the township-development process. 
																																																						
36 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA). 
37 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye and Laser Institute 
2014 3 SA 219 (CC) para 102. 
38 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 2. 
39 Para 2. 
40 Para 2. 
41 Para 3. 
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The Council refused.  It pointed out that the Ordinance imposed certain obligations 
on all township developers: they had to ask the Surveyor-General to approve their 
townships’ general plans; and, if the Surveyor-General did so, they had to submit the 
plans to the Registrar of Deeds.  According to the Council, Estates’ predecessor-in-
title had failed to meet these obligations timeously, the Administrator should therefore 
never have permitted the development of Oudekraal Township, and Estates did not 
inherit any rights to develop the site.42 
Estates instituted an application in the High Court to challenge the Council’s 
decision.  It asked the court to declare that it was entitled to develop Oudekraal 
Township.43  When the High Court declined to grant this order Estates appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.44 
The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that Estates did not have 
the right to develop Oudekraal Township.45  But the two courts reached this conclusion 
through different lines of reasoning.  Unlike the High Court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal focussed on the fact that there were several graves on the site that had 
religious and cultural significance to Muslims.46  It found that when the Administrator 
approved the development of Oudekraal Township, he was either unaware of the 
graves or he disregarded their existence.47  It held that the Administrator’s decision 
was invalid in either event: he either failed to consider material information or he 
considered the information but treated it as immaterial.48  The court therefore upheld 
the High Court’s order dismissing Estates’ application.49 
 
																																																						
42 Paras 3-5. 
43 Para 7. 
44 Para 12. 
45 Paras 13, 25-26. 
46 Para 14. 
47 Para 19. 
48 Para 25. 
49 Para 51. 
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2 3 Oudekraal and the theory of the second actor 
 
2 3 1 Introduction 
 
Those are Oudekraal’s background facts.  I now consider why the judgment is 
important to the law on indirect review.  A convenient starting point is to look at the 
Council’s legal position more closely. 
The Council refused to register Oudekraal Township’s engineering services plan 
because it believed that the Administrator’s earlier decision – the decision to approve 
the development of the township – was invalid.50  The Supreme Court of Appeal later 
held that the decision had indeed been invalid.  But did this mean that the Council was 
entitled to treat the decision as if it did not exist?  “No”, said the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.51  It explained: 
 
“Until the Administrator’s approval (and thus also the consequence of the approval) 
is set aside by a court in proceedings for judicial review it exists in fact and it has 
legal consequences that cannot simply be overlooked.  The proper functioning of a 
modern state would be considerably compromised if all administrative acts could 
be given effect to or ignored depending upon the view the subject takes of the 
validity of the act in question.  No doubt it is for this reason that our law has always 
recognised that even an unlawful administrative act is capable of producing legally 
valid consequences for so long as the unlawful act is not set aside.”52 
 
As this passage makes clear, the reason the Council could not simply ignore the 
Administrator’s decision was because the decision produced legal consequences, 
notwithstanding its invalidity.53  This might strike one as odd: one might assume that 
an invalid administrative is void and that, because it is void, it cannot produce any 
consequences.  One might assume, in other words, that “[n]othing will come of 
nothing”.54 
																																																						
50 Para 1. 
51 Para 26. 
52 Para 26. 
53 Paras 27, 29. 
54 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others v Nambiti Technologies (Pty) Ltd 
2016 2 SA 494 (SCA) para 33, quoting W Shakespeare King Lear Act 1, scene I, line 92. 
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Although this assumption may be logically sound, it is legally misguided.  Oudekraal 
confirmed that, unless it is set aside55 by a court, invalid administrative action is not 
strictly void or strictly voidable.56  Rather, it occupies a middle way57 between these 
two extremes – it is “theoretically void, yet functionally voidable”.58  So, although the 
act may be invalid in theory, in reality it is valid until a court sets it aside.59 
To complicate matters further, an invalid act can produce legal consequences even 
if it not only seems invalid, but has also been declared invalid by a court.60  This might 
seem inexplicably odd. But it is explained by the fact that courts have a discretion: 
they may choose not to set aside administrative action they have found to be invalid.61 
																																																						
55As explained by Hoexter, to “set aside” administrative action is “simply a way of saying that 
the decision no longer stands, or that it is void”.  See C Hoexter Administrative Law in South 
Africa (2012) 546. 
56 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 546-7; D Freund & A Price “On the 
legal effects of unlawful administrative action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 187; Merafong City v 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 36.  
57 D Freund & A Price “On the legal effects of unlawful administrative action” (2017) 134 SALJ 
184 187. 
58 C Forsyth “The theory of the second actor revisited” (2006) Acta Juridica 209 210. 
59 South African Reserve Bank v Shuttleworth 2015 5 SA 146 (CC) para 38; Department of 
Transport v Tasima (Pty) Ltd 2017 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 148; C Hoexter Administrative Law in 
South Africa (2012) 546-7; D Freund & A Price “On the legal effects of unlawful administrative 
action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 184-185; L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The 
Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” (2015) 7 CCR 1 2-3. 
60 See, for instance, Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 1 SA 170 (SCA) 
para 13. 
61 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
36; Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) 
para 81-85.  As illustrated by Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg 
Town Council 1903 TS 111 115, the discretionary nature of setting aside was recognised 
under common law.  It is codified by s 8 of the PAJA, as confirmed in Eskom Holdings Ltd v 
New Reclamation Group (Pty) Ltd 2009 4 SA 628 (SCA) para 9.  The discretion has proved 
particularly significant in the public procurement context, as demonstrated by Chairperson, 
Standing Tender Committee v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA); 
Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 23; AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
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Courts tend to exercise this discretion when the consequences of setting aside the 
act would be impractical or harmful.62  In AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency,63 for 
example, the Constitutional Court considered the South African Social Security 
Agency’s decision to award a tender for the payment of social grants.  The court 
declared the decision invalid.64  But, in a separate judgment dedicated to the remedy 
that should follow the declaration of invalidity,65 the court declined to set the tender 
award aside.  It took into account that millions of vulnerable people depend for their 
livelihood on the social grants and that the setting aside of the tender could harm these 
people profoundly and injure our society in general.66 
So simply because a court declares an administrative act invalid does not mean 
that the act is void.67  As Quinot and Maree point out, this is particularly puzzling under 
the constitutional dispensation: section 172(1) of the Constitution seems to imply that 
																																																						
62 Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson of the Tender Board: Limpopo 
Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 23, citing Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape 
Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 46. 
63 2014 1 SA 604 (CC). 
64 Paras 72, 91, 93, 98. 
65 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African 
Social Security Agency 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
66 Paras 32-33.  See further Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 
335 (CC). 
67 In a recent contribution on the topic at hand, Sonnekus seems to argue that a finding of 
invalidity must lead to an order setting aside the administrative action.  See, for instance, JC 
Sonnekus “Procurement contracts and underlying principles of the law – no special 
dispensation for organs of state (part 1 – the principles)” (2014) TSAR 320-321:  
“Any administrative conduct that is ultra vires is void in law and deprived of legal 
effect…If the conduct is not authorised by law it has no leg to stand on.  It is void ab 
initio.” (emphasis added). 
It is doubtful whether this proposition is true, as it conflicts with most of the settled law on 
courts’ remedial discretion.  It does seem, however, to be supported by Esorfranki Pipelines 
(Pty) Ltd v Mopani District Municipality 2014 2 All SA 493 (SCA) para 20. 
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a declaration of invalidity vitiates the impugned act,68 and the doctrine of objective 
constitutional invalidity69 implies that invalid administrative acts are void.70 
In Bengwenyama Mineral (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 
(“Bengwenyama”),71 the Constitutional Court confirmed that section 172 of the 
Constitution empowers courts to withhold the setting aside of invalid administrative 
action.72  But the court did not provide the missing pieces that would explain this 
puzzling fact in a doctrinally satisfactory way.73  Instead it held that courts have this 
discretion for reasons of pragmatism and equity.74  As the court did “not provide much 
conceptual clarity on the issue”,75 the puzzle remains incomplete. 
																																																						
68 As Quinot and Maree point out, once a court has made a declaration of invalidity under s 
172(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is empowered by s 172(b)(i) to make an order “limiting the 
retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity”.  This suggest that a declaration of invalidity 
has automatic retrospective effect, or, to put it differently, that it declares the law or conduct 
to be invalid at the outset – void ab initio (G Quinot & P J H Maree “The Puzzle of Pronouncing 
on the Validity of Administrative Action on Review” (2015) 7 CCR 27 32). 
69 According to the doctrine of objection constitutional invalidity, when a court declares law or 
conduct constitutionally invalid, it identifies a pre-existing invalidity.  In other words, the law or 
conduct is invalid from the moment it is inconsistent the Constitution, not from the subsequent 
moment when the court identifies the inconsistency.  It follows that a declaration of invalidity 
operates retrospectively, unless the court determines otherwise.  See Ferreira v Levin NO and 
Others; Vryenhoek v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) paras 26-27; Fose v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 94. 
70 G Quinot & P J H Maree “The Puzzle of Pronouncing on the Validity of Administrative Action 
on Review” (2015) 7 CCR 27 32. 
71 2011 4 SA 113 (CC)  
72 Para 85. 
73 One of the applicants presented the court with a constitutional justification for courts’ 
discretion to withhold the setting aside of invalid administrative action.  The applicant argued 
that when courts decline to set aside invalid administrative action, they effectively suspend the 
declaration of invalidity, as they are entitled to do by section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
Instead of engaging with this argument on its own terms, the court rejected it on the basis that 
it put courts’ remedial powers into a “conceptual straightjacket” (Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) 
Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) para 81-82). 
74 Paras 84-85. 
75 G Quinot & P J H Maree “The Puzzle of Pronouncing on the Validity of Administrative Action 
on Review” (2015) 7 CCR 27 33.  The court revised the issue in Merafong City v AngloGold 
Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 34-37, but again failed to provide a solution to the 
puzzle. 
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Clearly, the apparent anomaly that an invalid act can produce legally effective 
consequences does not invite “easy and consistently logical solutions”,76 and has 
created “terminological and conceptual problems of excruciating complexity”.77  
Scholars have proposed several different solutions to the apparent anomaly.78  In 
Oudekraal, the Supreme Court of Appeal embraced the solution proposed by Forsyth, 
namely “the theory of the second actor”.79 
 
2 3 2  The theory of the second actor 
 
The theory of the second actor is based on a rather metaphysical idea: there is a 
distinction between the realm of tangible things (“the Is”), and the realm of norms (“the 
Ought”).  Empirically ascertainable facts about the world belong to the first realm; 
moral codes, laws, and others norms belong to the second.80 
According to this distinction, a valid administrative act exists in both realms while 
an invalid administrative act exists in the factual realm only.81  Consider, for example, 
																																																						
76 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) para 
85. 
77 De Smith, Woolf & Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action 5 ed (1995) 5-44; quoted 
in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
29. 
78 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 
27-29.  For academic treatment of the apparent anomaly, see L Baxter Administrative Law 
(1984) 355-358; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 546-550; JC Sonnekus 
“Procurement contracts and underlying principles of the law – no special dispensation for 
organs of state (part 1 – the principles)” (2014) TSAR 320-336; JC Sonnekus “Procurement 
contracts and underlying principles of the law – no special dispensation for organs of state 
(part 2 – developing the common law, consequences, and remedies) (2014) TSAR 536-559; 
D Freund & A Price “On the legal effects of unlawful administrative action” (2017) 134 SALJ 
184-208; G Quinot & P Maree “The Puzzle of Pronouncing on the Validity of Administrative 
Action on Review” (2015) 7 CCR 27-42; L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The 
Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” (2015) 7 CCR 1 2-3. 
79 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
29; C Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’: Invalidity, conceptual reasoning and the rule of 
law’ in C Forsyth & I Hare (eds) Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC 
(1998) 141 141. 
80 Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’” Essays on Public Law 147, citing Hans Kelsen Reine 
Rechtslehre 2ed (1960). 
81 Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’” Essays on Public Law 147. 
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the administrative action of an organ of state that decides to award a public tender.  
Assume that the organ of state awards the tender for nefarious purposes and flagrantly 
contravenes the Constitution and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 
5 of 2000 in the process.  The decision is clearly invalid and does not exist in law.  But 
its factual existence is undeniable: it will be evidenced by the correspondence between 
the organ of state and its preferred bidder, the contract they concluded, and so forth. 
The distinction is philosophically interesting, but what is the point?  According to the 
theory of the second actor, the point is that there are some cases where the legal force 
of an act depends only on the factual existence – and not the legal existence – of a 
preceding administrative act.82  In such cases an invalid administrative act can 
produce legal consequences: the consequences flow from the act’s mere factual 
existence.83 
The crucial issue, then, is not whether the initial administrative act is valid, voidable, 
void or something else entirely.84  Rather, it is whether the second act depends on the 
first act’s factual or legal existence.85  As such, the theory of the second actor prompts 
a subtle but ingenious shift in focus – from the status of the first act to the powers of 
the second actor.  Forsyth puts it as follows: 
 
“[U]nlawful administrative acts are void in law.  But they clearly exist in fact and they 
often appear to be valid; and those unaware of their invalidity may take decisions 
and act on the assumption that these acts are valid.  When this happens the validity 
of these later acts depends upon the legal powers of the second actor.  The crucial 
issue to be determined is whether the second actor has legal power to act validly 
notwithstanding the invalidity of the first act.”86 
 
In prompting this shift in focus, the theory of the second actor does not unknot the 
void/voidable conundrum.87  That is to say, it does not give the final word on whether 
invalid administrative acts are strictly void or strictly voidable.  But by focussing on the 
																																																						
82 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
29. 
83 Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’” Essays on Public Law 146-148. 
84 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 
27-30. 
85 Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’” Essays on Public Law 148. 
86 Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 210. 
87 210. 
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powers of the second actor, the theory avoids being entangled in the void/voidable 
conundrum altogether.88 
The theory of the second actor was designed to explain how an invalid 
administrative act can produce legally effective consequences.89  But, as recognised 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Oudekraal, the theory can explain when a court 
should allow a collateral challenge.90 
This works as follows.  According to the theory, the validity of the second act will 
sometimes depend not only on the factual existence of the first act, but also on its legal 
existence, ie its validity.  In these circumstances, an invalid administrative act cannot 
produce legally effective consequences and may therefore be ignored.  As such, a 
subject needn’t take the initiative to have the act set aside: should the state enforce 
the act against the subject, he will be allowed to raise the invalidity of the administrative 
action as a defence in the enforcement proceedings.  He will, in other words, be 
allowed to raise a collateral challenge.91 
When will the validity of the second act depend on the legal existence of the first 
act?  According to the Forsyth, this is ultimately a matter of interpretation of the 
empowering instrument concerned.92  In interpreting the empowering instrument, the 
focus is on the powers of the second actor, the key question being whether those 
powers depend on the first act’s factual or legal existence.93 
In Oudekraal, the Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged that the validity of the 
second act will often depend on the validity of the first act “where the subject is sought 
to be coerced by a public authority into compliance with an unlawful administrative 
act”.94  According to the court, this is because “the legal force of the coercive action 
will most often depend upon the legal validity of the administrative act in question”.95 
																																																						
88 221. 
89 Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’” Essays on Public Law 146-147. 
90 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 
32-34; Forsyth “‘The metaphysics of nullity’” Essays on Public Law 155-156. 
91 155-156. 
92 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
35; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 549. 
93 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
31. 
94 Para 32. 
95 Para 35. 
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The court noted that it would be a violation of the principle of legality to turn down a 
collateral challenge in such cases.  It referred to the English case of Boddington v 
British Transport Police96 (“Boddington”) to illustrate the point.  In this case, Mr 
Boddington had been fined for smoking on a railway carriage, which was an offence 
under a bylaw.  In his criminal trial, he raised a collateral challenge by arguing that the 
bylaw was invalid, which collateral challenge the House of Lords allowed.97  In a 
passage quoted with approval by the court in Oudekraal,98 Lord Irvine explained: 
 
“It would be a fundamental departure from the rule of law if an individual were liable 
for conviction for contravention of some rule which is itself liable to be set aside by 
a court as unlawful.  Suppose an individual is charged before one court with a 
breach of a byelaw and the next day another court quashes that byelaw…Any 
system under which the individual was convicted and made subject to a criminal 
penalty for breach of an unlawful byelaw would be inconsistent with the rule of 
law.”99 
 
In Oudekraal, the Supreme Court of Appeal drew two implications from the fact the 
rule of law obliges a court to allow a litigant to raise a competent collateral challenge. 
The first is that a court may not choose to disallow a competent collateral 
challenge.100  This is an exception to the rule that a court has a discretion on whether 
it will hear an application for judicial review.101  A court may, for instance, dismiss the 
application because it was instituted after an undue delay.102  It may thus, in the words 
																																																						
96 1999 2 AC 143 (HL). 
97 Lord Steyn, with whom Lord Hoffman and Lord Browne-Wilkinson concurred, expressly 
used Forsyth’s theory of the second actor to decide whether Mr Boddington should be allowed 
to raise a collateral challenge. 
98 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
32. 
99 Boddington v British Transport Police 1999 2 AC 143 (HL) 153H-154A. 
100 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
36. 
101 Para 36; Metal and Allied Workers Union of SA v National Panasonic 1991 2 SA 527 (C) 
250F-254D. 
102 For the common-law position on delay, see Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms) Bpk v 
Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978 1 SA 13 (A) at 41E-F.  The delay rule is now codified in the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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of Gregorowski J, refuse to hear an applicant who “now wishes to drag a cow long 
dead out of the ditch”.103 
The second implication flows from the first.  It is that direct review and indirect 
review are not “interchangeable manifestations of a single remedy that arises 
whenever an administrative act is invalid”.104  Rather, they are materially different ways 
of challenging the validity of administrative action. 
 
2 3 3  The Council’s collateral challenge 
 
In Oudekraal the Council sought to collaterally challenge the Administrator’s decision 
to permit the development of the township.  The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected 
this challenge105 and used the theory of the second actor to do so.106 
It reasoned as follows.  Under the Ordinance, the Surveyor-General and the 
Registrar of Deeds could approve a township’s general plan if the Administrator in fact 
approved the township’s development.  They did not have to verify that, as a matter of 
law, the Administrator’s decision was valid.107  The Council was in the same position.  
Its duty to consider Estates’ engineering services plan did not depend on whether the 
Administrator’s decision was valid.  It depended on whether the Administrator in fact 
decided to approve the Oudekraal Township.108  This meant that the Council could not 
simply ignore the Administrator’s decision.109  It also meant that the Council could not 
																																																						
103 Louw v Mining Commission, Johannesburg 1986 3 OR 190 200, cited in L Baxter 
Administrative Law (1984) 715. 
104 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
36. 
105 Para 39. 
106 Para 39; Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 219; Van Der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 6 SA 174 
(C) 183C-F; JC Sonnekus “Procurement contracts and underlying principles of the law – no 
special dispensation for organs of state (part 2 – developing the common law, consequences, 
and remedies) (2014) TSAR 536 537. 
107 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
39; Van Der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 6 SA 174 (C) 183C-F. 
108 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
40. 
109 Paras 26,31,39. 
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collaterally challenge the decision once Estates sought to enforce it.110  Although the 
decision was conspicuously misguided, it existed in fact, and the Council should not 
have pretended that it did not. 
 
2 3 4  Estates’ right to develop Oudekraal Township 
 
The Council’s collateral challenge thus failed.  This did not mean, however, that 
Estates could obtain the relief it sought: a declaratory order that its “development 
rights…[were] of full force and effect”.111 
The court refused to grant this relief for two reasons.  First, the relief was overbroad 
and the court was not prepared to grant such “all-embracing and undifferentiated 
form”.112  Second, if Oudekraal Township were to be developed according to its 
general plan, it would fail to preserve the burial places on site.  This was not something 
the court could condone, as the development would violate the Bill of Rights, among 
other things.113 
This left the dispute between Estates and the Council in a bind.  The Administrator’s 
decision to approve the development of Oudekraal Township was clearly flawed and 
susceptible to review.  But no one had directly asked the court to review the decision 
and set it aside.114  So although the Administrator’s decision was clearly reviewable, it 
remained extant. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal intimated that the solution to the stalemate was to 
have the Administrator’s decision properly set aside in direct judicial-review 
proceedings.115  Together with two other applicants, the City of Cape Town took the 
initiative to do.116 
																																																						
110 Para 39.  The court also pointed out that the Council was not being coerced on the strength 
of the Administrator’s decision.  It was therefore not apparent that the principle of legality 
obliged the court to consider the collateral challenge. 
111 Para 43. 
112 Para 44. 
113 Para 42. 
114 Paras 42-43. 
115 Paras 46-49. 
116 Para 31. 
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Estates opposed the application on the basis that it contravened the delay rule.117  
That was a good point, as the application lagged its target– the Administrator’s initial 
decision – by decades.  But Oudekraal was a “thoroughly exceptional”118 case: both 
the High Court119 and the Supreme Court of Appeal120 condoned the applicants’ 
delay.121  In the event, the application succeeded and the Administrator’s decision was 
reviewed and set aside.122 
 
2 4 Oudekraal’s legacy 
 
2 4 1  A venerated judgment 
 
Oudekraal is a venerated judgment.123  It has been affirmed on numerous occasions 
																																																						
117 Para 31. 
118 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 534; Cape Town City v South African 
National Roads Agency Ltd 2015 6 SA 535 (WCC) para 32. 
119 The City of Cape Town v Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 JDR 0982 (C); Oudekraal 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2010 1 SA 333 (SCA) paras 38-49. 
120 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2010 1 SA 333 (SCA) paras 
80-82. 
121 Paras 38-49, 82. 
122 Para 49. 
123 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 102. 
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by the Supreme Court of Appeal124 and the Constitutional Court.125  Judges have used 
Oudekraal to decide cases in a variety of contexts, including criminal trials,126 
interdicts,127 public-procurement disputes,128 land-use-planning disputes,129 
																																																						
124 See, for instance, V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services 
(Pty) Ltd 2006 1 SA 252 (SCA) para 10; Jacquesson v Minister of Finance 2006 3 SA 334 
(SCA) para 11; Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: 
Limpopo Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 23; Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee 
v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA) para 28; Seale v Van Rooyen NO; 
Provincial Government, North West Province v Van Rooyen NO 2008 4 SA 43 (SCA) para 13; 
City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 (SCA) para 45; 
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2010 1 SA 333 (SCA); City of Tswane 
Metropolitan Municipality v Cable City (Pty) Ltd 2010 3 SA 589 (SCA) para 15; Moseme Road 
Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 4 SA 359 (SCA) para 11; 
Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency v Cash Paymaster Services 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 216 (SCA) para 29; Kouga Municipality v Bellingan 2012 2 SA 95 (SCA) 
paras 12, 14; City of Johannesburg v Ad Outpost (Pty) Ltd 2012 4 SA 325 (SCA) para 19; 
Head, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2012 6 SA 525 
(SCA); MEC for Health, Eastern Cape, and Another v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye 
and Laser Institute 2014 3 SA 219 (SCA) paras 20-21; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 
2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) para 15; South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd v Democratic 
Alliance 2016 2 SA 522 (SCA) para 45. 
125 Gundwana v Steko Development 2011 3 SA 608 (CC) para 58; Camps Bay Ratepayers’ 
and Residents’ Association v Harrison 2011 4 SA 42 (CC) para 62; Bengwenyama Minerals 
(Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) para 85; Head of Department, 
Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) 
para 258 (minority judgment of Zondo J); MEC for Health, Eastern Cape and Another v Kirland 
Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) paras 100-103; South 
African Reserve Bank v Shuttleworth 2015 5 SA 146 (CC) para 32; Merafong City v AngloGold 
Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 36, 39,41, 43-44. 
126 For instance, S v Smit 2007 2 SACR (T) 375E. 
127 For instance, V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) 
Ltd 2006 1 SA 252 (SCA) para 10. 
128 For instance, Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: 
Limpopo Province 2008 2 SA 481 (SCA) para 23; Chairperson, Standing Tender Committee 
v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 2 SA 638 (SCA) para 28. 
129 For instance, City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 
(SCA) para 45; Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison 2011 4 SA 42 
(CC) para 62. 
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environmental-law matters,130 and intellectual-property-law cases.131  The High Court 
has even relied on Oudekraal in an apparently esoteric case concerning “the exchange 
trade of ‘derivatives’ and ‘futures’ securities in the form of corporate shares on the 
ALT-X exchange”.132 
Despite Oudekraal’s illustrious status, its correctness was recently at issue in MEC 
for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute.133  
In this case Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd (“Kirland”) asked the Department of Health 
of the Eastern Cape (“the Department”) for a licence to operate private hospitals in 
that province.134  The Department’s Superintendent-General, Mr Boya, turned down 
Kirland’s request.135  But he became incapacitated and went on sick leave before he 
could communicate his decision to Kirland.136  In his absence, an acting 
Superintendent-General, Dr Diliza, gave Kirland what it sought.137 
However, Dr Diliza had taken this decision under the dictates of an MEC.  The MEC, 
in turn, had been under “political pressure” to ensure that Kirland’s request was 
granted.138  When Mr Boya returned to work, he discovered these “political 
shenanigans”.139  After seven months of “dilly-dallying”,140 he eventually told Kirland 
that the Department had withdrawn Dr Diliza’s decision.141 
Kirland went to court to uphold Dr Diliza’s decision.142  In response, the Department 
argued that there was nothing to uphold: according to it, the decision was so defective 
that it did not exist.143 
																																																						
130 For instance, Khabisi v Aquarella Investment 83 (Pty) Ltd 2008 4 SA 195 (T) para 21. 
131 For instance, Roodezandt Ko-Operatiewe Wynmakery Ltd v Robertson Winery (Pty) Ltd 
2014 BIP 294 (SCA) para 14. 
132 Absa Bank Ltd v Ukwanda Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 550 (GSJ) para 1. 
133 2014 3 SA 481 (CC). 
134 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 69. 
135 Para 7. 
136 Para 69. 
137 Para 69. 
138 Para 10. 
139 Para 79. 
140 Para 71. 
141 Para 16. 
142 Para 66. 
143 Paras 66, 87. 
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The Department argued, in other words, that it was entitled to ignore Dr Diliza’s 
decision.  But this put it at odds with the precedent Oudekraal had set.144  As we have 
seen, in Oudekraal the Supreme Court of Appeal held that apparently invalid 
administrative action produces legal consequences and may not simply be ignored.145  
The only exception to this rule is where administrative action may be challenged 
collaterally.146  Given that the Department was stymied by Oudekraal, it asked the 
Constitutional Court to reconsider the correctness of the decision.147 
The majority of the Constitutional Court endorsed Oudekraal unconditionally.  In a 
judgment authored by Cameron J,148 it held that the “essential basis of Oudekraal”149 
– the idea that invalid administrative action may have legal consequences and may 
therefore not be ignored – articulates aspects of the rule of law.  It articulates the idea 
that courts are the exclusive arbiters of legality, and that organs of state may not 
circumvent legal processes to achieve what they consider to be fair or just 
outcomes.150  Oudekraal thus received a constitutional stamp of approval and the 
Department was held to be bound by its precedent.151 
 
2 4 2  A palimpsest 
 
Although judges frequently cite Oudekraal as an authority, and although they do so in 
a variety of contexts, a careful reading of their judgments reveals that they often 
represent Oudekraal in a light that obscures many of its subtler distinctions.  Like a 
palimpsest, Oudekraal’s original meaning seems to fade with every reiteration.  I will 
																																																						
144 Para 20. 
145 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
26. 
146 Para 32. 
147 Para 87. 
148 Moseneke ACJ, Skweyiya ADCJ, Dambuza AJ, Froneman J, Mhlantla AJ and Nkabinde J 
concurring. 
149 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 101. 
150 Para 103, citing Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v 
Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC); The Master of the High Court (North Gauteng High 
Court, Pretoria) v Motala NO and Others 2012 3 SA 325 (SCA). 
151 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) paras 102-103. 
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now discuss two ways in which this has occurred. 
 
2 4 2 1 The Oudekraal principle 
 
The first way judges truncate Oudekraal relates to the “Oudekraal principle”.  This is 
the principle that administrative action must be treated as valid until a court determines 
otherwise.152 
While the Supreme Court of Appeal clearly asserted this principle in Oudekraal,153 
it also asserted an exception to the principle.154  As we have seen, the exception to 
the principle is that, in those cases where administrative action may be challenged 
collaterally, the subject is entitled to ignore the administrative act.155  The first way in 
which judges truncate Oudekraal, then, is to invoke the Oudekraal principle without 
adding that the principle is subject to the collateral-challenge exception.156 
This arguably occurred in Kirland.  Here the majority of the Constitutional Court held 
that the Oudekraal principle barred the Department from ignoring Dr Diliza’s decision.  
																																																						
152 Comair Ltd v Minister of Public Enterprises 2016 1 SA 1 (GP) para 15; Hanekom v Voight 
2016 1 SA 416 (WCC) para 15; Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre 2016 3 SA 317 (SCA) para 43; Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen 
Iron Ore 2014 2 SA 603 (CC) para 38; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 
(CC) para 43; Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) paras 87-93. 
153 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
26. 
154 J Bleazard & S Budlender “Remedies in Judicial Review Proceedings” in G Quinot (ed) 
Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction (2015) 246-247; A Price & D Freund 
“On the Legal Effects of Unlawful Administrative Action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 189. 
155 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
32.  As I will explain in chapter 4 below, Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 
211 (CC) calls this proposition into question, as the Constitutional Court held that there are 
certain collateral challenges – or “reactive challenges”, as the Court called them – that must 
be instituted without unreasonable delay. 
156 There are also cases where judges clearly recognise that the Oudekraal principle is subject 
to the collateral challenge exception.  See, for instance, City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park 
Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 (SCA) paras 49-50; Van Der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 
6 SA 174 (C) 183C-184D; Nature’s Choice Properties (Alrode) (Pty) Ltd v Ekurhuleni 
Municipality 2010 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 13; Cape Town City v South African National Roads 
Agency Ltd 2015 6 SA 535 (WCC) para 12; Tasima (Pty) Ltd v Department of Transport 2016 
1 ALL SA 465 (SCA) 476C-D; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) 
paras 43-44. 
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But the majority did not consider whether the collateral-challenge exception applied to 
the case at hand, even though the Department apparently tried to frame its case as a 
collateral challenge to Dr Diliza’s decision.157 
In Merafong City, a judgment I analyse in detail below,158 the majority of the 
Constitutional Court affirmed both Oudekraal and Kirland.159  Cameron J, who again 
authored the majority’s judgment,160 held that Kirland had recognised that the 
Oudekraal principle was subject to the collateral-challenge exception.161  Kirland 
“recognised that there may be occasions where an administrative decision or ruling 
should be treated as invalid even though no action has been taken to strike it down”,162 
Cameron J remarked. 
But Cameron J’s remarks in Merafong City beg the question: if the majority in 
Kirland had indeed recognised that the Oudekraal principle is subject to the collateral-
challenge exception, why did it only apply the Oudekraal principle and not consider 
the Department’s putative collateral challenge? 
One hypothesis is that the Department’s status as an organ of state prevented it, in 
principle, from making a collateral challenge.  That is how the Supreme Court of 
Appeal subsequently understood Kirland’s implied message.163 
This seems like a reasonable explanation.  But it is disproven by Merafong City.  
Here Cameron J determined that there is no principled reason why an organ of state 
may not make a collateral challenge,164 and that there is nothing in Kirland that would 
suggest otherwise.165 
																																																						
157 L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” 
(2015) 7 CCR 1 15, n 93. 
158 Chapter 4 below. 
159 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 40-42 
160 Moseneke DCJ, Froneman J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Mhlantla J, and Nkabinde J 
concurring. 
161 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 43-44. 
162 Para 44. 
163 Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association 2015 2 ALL 
SA 657 (SCA) paras 16; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) paras 
15-17; Tasima v Department of Transport 2016 1 ALL SA 465 (SCA) 476I-477C.  But compare 
South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v Msunduzi Municipality 2016 (4) SA 403 (SCA) 
paras 35-40. 
164 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 25. 
165 Para 44. 
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Boonzaier offers a further hypothesis.166  He points out that when government 
seeks to undo its own irregularities, its remedial efforts may be motivated by the same 
vices that engendered the irregularity in the first place.  On his view, the majority in 
Kirland was primarily trying to prevent this from occurring: allowing the Department’s 
collateral challenge would have excused it from explaining its motives, as it would not 
have to disclose a record of its decision, nor would it have to explain why it delayed 
before approaching the court.  In a direct challenge, by contrast, those requirements 
would be mandatory, and the Department would be forced to prove that it was litigating 
in good faith.167 
Boonzaier’s hypothesis is perceptive168 and has been endorsed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal.169   Moreover, it was arguably borne out by Merafong City.  Here the 
majority allowed an organ of state to raise a collateral challenge, but only if the organ 
of state could adequately explain its motives for not initiating direct judicial-review 
proceedings.170  This approach affirmed the proposition that government may only 
take procedural shortcuts where its motives are beyond reproach. 
However, Boonzaier’s hypothesis is called into question by the Constitutional 
Court’s subsequent judgment in Department of Transport v Tasima (Pty) Ltd 
(“Tasima”).171  This case dealt with “[t]he Department of Transport’s highly suspect 
attempt to evade the consequences of its flagrant violation of due process”.172  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal had rejected the Department of Transport’s collateral 
																																																						
166 L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” 
(2015) 7 CCR 1 1-5. 
167 10-11. 
168 This does not mean that Boonzaier’s views are uncontroversial: he defends a position that 
is opposed to that enunciated by the Constitutional Court in, for instance, National Treasury v 
Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 6 SA 223 (CC) paras 45-46.  Here the Constitutional 
Court said that a court “should be slow to allow procedural obstacles to prevent it from looking 
into a challenge to the lawfulness of an exercise of public power” (my emphasis). 
169 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 63 
(SCA) para 39 n 35. 
170 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 54,75-76.  As explained 
at chapter 4, part 4 6 2 below, this holding was doctrinally problematic, as it blurs the distinction 
between direct and indirect review. 
171 2017 2 SA 622 (CC). 
172 L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” 
(2015) 7 CCR 1 15. 
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challenge precisely because the Department’s motives were suspect.173  It pointed 
out, for instance, that the Department only sought to raise a collateral challenge 
because this would give it an escape route from the PAJA’s time bar.  But the 
Constitutional Court permitted the Department to raise the collateral challenge, 
notwithstanding its murky motives.174 
Although the Constitutional Court insisted that the Department explain its delay, the 
delay bar was really no bar at all: the court condoned the delay even though it found 
the Department’s explanation “both porous and lacking the markings of good 
constitutional citizenship”.175 
Tasima thus suggests, contrary to Boonzaier’s hypothesis, that the Constitutional 
Court is not consistently inclined to use procedural requirements to prevent “bad 
actors” from seeking “good reviews”.  It suggests, rather, that the Constitutional Court 
may occasionally relax procedural requirements to hear “good reviews” – even if those 
reviews are sought by “bad actors”.176 
Finally, there is a simple hypothesis to explain what occurred in Kirland: perhaps 
the majority of the Constitutional Court did not consider the Department’s putative 
collateral challenge because that would have been unfair to Kirland. 
The reasoning for this hypothesis is as follows.  When Mr Boya purported to 
withdraw Dr Diliza’s decision, he told Kirland that the decision was “contrary to [the 
Department’s] view that the area is over supplied”.177  Mr Boya said nothing about the 
political machinations behind the scenes,178 and Kirland only found out about them 
when it received the Department’s answering affidavit.179  Kirland therefore had to 
																																																						
173 Tasima (Pty) Ltd v Department of Transport 2016 1 ALL SA 465 (SCA) 
174 Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) para 171. 
175 Para 159. 
176 This sentiment is neatly illustrated by the recent unreported judgment of the High Court in 
Joburg Market SOC Ltd v Aurecon South Africa (Pty) Ltd GJ 30-5-2017 Case no 36801/2015.  
In this case an organ of state brought an application for the judicial review of its own decision 
to award a public tender.  Its application was delayed.  But the High Court condoned the delay 
because the application seemed meritorious.  So, even though an organ of state impugned its 
own prior misdeeds, the strength of its review overshadowed the fact that it presented the 
review to the court in a way that was procedurally defective.  See further G Quinot “Public 
Procurement” (2017) 2 JQR 2.4. 
177 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 16, 74. 
178 Para 76. 
179 Para 76. 
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address the alleged malfeasance in its replying affidavit, which put it at a distinct 
disadvantage in the litigation: it was not in a position to properly defend Dr Diliza’s 
decision;180 it could not use the delay bar to its advantage;181 and the Plascon-Evans 
rule182 operated to its detriment.183  As Kirland was unaware of the actual reason for 
the Department’s about-turn, it would, in the words of the Constitutional Court, “be 
very unfair indeed to hold [its] feet to the fire of a dispute it did not then even realise 
existed”.184 
The final hypothesis is validated by both Merafong City and Tasima.  Unlike the 
Department in Kirland, the organs of state that sought indirect review in those cases 
embodied their challenges in counter-applications.  In both instances, this was a fact 
the Constitutional Court took into account in allowing the collateral challenges to 
proceed.185 
 
2 4 2 2 The theory of the second actor 
 
As we have seen, the theory of the second actor was an integral part of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Oudekraal.  The court used the theory to grapple with 
																																																						
180 Para 78. 
181 Para 83. 
182 The Appellate Division established the Plascon-Evans rule in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v 
Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 623 (A) 634H-635B.  According to the rule, where 
the affidavits in motion proceedings disclose a factual dispute, the court will only grant a final 
order if that would be justified by the facts the parties agree on, together with the facts that 
have only been averred by the respondent.  In other words, the respondent’s version of events 
is decisive (Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director 
of Public Prosecutions 2009 1 SA 1 (CC) para 8).  This rule also operates in favour of the 
respondent in a counter-application (MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 85). 
183 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) paras 77-82.  It should also be noted that our courts do generally not 
allow litigants to make out a new case in their replying papers.  See, for instance, Director of 
Hospital Services v Mistry 1979 1 SA 626 (A) at 635H-636B; Tao Ying Metal Industry (Pty) Ltd 
v Pooe NO and others 2007 3 All SA 329 (SCA) para 98. However, compare Finishing Touch 
163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd 2013 2 SA 204 (SCA) para 26. 
184 Para 80. 
185 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 57, 66; Department of 
Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) para 171. 
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two related topics: the apparent anomaly that an invalid act can produce legally 
effective consequences, and the circumstances in which a court should permit indirect 
review.  It explained: 
 
“[T]he proper enquiry in each case – at least at first – is not whether the initial act 
was valid but rather whether its substantive validity was a necessary precondition 
for the validity of consequent acts.  If the validity of consequent acts is dependent 
on no more than the factual existence of the initial act then the consequent act will 
have legal effect for so long as the initial act is not set aside by a competent 
court.”186 
 
As the theory of the second actor was an integral part of the reasoning in Oudekraal, 
one would expect it to have featured prominently in those cases where Oudekraal has 
been applied.  With single exceptions,187 however, this has not occurred.  Although 
judges frequently rely on Oudekraal, they have generally not performed what the 
Supreme Court of Appeal called “the proper enquiry in each case”.188  In other words, 
judges have generally applied Oudekraal without also applying the theory of the 
second actor. 
Kirland is again a case in point.  Here the Constitutional Court invoked Oudekraal 
to determine whether Dr Diliza’s decision – an apparently invalid act – produced legally 
effective consequences.  But the court did not use “the proper enquiry” to answer this 
question: it did not interpret the empowering instrument189 to see whether the 
substantive validity of Dr Diliza’s decision was a necessary precondition for the validity 
of Kirland’s private-hospital license.  Instead, it considered a range of pragmatic and 
policy-reasons for deciding that Dr Diliza’s decision was legally effective and could not 
simply be ignored.  It took into account, for instance, that “it would spawn confusion 
																																																						
186 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
31 (emphasis added). 
187 For example, Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) paras 87-93 (minority 
judgment of Jafta J); S v Smit 2007 2 SACR 335 (T). 
188 Interestingly, Forsyth questions whether the Supreme Court of Appeal itself performed “the 
proper enquiry” in Oudekraal.  He doubts whether the court engaged in a sufficiently rigorous 
analysis of the Council’s powers under the relevant empowering instruments.  See Forsyth 
(2006) Acta Juridica 224-225. 
189 Namely, the Health Act 63 of 1977 and its associated regulatory framework. 
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and conflict” if administrators ignored their peers’ decisions,190 and that government 
should not be allowed to take the law into its own hands, as this undermines the 
institutional role, and constitutional status, of the judiciary.191 
If judges have not been partial to the theory of the second actor, which methods 
have they used to adjudicate indirect-review cases?  That is the question I consider in 
chapter 3.  
																																																						
190 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 66. 
191 Para 103. 
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CHAPTER 3: DIFFERENT JUDICIAL METHODS 
 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
Judges have invoked Oudekraal in almost every reported judgment that has 
subsequently dealt with indirect review.192  Yet they have generally not used the theory 
of the second actor to adjudicate these cases.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss the judicial methods judges have used instead. 
By way of introduction, I briefly consider a case where the theory of the second 
actor was used to decide whether a litigant could raise a collateral challenge, as this 
provides a point of contrast for the ensuing discussion. 
 
3 2 S v Smit 
 
Mr Nicolaas Michiel Smit, the defendant in S v Smit,193 was charged with committing 
two offences on twelve occasions.  The first offence was the refusal or failure to pay 
tollgate fees, a crime under the South African National Roads Agency Limited and 
National Roads Act 7 of 1998 (“Roads Act”).  The second offence was failing to comply 
with a traffic sign (a red traffic light), a crime under the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 
1996.194  This came about when, in a gesture of vehicular rebellion, he drove through 
a toll plaza on a national road (the N4) without paying and without stopping when 
instructed to do so. 
Mr Smit’s defence was simple: government had not validly declared the N4 a “toll 
road” in terms of the Roads Act, he therefore had no obligation to pay a toll to use the 
road, and he had thus not acted unlawfully when he refused to pay the so-called toll.195 
																																																						
192 The Constitutional Court’s judgment in Head of Department, Department of Education, Free 
State Province v Welkom High School and Others 2014 2 SA 228 (CC), which I discuss below, 
is a notable exception.  Although the case dealt with indirect review the judgment did not cite 
Oudekraal as authority. 
193 2007 2 SACR 335 (T). 
194 S v Smit 2007 2 SACR 335 (T) 341A-C. 
195 342I-J. 
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The state countered by relying on the Oudekraal principle.196  It said, in other words, 
that Mr Smit could not simply take the law into his own hands: if he disputed the validity 
of the toll road, his recourse was to ask a court to set the toll-road declaration aside.  
Mr Smit sought to evade the Oudekraal principle by framing his defence as a collateral 
challenge.197 
In considering whether Mr Smit could raise the collateral challenge, the court 
referred to Oudekraal and the theory of the second actor.198  It held that Mr Smit’s 
prosecution for failing to pay the toll fees depended on the substantive validity, and 
not the mere factual existence, of the toll-road declaration.199  The state, being the 
second actor, could therefore only validly prosecute Mr Smit if the first act, the 
declaration of the toll road, was valid. 
The court held that Mr Smit was thus entitled to have ignored the toll plaza with 
impunity.  He was equally entitled to collaterally challenge the validity of the toll-road 
declaration in his criminal trial.200  This he did successfully, persuading the court that 
the toll-road declaration had indeed been irregular.  The court accordingly exculpated 
him of the offence of failing to pay toll fees.201 
In contrast, the court found Mr Smit guilty of the offence of failing to comply with a 
traffic signal.202  It reasoned that the imposition of the traffic light did not depend for its 
effectiveness on the legal validity of the toll-road declaration. All it depended on was 
the fact that N4 had been declared a toll road.  As the toll road had, in fact, been 
declared, Mr Smit could not simply ignore the traffic signal, and could not later 
collaterally challenge the signal’s validity.203 
 
3 3 The categorical method 
 








202 381B-F, 391B-C. 
203 381B-F. 
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theory of the second actor to adjudicate indirect-review cases,204 but have used two 
other judicial methods instead.205  The first is what I will call “the categorical method”. 
This method is based on the idea that a collateral challenge may only be raised by 
a fixed category of persons, in a fixed category of situations.  An often-repeated idea 
is that “[a] collateral challenge to the validity [an] administrative act will be 
available…only ‘if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right 
proceedings”.206 
Who is the “right person”, what is “the right remedy”, and what are “the right 
proceedings”?  According to the categorical method, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
answered these questions in Oudekraal: 
 
“It is in those cases – where the subject is sought to be coerced by a public authority 
into compliance with an unlawful administrative act – that the subject may be 
entitled to ignore the unlawful act with impunity and justify his conduct by raising 
what has come to be known as a ‘defensive’ or a ‘collateral’ challenge to the validity 
of the administrative act”.207 
 
The archetypal collateral challenge, then, will be made by “a subject” who is subject 
to “coercion by a public authority”, where coercion is premised on “an unlawful 
administrative act”.  The categorical method requires a court to assess whether a 
prospective collateral challenge adheres to this ideal type.  Unlike the theory of the 
second actor, it does not require the court to analyse the powers of the second actor 
under the relevant empowering instrument. 
The cases that have been decided by way of the categorical method fall into two 
																																																						
204 City of Tswane Metropolitan Municipality v Cable City (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 All SA 1 (SCA) could 
also be an outlier, as the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning closely resembles the theory 
of the second actor. 
205 To be clear, I am not implying that these are the only types of judicial methods that have 
been used or will be used in the future.  I am merely proposing a typology of judicial methods 
in an effort to make the law on indirect-review more coherent and systematic. 
206 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
35, quoting Wade Administrative Law 6 ed 331, as cited in Metal and Electrical Workers Union 
of South Africa v National Panasonic Co (Parow Factory) 1991 2 SA 527 (C) 530C-D & 
National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical Industry v 
Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 2 SA 245 (C) 253E-F. 
207 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
35 (emphasis added). 
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groups.  Some turned on whether the challenger was “coerced by a public authority”.  
In others, the central question was whether the challenger was “a subject”.  I will now 
discuss the most influential judgments in each group. 
 
3 3 1 Is the challenger “coerced by a public authority”? 
 
3 3 1 1 V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) 
Ltd 
 
The categorical method was established in V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd208 (“V & A”), the second reported Supreme 
Court of Appeal judgment to cite Oudekraal.209 
V & A was a dispute about a helicopter landing site.210  The appellant was a 
company that let commercial property.  It had let the site to the respondent, Marine 
Services (Pty) Ltd (“Marine Services”), a company that operated helicopters.211  After 
the lease commenced, the South African Civil Aviation Authority issued a grounding 
order against Marine Services.212  The order prohibited it from operating one of its 
helicopters until its airworthiness had been assessed.213 
Marine Services intimated that it would ignore the grounding order and that it would 
continue operating the controversial helicopter at the landing site.214  But this 
amounted to a threatened infringement of the lease, as Marine Services had agreed 
in the lease that it would comply with the rules of the Civil Aviation Authority.215  The 
																																																						
208 2006 1 SA 252 (SCA). 
209 Associated Institutions Pension Fund v Van Zyl 2005 2 SA 302 (SCA) was the first reported 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment to cite Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 
2004 6 SA 222 (SCA).  As the judgment did not pertain to indirect review, I do not consider it 
in this thesis. 
210 V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd 2006 1 SA 
252 (SCA) para 1. 
211 Para 1. 
212 Para 3.  The grounding order was issued in terms of the Civil Aviation Regulations 
promulgated under the Aviation Act 74 of 1962. 
213 Para 3. 
214 Para 4. 
215 Paras 6-9; Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd v V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd 
2006 3 BCLR 351 (CC) para 2. 
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appellant thus asked the High Court for an order interdicting Marine Services from 
using the landing site until the grounding order had been lifted.216  In the interdict 
proceedings, Marine Services sought to raise a collateral challenge to the validity of 
the grounding order.217 
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal cited Oudekraal as authority, it did not use 
the theory of the second actor to adjudicate the collateral-challenge issue, but used 
the categorical method instead.  It did not try to establish what the empowering 
instrument said about the second actor’s powers.  It held, rather, that a collateral 
challenge will only be available “where a public authority seeks to coerce a subject 
into compliance with an unlawful act”.218 
According to the court, Marine Services did not fit this mould.219  Its direct adversary 
was a private company, not a public authority.  And this private company was trying to 
coerce Marine Services into complying with a consensual undertaking, not an 
administrative act.220 
V & A was therefore not a case where the litigant seeking to raise a collateral 
challenge was being coerced by a public authority.  It was a case where a landlord 
sought to enforce its lease.221  In the event, the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected 
Marine Service’s attempted collateral challenge.222  It held, in effect, that the challenge 
																																																						
216 V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd 2006 1 SA 
252 (SCA) para 4. 
217 Paras 9-10. 
218 Para 10. 
219 Paras 10-14. 
220 Paras 10-14. 
221 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 2016 
1 SA 473 (GJ) para 90. 
222 Para 15.  The respondent instituted an application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court.  That court’s judgment was reported as Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd v V & A 
Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd 2006 3 BCLR 351 (CC).  Before the Constitutional Court, the 
respondent argued that the Supreme Court of Appeal had unduly limited the circumstances in 
which a collateral challenge should be permitted (para 4).  The Constitutional Court did not 
engage with this argument, and left the question open whether the Supreme Court of Appeal 
had circumscribed collateral challenges too narrowly (para 5).  It held, however, that even on 
a more relaxed approach to allowing collateral challenges, the respondent’s challenge would 
not pass muster (para 7).  The court mentioned two reasons for this conclusion.  First, the 
respondent had been taken to court by its contractual counterparty, and not by the Civil 
Aviation Authority.  Second, there was nothing that prevented the respondent from instituting 
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had not been made “in the right proceedings” as Marine Services was not being 
“coerced” by a “public authority”.223 
 
3 3 1 2 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Exclusive Books 
 
It is instructive to compare V & A with Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport 
Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books224 (“Airport Bookshops”).  In this case the 
Airports Company of South Africa (“ACSA”), a public authority,225 sought to evict 
Exclusive Books, a book merchant, from the shop it hired from ACSA.226 
The dispute arose when ACSA invited companies to submit bids for the tenancy of 
a group of shops, including the shop Exclusive Books occupied.  Exclusive Books 
submitted a bid in the hope of retaining its lease, but its bid was unsuccessful.227  
ACSA informed Exclusive Books that it had to leave the shop when the lease 
terminated.228  But Exclusive Books did not leave.  It instituted an application for the 
judicial review of ACSA’s tender for the tenancy of the shops.229 
The central question in the eviction proceedings was whether ACSA had lawfully 
cancelled the lease.  If it had, Exclusive Books was occupying the shop unlawfully, 
and ACSA was entitled to the eviction order.  But if the lease was extant, Exclusive 
																																																						
an application for the judicial review of the Civil Aviation Authority’s decision to issue the 
grounding order (paras 7-8).  In the event, the Constitutional Court dismissed the respondent’s 
application for leave to appeal (para 9). 
223 In Absa Bank Ltd v Ukwanda Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 550 (GSJ), a case in 
which a bank sued a company to recover the final harm the company had allegedly caused it, 
the company sought to raise a collateral challenge against the validity of an earlier decision 
by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  The High Court held that the case was “in principle 
identical” to V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd 
2006 1 SA 252 (SCA) (para 65).  On the authority of the latter judgment, it held that the 
company could not raise a collateral challenge, as it was not seeking to defend against 
coercion by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, but against the claim by the bank (para 66). 
224 2016 1 SA 473 (GJ). 
225 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 2016 
1 SA 473 (GJ) para 89. 
226 Para 3. 
227 Paras 5-7. 
228 Paras 8, 11. 
229 Para 10. 
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Books was in lawful occupation of the shop and ACSA could not get the order it 
sought.230 
ACSA said that the lease was terminable on a month’s notice and that it had given 
such notice to Exclusive Books.231  However, on Exclusive Books’ prompting, the High 
Court found that the lease contained a tacit term that precluded ACSA from terminating 
the lease “until completion of a lawful tender process”.232  Exclusive Books argued that 
ACSA had breached this term because its tender process had not been lawful.233  The 
effect of Exclusive Books’ argument was to collaterally challenge the validity of the 
tender.234 
The High Court held that Exclusive Books was entitled to raise this collateral 
challenge.235  It thus considered Exclusive Books’ arguments on why ACSA’s public-
procurement process had been valid.236  It found these arguments convincing, and 
held that the tender had been invalid in terms of several of the PAJA’s grounds of 
review.237 
																																																						
230 Paras 15, 86. 
231 Paras 15, 25; Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Exclusive Books 2017 3 SA 128 (SCA) para 16. 
232 Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 2016 
1 SA 473 (GJ) para 80. 
233 Para 78. 
234 Para 87. 
235 Paras 87-101. 
236 Paras 102-136. 
237 Para 136.  ACSA appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the High Court’s order 
(Airports Company South Africa Ltd v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 2017 
3 SA 128 (SCA)).  A majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s order.  
It apparently confirmed the High Court’s finding on the competency of Exclusive Books’ 
collateral challenge (paras 8-13, 22, 26).  But it did not deal with this issue in any detail.  It 
held that ACSA had not put up any evidence that contested Exclusive Books’ interpretation of 
the lease (para 23) or its averment that the public-procurement process had been invalid 
(paras 12, 26). 
Willis JA wrote a dissenting judgment.  He determined that, on the plain meaning of the 
lease, the validity of the public-procurement process had no bearing on when the lease could 
be terminated (paras 34, 36, 39).  As such, he considered Exclusive Books’ collateral 
challenge to be irrelevant to the eviction proceedings (paras 40, 41, 57).  He intimated, obiter, 
that Exclusive Books sought to use the collateral challenge, not as an instrument to expose 
malfeasance, but rather as a weapon in “commercial ‘blood sports’” (para 60).  He also 
remarked, again obiter, that the High Court should not have considered the collateral 
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The High Court did not use the theory of the second actor to adjudicate the 
competency of Exclusive Books’ collateral challenge.  Instead, in a clear illustration of 
the reasoning underlying the categorical method, it held: 
 
“In the present matter Acsa is a public authority…The tender process amounts to 
administrative action.  Acsa seeks coercive action against Exclusive Books in the 
form of ejectment from the premises it occupies…[I]ts entitlement to act coercively 
through a court order is dependent upon the legal validity of its administrative action 
in the conduct of the tender process.  In those instances, on the basis of Oudekraal, 
it is the ‘right remedy…sought by the right person in the right proceedings’.”238 
 
The facts in V & A and Airport Booksellers are similar.  In both cases, a lessee 
resisted enforcement of the lease it had concluded with its lessor.  In both cases the 
lessee attacked the validity of the administrative action on which the enforcement was 
based.  Why, then, did the cases have opposite outcomes? 
The answer, as pointed out by the court in Airport Booksellers, lay in the important 
factual dissimilarities between V & A and Airport Booksellers.239  The antagonist in 
V & A was a private party.  It forced Marine Services to comply with the administrative 
action of a third-party public authority, ie the Civil Aviation Authority.  By contrast, 
ACSA, the antagonist in Airport Booksellers, was itself a public authority.  What’s 
more, it sought to coerce Exclusive Books based on its own underlying administrative 
action, namely its decision to award a tender for the tenancy of the shops.  So, 
although Marine Services and Exclusive Books both resisted enforcement of a lease, 
and although they both did so by attacking the validity of underlying administrative 
action, only Exclusive Books resisted enforcement by a public authority.  From the 
perspective of the categorical method, that made all the difference. 
 
																																																						
challenge.  His reasons were, firstly, that Exclusive Books’ averments on the validity of the 
tender were “altogether too terse to be taken seriously”; and secondly, that ACSA’s answering 
affidavit in the review application was not before the court. 
238 Paras 89. 
239 Paras 90-93. 
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3 3 1 3 Club Mykonos Langebaan Ltd v Langebaan Country Estate Joint Venture 
 
Club Mykonos Langebaan Ltd v Langebaan Country Estate Joint Venture240 (“Club 
Mykonos”) was another case in which indirect review was at issue in a private-party 
dispute.  In this case, two property developers were at loggerheads.241 
A municipal council, acting in terms of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 
(“the LUPO”), gave the respondent permission to rezone and subdivide a tract of 
land.242  The permission was subject to conditions the council had imposed to 
accommodate the appellant’s objections to the development.243 
The dispute between the property developers turned on whether the respondent 
had complied with these conditions.244  Besides arguing that it had indeed complied,245 
the respondent mounted a collateral challenge to their validity.246  In assessing the 
competence of the collateral challenge, the High Court did not undertake a second-
actor analysis of the LUPO, but instead considered whether the case before it 
corresponded to the categorical-challenge archetype.247 
It held that, as was the case in V & A, the respondent was not being coerced by the 
public authority that engendered the contentious administrative action, ie the local 
municipal council.248  Rather, its opponent was a private party which, acting in its 
commercial self-interest, asked the court to ensure that the respondent complied with 
the impugned administrative act.249  This meant that “issues which may be relevant to 
the validity of the conditions” were not properly before the court.250  Accordingly, the 
																																																						
240 2009 3 SA 546 (C) 
241 Club Mykonos Langebaan Ltd v Langebaan Country Estate Joint Venture 2009 3 SA 546 
(C) paras 1-2. 
242 Para 6. 
243 Para 6.  Essentially, the conditions determined that the respondent had to execute the 
development in a way that respected the road network that was planned for the area (paras 
8-9). 
244 Para 6. 
245 Para 28. 
246 Para 29. 
247 Para 40. 
248 Para 40. 
249 Para 40. 
250 Para 40. 
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court held the respondent’s collateral challenge to be misguided.251 
 
3 3 1 4 Kouga Municipality v Bellingan 
 
In V & A and Club Mykonos, the parties seeking to raise a collateral challenge failed, 
not because the second-actor analysis went against them, but because they made 
their challenges in what the courts considered to be the wrong type of case.  In Kouga 
Municipality v Bellingan252 (“Kouga”), the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the 
applicants did have the right type of case for a collateral challenge.  The complication, 
however, was that they used the wrong procedure to present their case.253 
The applicants in Kouga were liquor traders.254  They asked the High Court to 
review the Kouga Municipality’s decision to pass a bylaw which made it a criminal 
offence to trade in liquor outside certain hours.255  The liquor traders’ interest in the 
validity of the bylaw was obvious – they had been charged with committing the offence 
it prohibited.256 
Although there was little doubt that the bylaw was indeed invalid,257 the liquor 
traders faced a serious problem: having waited some three years to institute their 
judicial-review application, it seemed that they had broken the rule against delay.258  
But the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the liquor traders had, in substance, made 
a collateral challenge to the validity of the bylaw,259 even though they had clothed this 
collateral challenge in the form of a judicial-review application.  Because the liquor 
traders had, in substance, made a collateral challenge and not a direct challenge, the 
delay rule had no bearing on their case.260 
As was the case in Airport Booksellers, the court did not use second-actor 
reasoning to decide that a collateral challenge was appropriate in the case before it.  
																																																						
251 Para 40. 
252 2012 2 SA 95 (SCA). 
253 Kouga Municipality v Bellingan 2012 2 SA 95 (SCA) para 15. 
254 Para 1. 
255 Para 2. 
256 Para 13. 
257 Paras 9-11. 
258 Para 13. 
259 Para 12. 
260 Para 16. 
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Instead, it focussed on the fact that the liquor traders had essentially sought “the right 
remedy”: because they sought to resist criminal prosecution for contravening an 
invalid bylaw, they were, in effect, defending themselves against a public authority that 
sought to coerce them into compliance with an unlawful administrative act.261  As such, 
the court held that the liquor traders’ case neatly resembled the collateral-challenge 
archetype, even though this had been obscured by their misguided judicial-review 
application.262 
 
3 3 1 5 Head, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High 
School 
 
Head, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School263 
																																																						
261 Para 14. 
262 Kouga Municipality v Bellingan 2012 2 SA 95 (SCA) can be usefully compared with 
Gongqose v S; Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries 2016 2 ALL SA 130 
(ECM).  In this case the appellants had been charged with contravening provisions of the 
Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 (“the MLRA”).  They were accused, among other 
things, of having attempted to fish in a Marine Protected Area (“MPA”).  They were found guilty 
in the court below. 
The appellants launched a multi-pronged attack on their criminal conviction.  One of these 
prongs was an application for the judicial review of two ministerial decisions: first, the decision 
to declare the relevant area a MPA in which there could be no fishing; second, the decision 
not to exempt the appellants – and the communities they belonged to – from the provisions of 
the MLRA that prohibited fishing in the MPA (para 52).  The respondents countered by arguing 
that the judicial-review application contravened the delay rule, as the appellants had made the 
application more than 180 days after the impugned decisions were made (para 56). 
The appellants argued that their application was a collateral challenge and was therefore 
not barred by the delay rule (para 59).  They relied on Kouga Municipality v Bellingan 2012 2 
SA 95 (SCA) as authority for this argument (para 62).  But the High Court held that the cases 
were “distinguishable in a vast manner” (para 63): in Kouga Municipality the collateral 
challenge had been instituted during a postponement of the criminal trial; in the instant case 
the appellants made their judicial-review application after their criminal trial had concluded.  
The High Court thus rejected the appellants argument that their judicial-review application was 
a collateral challenge (para 64).  The appeal was ultimately dismissed (para 79). 
263 2012 6 SA 525 (SCA); Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province 
v Welkom High School and Others 2014 2 SA 228 (CC).  It should be noted that Welkom is 
important for several areas of the law.  It is, for example, an important judgment for the law on 
socio-economic rights.  In this regard, see S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful 
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(“Welkom”) was the mirror image of Kouga.  While the applicants in Kouga raised a 
collateral challenge in substance and a direct challenge in form, the appellant in 
Welkom did the opposite: he framed his case as a collateral challenge while his 
challenge was, in substance, direct.264 
The appellant in Welkom, to whom I will refer as the “HOD”, was the head of a 
provincial department of education.265  He instructed two public schools to rescind 
decisions they had taken under their respective policies on pregnant learners.266  He 
did this because he believed that that the policies were unconstitutional,267 given that 
they forced pregnant learners to temporarily leave school.268 
The schools refused to rescind their decisions and turned to the High Court for 
relief,269 which relief the court granted.  Among other things, it interdicted the HOD 
from interfering with the schools’ implementation of their policies.270 
The HOD appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.  Here he argued that he was 
entitled to attack the validity of the schools’ policies collaterally in the case the schools 
had made against him.271  The Supreme Court of Appeal disagreed.272  It reasoned 
that the HOD was not subject to any coercion;273 and further, that while the HOD said 
that he was challenging the policies indirectly, in substance his challenge was direct.274 
In dismissing the HOD’s putative collateral challenge, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
displayed the hallmark of the categorical method: it rejected the challenge, not 
because second-actor logic yielded this outcome, but because the HOD was not the 
“right person in the right proceedings”.  The court contrasted the HOD’s position with 
																																																						
Engagement in Education Rights Disputes” (2016) 19 PER 2 20-29.  Given the focus of this 
thesis, I will, however, focus exclusively on Welkom’s impact on the law on indirect review. 
264 Head, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2012 6 SA 
525 (SCA) para 15. 
265 Para 1. 
266 Paras 4-5. 
267 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 
and Others 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 1. 
268 Para 6. 
269 Para 6. 
270 Para 6. 
271 Para 12. 
272 Para 14. 
273 Para 14. 
274 Para 16. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		46	
that of the pregnant learners affected by the policies: unlike the HOD, these learners 
were being coerced under the policies, since the policies temporarily barred the 
learners from school.275  Had the schools sought to interdict the learners from returning 
to school, they would have been entitled to challenge the policies collaterally in those 
proceedings.276 
Welkom went on further appeal to the Constitutional Court.277  The majority of the 
court, in a judgment written by Khampepe J,278 agreed with the Supreme Court of 
Appeal that the HOD could not simply instruct the schools to treat their policies as if 
they did not exist.279  As Khampepe J explained, if the HOD considered the policies to 
be invalid, he still had to respect their legal force and challenge them in the legally 
prescribed way.280 
Khampepe J reached this conclusion without citing Oudekraal and without using 
the normal indirect-review nomenclature.  She did not, for instance, use the term 
“collateral challenge” in her judgment.281  But she still engaged with the same legal 
question that was before the Supreme Court of Appeal.282  This was whether the HOD 
could collaterally challenge the schools’ policies, or whether he should have taken the 
initiative to have them set aside.283  
Interestingly, Khampepe J dealt with this question by using a method more akin to 
																																																						
275 Para 14. 
276 Para 14. 
277 Para 1. 
278 Moseneke DCJ and van der Westhuizen J concurred with Khampepe J’s judgment.  
Froneman J and Skweyiya J jointly authored a separate concurring judgment. 
279 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 
and Others 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 76, 79, 86, 88, 90, 105. 
280 Paras 1, 72, 76, 79, 86, 88, 90, 105. 
281 This contrasts with the minority judgment of Zondo J, who used indirect-review 
nomenclature, and cited Oudekraal, to adjudicate the HOD’s case.  See Head of Department, 
Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) 
para 255. 
282 This is arguably illustrated by Khampepe J’s subsequent judgment in Department of 
Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) para 147, n 90.  Here she held that Head of 
Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 
228 (CC) was part of “a long string of [the Constitutional Court’s] judgments” to deal with the 
interaction between the Oudekraal principle and the collateral-challenge exception. 
283 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 
2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 1, 28. 
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the theory of the second actor than to the categorical method.  Consistent with second-
actor methodology, Khampepe J sought the answer to the legal question in the 
relevant empowering instruments,284 which in Welkom included the Constitution and 
the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996.285  As such, the key question in her 
judgment was whether these instruments empowered the HOD to treat the schools’ 
policies as if they were legally inconsequential.286 
Based on an astute, wide-ranging analysis of these empowering instruments,287 
and based further on the Constitutional Court’s earlier judgment in Head of 
Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo,288 
Khampepe J concluded that the HOD’s executive authority over the schools “[did] not 
entitle him to superimpose his own policies and countermand those of the school by 
fiat, simply because he [was] of the opinion that the latter [were] unconstitutional”.289 
So, unlike the Supreme Court of Appeal in Welkom, Khampepe J did not use the 
categorical method to decide whether the HOD should be allowed to raise a collateral 
challenge to the validity of the schools’ policies.  That is, she did not reject the HOD’s 
attempted collateral challenge simply because the HOD was not subjected to coercion 
by a public authority.  Instead, by using a judicial method that was similar – if not 
identical – to the theory of the second actor, she resolved the legal question by 
determining what the empowering instrument said about the HOD’s powers vis-à-vis 
the policies. 
Zondo J, writing for a dissenting minority of the Constitutional Court,290 disagreed 
																																																						
284 See, for instance, paras 3, 28, 72. 
285 Para 7. 
286 See, for instance, paras 1, 28, 72, 90, 94, 105. 
287 Paras 34-71, 77-88, 98. 
288 2010 2 SA 415 (CC).  This was also a case involving the head of a provincial department 
of education.  This HOD had formed the view that a high school’s governing body had 
irregularly adopted a language policy.  He therefore purported to rescind the governing body’s 
power to adopt language policies, and further purported to confer this power on a committee 
of his choosing.  The Constitutional Court held that, although the HOD could exercise 
supervisory powers over the school’s language policy, these supervisory powers were 
delineated by the Schools Act, and the HOD had failed to stay within the Act’s boundaries 
when he appointed the committee.  See Head of Department, Department of Education, Free 
State Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 73-75. 
289 Para 79. 
290 Mogoeng CJ, Jafta J, and Nkabinde J concurring. 
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with the reasoning of both Khampepe J and the Supreme Court of Appeal.  Unlike 
Khampepe J, Zondo J held that the HOD was both entitled and obliged – by the 
Constitution, the Schools Act, and the Employment of Educators Act 76 of 1998 – to 
direct the schools to undo the decisions they had taken under their policies.291 
According to Zondo J, the HOD could also raise a collateral challenge because – 
contrary to the view of the Supreme Court of Appeal – he was being coerced to 
acquiesce with the schools’ policies.292  Although it is not entirely clear on what 
grounds Zondo J made this finding,293 he clearly considered the presence of coercion 
to be determinative of the collateral-challenge issue.  Zondo J’s judgment therefore 
implies that collateral challenges avail a certain category of litigants, namely those that 
are being coerced into compliance with an unlawful administrative act. 
 
3 3 1 6 Maxime Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson: National Gambling Board NO and 
Others 
 
In his minority judgment in Welkom, Zondo J held coercion to be the touchstone of a 
collateral challenge.  In Maxime Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson: National Gambling 
Board NO and Others (“Maxime Hotel”),294 the High Court applied the same criterion. 
The underlying dispute in Maxime Hotel centred on gambling instruments called 
“limited pay-out machines”.295  Maxime Hotel (Pty) Ltd held a licence to operate five of 
these machines, but it wanted to operate more.  It therefore asked the Gauteng 
Gambling Board (“the GGB”) for an additional licence that would allow it to operate 
forty gambling machines.296   
The GGB decided to give Maxime Hotel the licence.  But its decision was subject 
to the concurrence of the National Gambling Board (“the NGB”).297  Months passed 
																																																						
291 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 
2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 192, 199, 201, 202-207, 211, 237, 249, 251. 
292 Para 258. 
293 Zondo J apparently reasoned that, since the schools’ principals were the HOD’s 
employees, they were being coerced into complying with the invalid policies; and the HOD – 
in his capacity as the principals’ employer – experienced this coercion vicariously (para 258). 
294 Maxime Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson: National Gambling Board 2014 JDR 0657 (GNP). 
295 Para 24. 
296 Paras 3-4. 
297 Para 5. 
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without the NGB indicating whether it concurred or not.  Maxime Hotel then instituted 
an application in which it impugned the NGB’s authority to decide whether limited-pay-
out-machine licences should be granted.298 
The GGB and the NGB opposed the application.  In addition to opposing the 
application on the merits, they raised several preliminary points.  One was that, if 
Maxime Hotel sought to challenge the NGB’s failure to take a decision, it should have 
done this by instituting a judicial-review application under the PAJA.299  Relying on 
Kouga as authority,300 Maxime Hotel countered by arguing that it had not been obliged 
to institute judicial-review proceedings, as it was entitled to challenge the NGB’s 
authority collaterally.301 
The High Court disagreed. It held that a collateral challenge can only be raised by 
someone at risk of being coerced by the state, which Maxime Hotel was not: it was 
simply waiting to see whether its application for an additional license would 
succeed.302  In deciding that Maxime Hotel could not raise a collateral challenge, the 
High Court did thus not engage in a second-actor analysis of the empowering 
instrument.  Instead, it considered “[t]he proximity of the risk of facing coercive action 
by a public authority” to be the key criterion,303 which criterion Maxime Hotel failed to 
meet. 
 
3 3 2 Is the challenger a subject? 
 
Besides the fact that they were all decided by way of the categorical method, the 
common feature of the preceding six cases is that they turned on whether the 
																																																						
298 Paras 1, 8, 12-15. 
299 Para 16. 
300 Para 26. 
301 Para 24. 
302 Para 29. 
303 Para 31.  The High Court also used a coercion-based approach to disallow a collateral 
challenge in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2009 5 SA 
661 (SE) 673C-E and Gillyfrost 54 v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality 2015 4 All 
SA 58 (ECP) paras 54-57.  Heher JA also seems to have favoured the approach in his minority 
judgment in City of Cape Town v Helderberg Park Development (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 12 (SCA) 
para 50. 
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challenger was “coerced by a public authority”.  In these cases the courts focussed on 
the status of the entity seeking to enforce the contentious administrative action. 
Courts have also used the categorical method in cases that turned on whether the 
challenger was a “subject”, as this term was used in Oudekraal.  Here, courts focussed 
on the status of the challenger, not the enforcer. 
Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association304 
(“Kwa Sani”) is a good example of such a case.  Here the Supreme Court of Appeal 
used the categorical method to decide that, because a municipality was not a “subject”, 
it could not collaterally challenge the validity of an agreement it had concluded with a 
voluntary association. 
The parties had agreed that the association would provide the municipality with 
disaster-management and security services, for which the municipality would pay the 
association a fee.305  They further decided that the agreement would endure for a fixed 
term.  Before the term expired, the municipality purported to cancel the agreement, 
which cancellation the association rejected.306  Thereafter, for a two-year period, the 
association continued providing the services to the municipality while the municipality 
stopped paying the association.307 
Acting in terms of the agreement, the association instituted arbitration proceedings 
in which it claimed payment from the municipality.  The municipality took the view that 
the agreement was invalid, and that the arbitration, which flowed from the agreement, 
was stillborn.  It instituted a judicial-review application to have the agreement declared 
invalid and set aside.308 
The municipality’s application contravened the delay rule.  But it argued that it could 
not be time-barred, as it was raising a collateral challenge.  Relying on Kouga, it 
argued that it could collaterally challenge the agreement because the association 
sought to use the agreement to coerce the municipality into payment.309  The Supreme 
Court of Appeal disagreed.  It explained: 
																																																						
304 2015 2 All SA 657 (SCA). 
305 Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association 2015 2 ALL 
SA 657 (SCA) paras 1, 5-6, 8. 
306 Paras 7-8. 
307 Para 8. 
308 Para 11. 
309 Para 13. 
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“In the present matter, it is the municipality which is the public authority, and not the 
association.  The municipality is also not in the position of a subject being coerced 
by a public authority whose underlying administrative action is invalid.  No collateral 
challenge is raised by way of the application.  The application concerned a public 
authority claiming that its own administrative action was invalid.  This submission 
of the municipality thus falls wide of the mark.”310 
 
The court thus rejected the municipality’s collateral challenge on a principled basis, 
not because the second-actor analysis yielded this outcome.  It held that, as a rule, an 
organ of state cannot avail itself of a collateral challenge, particularly not where it 
seeks to impugn its own prior decision.311  It relied on Kirland for this proposition.312 
The Supreme Court of Appeal subsequently reiterated this proposition – that an 
organ of state cannot raise a collateral challenge – on two occasions.313  This may be 
quite surprising if one considers the court’s earlier judgment in Municipal Manager: 
Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading (“Quakeni”).314 
Here a company had also sought to enforce its contract with a municipality.  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal decided that, because the contract flowed from an invalid 
public-procurement process, the municipality was not only entitled – but obliged – to 
challenge the validity of the contract indirectly, which is what the municipality had 
done.315  Although the court did not expressly say that a municipality may raise a 
collateral challenge, that is what it seemed to imply: it held that it would be unduly 
formalistic to force the municipality to challenge its earlier decision in direct-review 
proceedings, as the municipality had “raised the question of the legality of the contract 
fairly and squarely, just as it would have done in a formal review”.316 
																																																						
310 Para 14. 
311 Para 15. 
312 Para 16. 
313 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) paras 15-17; Tasima v 
Department of Transport 2016 1 All SA 465 (SCA) 476I-477C. 
314 2010 1 SA 356 (SCA) 
315 Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading CC 2010 1 SA 356 
(SCA) para 26. 
316 Para 23, relying on Rajah & Rajah (Pty) Ltd v Ventersdorp Municipality 1996 4 SA 402 (A) 
at 407D-E; Transair (Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission 1977 3 SA 784 (A) at 792H-
793G; and Premier, Free State v Firechem Free State (Pty) Ltd 2000 4 SA 413 (SCA) para 
23.  On the ambit of the precedent set by Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v 
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However, although Quakeni supports the idea that an organ of state may challenge 
its own decisions collaterally on occasion, it does not support the idea that an organ 
of state may ignore its own decisions with impunity.  On the contrary, the court held 
that an organ of state is obliged to actively resist the enforcement of its decision, 
should the decision be invalid.317  An important factual difference between Kwa Sani 
and Quakeni relates to way in which the respective municipalities resisted 
enforcement of their decisions.  While the municipality in Kwa Sani took a 
lackadaisical, reactionary approach,318 the municipality in Quakeni had no choice but 
to act swiftly, as it was the respondent in an urgent application.319  This factual 
difference could perhaps explain why the court allowed a collateral challenge in 
Quakeni but not in Kwa Sani. 
In South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v Msunduzi Municipality320 
(“Msunduzi”), a judgment the Supreme Court delivered after Kwa Sani, the court again 
intimated that an organ of state may, in appropriate circumstances, raise a collateral 
challenge. 
The dispute in this case started when a pension fund tried to change its rules.  
Under the amended rules, the Msunduzi Municipality, in its capacity as employer of 
members of the fund, had to pay the fund increased annual contributions.  When it 
refused to do so, the fund instituted an action against it, claiming contributions that 
were allegedly unpaid.321 
The Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 prescribed the process the fund had to follow to 
change its rules.322  Its board of trustees had to adopt a resolution to change the rules, 
																																																						
FV General Trading CC 2010 1 SA 356 (SCA), see State Information Technology Agency 
SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 63 (SCA) paras 27-31. 
317 Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading CC 2010 1 SA 356 
(SCA) para 26; Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association 
2015 2 All SA 657 (SCA) para 16. 
318 Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association 2015 2 All SA 
657 (SCA) paras 8, 10-11. 
319 Municipal Manager: Qaukeni Local Municipality v FV General Trading CC 2010 1 SA 356 
(SCA) paras 1-2, 9. 
320 2016 4 SA 403 (SCA). 
321 South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v Msunduzi Municipality 2016 4 SA 403 
(SCA) paras 1-2. 
322 Paras 4-5. 
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it had to send the resolution to the Registrar of Pension Funds, and the Registrar had 
to approve the resolution.323 
The municipality argued that the fund had not followed this process when it tried to 
change the rules.324  The fund’s answer was that the Registrar had in fact endorsed 
the rule change, and – because of the Oudekraal principle – that the Registrar’s 
decision had to be treated as valid until set aside by a court in judicial-review 
proceedings.325 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the fund was mistaken: because it sought 
to enforce the decision to change its rules, it had to prove to the court that the decision 
was valid.326  According to the court, the fund had failed woefully to do so.327  As the 
fund had failed to prove one of the essentials of its claim, the Supreme Court upheld 
the ruling of the court below – absolution from the instance in favour of the municipality. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Appeal endorsed the High Court’s 
judgment in South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v George Municipality,328 
where Dolama J held that a municipality could collaterally challenge the fund’s 
decision to change its rules.329  However, Lewis JA, who authored the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s judgment, doubted whether the case before her was “one where a 
collateral challenge even arises”.330  In making this remark, Lewis JA presumably 
meant that, because the fund had failed to make even a prima facie case, it was 
unnecessary for the municipality to raise any challenge, collateral or otherwise.  So, 
although the Supreme Court of Appeal clearly intimated in Msunduzi that an organ of 
state could raise a collateral challenge in appropriate circumstance, its remarks in that 
regard were probably obiter dicta. 
As I will discuss in detail later,331 in Merafong City the Constitutional Court 
subsequently made it clear than an organ of state may indeed raise a collateral 
																																																						
323 S 12 of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
324 South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v Msunduzi Municipality 2016 4 SA 403 
(SCA) paras 30. 
325 Paras 28, 35. 
326 Para 37. 
327 Para 37. 
328 WCC 11-9-2015 case no 2064/08. 
329 Para 38. 
330 Para 39. 
331 See chapter 4 below. 
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challenge.332  In Tasima the Constitutional Court decided that an organ of state may 
even collaterally challenge its own prior decision.333  The court suggested, however, 
that an organ of state’s collateral challenge will be of a special kind: it will be subject 
to the rule against delay.334  But, as we will see below, there are reasons for doubting 
whether this development was jurisprudentially successful. 
 
3 4 The flexible method 
 
3 4 1 Introduction 
 
As part 3 3 demonstrates, the defining feature of the categorical method is that it is 
premised on a rule: a collateral challenge will only be allowed where a “subject is 
sought to be coerced by a public authority into compliance with an unlawful 
administrative act”.335 
The categorical method requires a judge in an indirect-review case to decide 
whether this rule applies to the facts of the case at hand.  As we have seen, this has 
resulted in several indirect-review judgments that have explored this rule’s “penumbra 
of uncertainty”,336 to use Hart’s famous phraseology.  Judges have, for instance, 
considered whether an organ of state is a “subject”,337 whether a commercial-property 
company is “a public authority”,338 and whether a school governing body “coerces” a 
minister when it disregards his instructions.339 
This can be contrasted with another way in which judges have adjudicated indirect-
																																																						
332 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC). 
333 Department of Transport v Tasima 2017 2 SA 622 (CC).  Tasima has not, however, settled 
the legal position, as lower courts continue to issue conflicting judgments on whether organs 
of state may collaterally challenge their own prior decisions.  In this regard, see G Quinot 
“Public Procurement” (2017) 2 JQR 2.5. 
334 This proposition was subsequently reiterated in State Information Technology Agency SOC 
Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC). 
335 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
35. 
336 HLA Hart The Concept of Law 3rd ed (2012) 12. 
337 See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 above. 
338 See chapter 3 part 3 3 1 above. 
339 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School 
2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 258. 
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review cases, which I will call “the flexible method” for ease of reference.  This method 
shuns the very idea that there can be a rule that covers all possible indirect-review 
cases.340  Instead, it determines that a collateral challenge should be allowed where, 
in the circumstances of the case before the court, that would be in the interests of 
justice.341  Unlike the categorical method, the flexible method asks judges to exercise 
a broad discretion, to assess a wide array of factors, and to consider the pragmatic 
dimensions of the dispute they are called upon to adjudicate.342 
The flexible method predates Oudekraal.343  In Metal and Allied Workers Union of 
SA v National Panasonic,344 for instance, the erstwhile Cape Provincial Division of the 
High Court held that it was impossible to lay down a “fixed rule” to determine when a 
collateral challenge should be allowed.345  It held that courts should rather assess the 
competence of collateral challenges on a case-by-case basis, and by considering the 
nature of impugned act, the reason it had not been impugned earlier, the relationship 
between the parties implicated in the challenge, and “whatever other factors may be 
relevant”.346 
In the post-Oudekraal era, the flexible method has not been as prominent as the 
categorical method.  But of late it has achieved notional ascendancy, having received 
the endorsement of the Constitutional Court in Merafong City.  Yet, as I will explain 
below, Merafong City itself creates confusion about the flexible method, and it is 
therefore unlikely that the judgment has halted the diffusion of judicial methods in 
indirect-review cases. 
Before considering Merafong City in detail, I first discuss Khabisi v Aquarella 
Investment 83347 (“Khabisi”), a case which clearly demonstrates the operation of the 
flexible method. 
 
3 4 2 Khabisi v Aquarella Investment 83 
																																																						
340 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 25. 
341 Para 56. 
342 Para 56. 
343 Para 55. 
344 1991 2 SA 527 (C) 
345 Metal and Allied Workers Union of SA v National Panasonic 1991 2 SA 527 (C)  
346 530G-H, cited in Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 28. 
347 2008 4 SA 195 (T). 
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Khabisi was a dispute about the construction of a residential complex in an ecologically 
sensitive area in Pretoria.348  The dispute started in 2007, when one Dr Cornelius, the 
head of the Gauteng provincial Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment (“DACE”), ordered the respondents to cease all construction on the site.  
These orders took the form of compliance notices in terms of the National Environment 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”), and directives in terms of the Environmental 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989.349 
The respondents told Dr Cornelius that they would ignore his orders, as they 
considered them to be invalid and void.350  True to their word, they continued the 
construction of the complex.351  When a letter of demand failed to deter the them, Dr 
Cornelius and the MEC for DACE initiated proceedings in the High Court, asking for 
an order that would interdict the respondents from continuing the development.352 
Could the respondents just ignore Dr Cornelius’ orders?  That was the legal 
question before the court.353  The respondents said that they could, and justified their 
insouciance by raising a collateral challenge to the validity of Dr Cornelius’ orders.354 
The High Court roundly dismissed this argument, calling it “seriously 
misconceived”.355  Although the court analysed the empowering instruments,356 it did 
not engage in a second-actor analysis.  In a clear expression of the flexible method, it 
held, instead, that whether a litigant may raise a collateral challenge will depend on 
various factors.357 
																																																						
348 Khabisi v Aquarella 2008 4 SA 195 (T) paras 4, 16. 
349 Para 6. 
350 Para 7. 
351 Para 7. 
352 Paras 3, 7. 
353 Paras 9-10, 20-21. 
354 Paras 12,14,23. 
355 Para 22.  The court ultimately granted the interdict.  See Khabisi v Aquarella 2008 4 SA 
195 (T) para 30. 
356 The court focussed on the provisions of the NEMA, as it considered it unnecessary to 
consider the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989.  See Khabisi v Aquarella 2008 4 SA 
195 (T) paras 12. 
357 Para 24. 
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Using this flexible, multi-factor approach, the court considered, first, that a collateral 
challenge would frustrate NEMA’s aims, as the Act was clearly set against a collateral 
challenge: NEMA said, in peremptory terms, that compliance notices had to be 
obeyed; made non-compliance a criminal offence; provided the respondents with the 
opportunity to lodge an objection against the compliance notices; and further provided 
the respondents with an avenue of appealing against the compliance notices to the 
MEC or the responsible minister.358 
The court considered, second, that the respondents’ reactive attitude was “both 
inimical to and seriously subversive of a sound and efficient system of public 
administration”.359  This was because the respondents’ nonchalance hampered the 
DACE and its functionaries from performing the crucial environmental-conservation 
functions entrusted to them by the Constitution, the NEMA, and its associated 
regulatory framework.360  The court stressed: 
 
“One shudders to imagine the amount of damage to the environment and ecology 
which would result if all people who owned properties were to develop them as they 
wished, against any objections raised by a competent environmental authority.”361 
 
In making these remarks, the court drew from the authority of the Constitutional 
Court judgment in Pretoria City Council v Walker362 (“Walker”), where similar policy-
considerations were articulated.  This is interesting, as Walker is not ordinarily invoked 
in the indirect-review context.363 
In this case the City Council of Pretoria had sued Mr Walker for outstanding 
municipal-service levies.364  Mr Walker admitted that he had received utilities without 
paying for them.  But he argued that he was entitled to withhold payment, because the 
																																																						
358 Paras 18, 24-25. 
359 Para 25. 
360 Para 27. 
361 Para 27. 
362 1998 2 SA 363 (CC). 
363 There are two exceptions: J de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa 
(2005) 393, 395; JA D’Oliveira “Administrative Justice” in WA Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA 3 3 
ed (2015) para 12. 
364 City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) para 1. 
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Council’s practice of levying and enforcing rates on a differential basis365 violated his 
constitutional right to equality.366  In effect, Mr Walker sought the indirect review the 
way the Council exercised its powers.  So, although it is debatable whether Walker 
was concerned with the indirect review of administrative action,367 the case clearly 
concerned the indirect review of the exercise of public power.368 
The Constitutional Court held that the Council had unjustifiably limited Mr Walker’s 
right to equality.369  But that was not the end of the matter.  It next considered whether, 
like the High Court, it should order absolution from the instance,370 the effect of which 
would be to dismiss the Council’s claim against Mr Walker.371 
The court’s answer was an emphatic “no”.372  It sharply criticised the reactionary 
way in which Mr Walker had conducted his litigation, and articulated the policy-
considerations that the High Court reiterated in Khabisi.  It held that Mr Walker’s 
purported collateral challenge amounted to unlawful self-help, that it was antithetical 




365 Residents of previously advantaged communities paid for water and electricity at a higher 
rate than residents of previously repressed communities.  Furthermore, only the residents of 
previously advantaged communities faced the threat of legal action if they failed to pay for the 
services they received from the municipality.  See City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 2 
SA 363 (CC) paras 23. 
366 City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) paras 1,6,27,47. 
367 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
1999 1 SA 374 (CC) paras 43-46; City of Tshwane v Marius Blom & G C Germishuizen 2014 
1 SA 341 (SCA) paras 18-19.  But compare, Gillyfrost 54 (Pty) Ltd v Nelson Mandela Bay 
Metropolitan Municipality 2015 4 All SA 58 (ECP) paras 13-14, 32, 43, 47-48. 
368 City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC) para 89. 
369 Paras 81-82.  The court held that it was unfairly discriminatory, within the meaning of s 8(2) 
of the Interim Constitution, for the Council to enforce payment of service charges from the 
residents of previously advantaged areas, while not enforcing such payment from the 
residents of previously repressed communities. 
370 On absolution from the instance generally, see rules 39(3) & 39(6) of the Uniform Rules of 
Court; Claude Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Daniel 1976 4 SA 403 (A) at 409G-H; Gordon Lloyd 
Page & Associates v Riviera 2001 (1) SA 88 (SCA) para 2. 
371 Paras 93-95. 
372 Paras 93-95. 
373 Para 93. 
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“It is not for the disgruntled individual to decide what the appropriate relief should 
be and to combine with others or take it upon himself or herself to punish the 
government structure by withholding payment which is due.”374 
 
What Mr Walker should have done, the court explained, was to take the initiative of 
approaching a court for appropriate relief, such as a declaration of rights or an 
interdict.375  In the result, Mr Walker’s constitutional attack was not a defence to the 
council’s claim for payment, and the Constitutional Court overruled the High Court’s 
order of absolution from the instance.376 
These considerations were absent from the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning 
in City of Tswane Metropolitan Municipality v Cable City (Pty) Ltd,377 another indirect-
review case that turned on the validity of municipal rates and levies.378  In this case 
the respondent, a company, refused to pay service levies to the plaintiff, a municipality.  
The company refused to pay because, in its view, the levies were based on an invalid 
ministerial notice.  When the municipality sued the company for payment of the levies, 
the company collaterally challenged the ministerial notice.379 
In deciding whether the company could raise this collateral challenge, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal did not engage with the line of reasoning espoused in 
																																																						
374 Para 93. 
375 Para 96. 
376 Para 97.  In Liebenberg v Bergrivier Municipality 2013 5 SA 246 (CC) the Constitutional 
Court heard the case of 85 farmers who refused, for 8 years, to pay municipal rates to the 
Bergrivier Municipality had imposed on them (paras 1-4). 
When the municipality sued the landowners for the outstanding rates, they countered by 
disputing the lawfulness of the municipality’s imposts.  As these actions were instituted in 
magistrates’ courts, and as these courts did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the lawfulness 
of the rates, the municipality abandoned the enforcement proceedings and instead sought 
declaratory orders, from the High Court, that would confirm the lawfulness of the rates (paras 
5-7).  The Constitutional Court had to decide whether to grant this declaratory order.  As such, 
the court pointed out, it did not have to determine “whether the applicants have brought a so-
called collateral challenge and their entitlement to do so” (para 16). 
In dismissing the farmers’ appeal, the court invoked City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 
2 SA 363 (CC) and reiterated that “a culture of non-payment for municipal services” has no 
place in the constitutional dispensation (paras 79-80). 
377 2010 1 ALL SA 1 (SCA). 
378 City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Cable City (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 ALL SA 1 (SCA) 
paras 1,7. 
379 Para 16. 
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Khabisi and Walker.  Unlike the court in Walker, for instance, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal expressed no concern that – should ratepayers be entitled to ignore municipal 
rates and services because they consider them invalid – this may obstruct municipal 
governance, enervate the rule of law, and spawn anarchy.  It held, instead, that 
because the validity of the ministerial notice was a prerequisite for the validity of the 
municipal levy, the court had no choice but to hear the company’s collateral 
challenge.380  In coming to this conclusion, the court appears to have used a modified 
form of the theory of the second actor.381 
Khabisi can also usefully be compared with Nature’s Choice Properties (Alrode) 
(Pty) Ltd v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (“Nature’s Choice”).382  Like Khabisi, 
Nature’s Choice dealt with a collateral challenge to the enforcement of environmental 
law.  Unlike the High Court in Khabisi, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nature’s Choice 
used the categorical method to assess the competence of the collateral challenge. 
Nature’s Choice was a dispute between a municipality and a company operating 
a food-processing factory in the municipality’s jurisdiction.  The municipality had made 
regulations under the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965.  They made it 
mandatory to get the municipality’s permission if one wanted to install a “fuel-burning 
appliance” on any premises in the municipality.  The company breached this regulation 
by installing a coal-fired boiler on its property without the municipality’s consent.383 
The regulations empowered the municipality to force the company to remove the 
boiler.  The municipality did not do this.  Instead, it asked the company to submit a 
proper application for the installation of the boiler.  The company acquiesced, but the 
municipality turned down its application.384  When the company continued to use the 
																																																						
380 Para 16. 
381 In an earlier judgment, Weenen Transitional Local Council v Van Dyk 2002 4 SA 653 (SCA), 
the Supreme Court of Appeal also allowed a ratepayer to challenge the validity of municipal 
rates collaterally. It held that the municipality had failed to comply with the Ordinance that 
empowered it to levy rates, and that the rates were not due and payable when the municipality 
instituted the action.  
382 2010 1 All SA 12 (SCA). 
383 Nature’s Choice Properties (Alrode) (Pty) Ltd v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 
1 All SA 12 (SCA) para 1-3. 
384 Paras 11-12. 
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boiler, the municipality turned to the High Court, which ordered the company to stop 
using the boiler and to have it removed within 30 days.385 
Before the Supreme Court of Appeal, the company collaterally attacked the 
municipality’s decision to turn down its boiler application.  It said that the municipality 
exceeded its authority when it made this decision, and that the decision was therefore 
unlawful.  The Supreme Court of Appeal seems to have considered it self-evident that 
the company was entitled to raise this collateral challenge.  It appears to have 
reasoned that the company sought to defend itself against the administrative coercion 
of a public authority, and was thus seeking the “right remedy” in the “right 
proceedings”.  The court held that, because the “municipality [was] seeking to enforce 
an illegal decision”, the company could ignore the decision and later challenge it 
collaterally.386  So, as was the case in Cable City, the Supreme Court of Appeal did 
not consider the political and practical reasons for disallowing a collateral challenge 
that the courts expressed in Walker and Khabisi respectively. 
 
3 5 Conclusion 
 
If one only considers the indirect-review cases that were decided by way of the 
categorical method, it may seem that the law on indirect review developed relatively 
harmoniously after Oudekraal.  Most of these judgments follow a similar logic and deal 
with cognate themes.  They are all structured around a set of core assumptions, 
adhere to the same central rule, and reach reasonably predictable outcomes. 
But this chapter has shown that the categorical method is but one of the methods 
judges have used to decide indirect review cases and that the law on indirect review 
fractures when the different judicial methods interact. 
This is clearly illustrated by Khabisi and Walker on the one hand, and Cable City, 
on the other.  Though the courts dealt with equivalent issues in these cases, they 
reached opposite outcomes, which outcomes flowed from the different methods the 
courts used to adjudicate the respective cases.  
Because the courts in Khabisi and Walker used the flexible method, they were 
attuned to the broader socio-political, institutional, and pragmatic consequences that 
																																																						
385 Para 2. 
386 Para 13. 
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a collateral challenge may engender.  This led them to reject the putative collateral 
challenges before them, and to do so harshly.  In Cable City the Supreme Court of 
Appeal adjudicated the competence of the collateral challenge on a narrow, legalistic 
basis.  It was only concerned with whether the municipal levy depended on the factual 
or legal existence of the ministerial notice.  Again, this made the outcome of the case 
ostensibly self-evident: because the legal existence of the ministerial notice was a 
prerequisite for the validity of the municipal levy, the court had no choice but to hear 
the company’s collateral challenge. 
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CHAPTER 4: AN EVALUATION OF MERAFONG CITY 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that our courts have used disparate judicial 
methods to adjudicate indirect-review cases and that these methods are mutually 
exclusive in material respects. 
Merafong City, which is arguably the most authoritative current case on indirect 
review, takes the jurisprudential zero-sum game a step further.  Here the High Court, 
Supreme Court of Appeal, and Constitutional Court used different methods to 
adjudicate the same dispute.387  The purpose of this chapter is to assess the way in 
which the Constitutional Court deal with this methodological diffusion.  It will be argued 
that the court failed to harmonise the law on indirect review and that this area of the 
law is accordingly in need of doctrinal reform. 
 
4 2 Background to Merafong City 
 
Merafong City was essentially a dispute about water.  The applicant in the court of first 
instance, AngloGold Ashanti Ltd (“AngloGold”), mined within the Merafong City local 
municipality (“Merafong”)388 and it used water to do so.389  It had its own water-
reticulation system but this system did not satisfy all its needs.  So, since 1958, it 
acquired additional water from Rand Water, an organ of state with water-provision 
duties.390 
In 1997, Parliament promulgated the Water Services Act 108 of 1997.  This Act 
empowered Merafong to administer water services in its area of jurisdiction.391  
Exercising those powers in 2004, Merafong notified all the mining houses in its 
jurisdiction that it would assume the responsibility of providing them with water.  
Merafong also set new tariffs which were much higher than those previously set by 
																																																						
387 On the idea of a jurisprudential zero-sum game, see Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 
(CC) para 42. 
388 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) para 2. 
389 Para 2. 
390 Para 3. 
391 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		64	
Rand Water.392  It added a surcharge to the tariff to “find new sources of income to 
ensure [its] financial stability”.393 
AngloGold felt aggrieved by the new tariff and appealed to the Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (“the Minister”), as the Act entitled it to do.394  The Minister upheld 
the appeal.  She overturned Merafong’s decision to add a surcharge to the price of 
water AngloGold used for industrial purposes.  But she held that Merafong could add 
a surcharge to the price of water AngloGold used for domestic purposes.395 
Merafong was not satisfied with this result.  It obtained legal advice that the 
Minister’s decision was void.396  On the strength of this advice it ignored the decision 
and continued to add a surcharge to the price of water it supplied to AngloGold.397  
AngloGold continued paying the surcharge but did so “under protest”.398 
 
4 3 High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
The parties failed to find an amicable solution to their disagreement.399  AngloGold 
then instituted an application in the High Court, asking for an order compelling 
Merafong to comply with the Minister’s ruling.  Merafong reacted with a counter-
application in which it sought an order invalidating the Minister’s ruling.400 
The High Court granted AngloGold’s application and dismissed Merafong’s counter-
application.401  It found that the Minister’s ruling was valid.402  But it also found that – 
due to the Oudekraal principle – whether the Minister’s ruling was valid or not, it was 
legally effective until set aside by a court.403  Merafong should thus have adhered to 
the Minister’s ruling instead of ignoring it, the court ruled. 
																																																						
392 Paras 6-7. 
393 Para 7. 
394 Para 8. 
395 Para 9. 
396 Para 10. 
397 Para 10. 
398 Para 10. 
399 Para 11. 
400 Para 13. 
401 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd v Merafong City Local Municipality 2014 JDR 0321 (GNP) para 83. 
402 Paras 41-68. 
403 Anglogold Ashanti Ltd v Merafong City Local Municipality 2014 JDR 0321 (GNP) para 70. 
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Merafong sought to evade this ruling by framing its counter-application as a 
collateral challenge to the Minister’s ruling.  But the court swiftly dismissed this 
argument, holding that: 
 
“A collateral challenge is not available to a public authority.  The defence is 
meant to prevent the power of a state to bear on a citizen and as such a public 
authority like a municipality cannot use this defence.”404 
 
The High Court clearly used the categorical method to determine the competence 
of Merafong’s collateral challenge, as did the Supreme Court of Appeal.  It held that it 
was “simply untenable” that one organ of state could use a collateral challenge against 
another organ of state, given that the state could not be a “subject” in way this term 
was understood in Oudekraal.405 
 
4 4 Constitutional Court 
 
Merafong appealed to the Constitutional Court.  It persisted with its argument that its 
challenge to the Minister’s ruling was collateral in nature, and that the Oudekraal 
principle did therefore not apply to its challenge.406 
In a judgment authored by Cameron J,407 the majority of the Constitutional Court 
plainly disapproved of the categorical method used by the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  According to Cameron J, this method “squeeze[d] collateral 
challenge into a rigid format – one that neither doctrine not practical reason appears 
to warrant”.408 
In contrast to the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, the majority of the 
Constitutional Court used the flexible method to decide whether Merafong could raise 
a collateral challenge.  Cameron J held that a collateral challenge “should be available 
																																																						
404 Para 72. 
405 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) para 17. 
406 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 23. 
407 Moseneke DCJ, Froneman J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Mhlantla J, and Nkabinde J 
concurring. 
408 Para 25. 
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where justice requires it to be”, that this will depend on the facts of the case before the 
court, and that the inquiry will depend “on a variety of factors”.409 
Ultimately the majority allowed Merafong to raise a collateral challenge on 
pragmatic grounds.410  It considered that Merafong would probably reinstitute 
proceedings if its collateral challenge failed, thereby prolonging the stalemate and 
increasing the costs of the litigation.  Thus one reason for allowing Merafong’s 
collateral challenge was to avoid delaying an already protracted dispute.411 
The minority of the Constitutional Court agreed with the majority that Merafong 
should be allowed to raise a collateral challenge.412  Jafta J, who authored the minority 
judgment,413 described the Supreme Court of Appeal’s categorical method as a 
“narrow technical approach”,414 and agreed with Cameron J that this approach was 
misguided.  Although it is not entirely clear which judicial method Jafta J preferred, he 
seems to have endorsed the theory of the second actor.415 
A striking feature of Jafta J’s judgment is his rather idiosyncratic reading of 
Oudekraal.  According to Jaftha J, Oudekraal held that administrative action will only 
be enforceable if it is “valid”, and will only be valid if it is lawful.416 Or as Jafta J put it: 
 
“If it is illegal, an administrative act cannot be enforced because it would be 
inconsistent not only with the rule of law but also with section 33 of the Constitution 
which guarantees ‘an administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair’”.417 
 
With respect, this is incorrect.  First, Oudekraal did not determine that administrative 
action will only be enforceable if valid.  It determined the opposite.  The court held that, 
																																																						
409 Para 56. 
410 Para 65. 
411 Para 67. 
412 Paras 97-106. 
413 Bosielo AJ and Zondo J concurring. 
414 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 104. 
415 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 
31-32. 
416 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 95. 
417 Para 95. 
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subject to the collateral-challenge exception, administrative action is enforceable until 
set aside by a court.418 
Second, it is meaningless to label administrative action as “unlawful” or “illegal” 
before a court reviews it.  This is because courts are the sole “arbiters of legality”.419  
Accordingly, only courts have the authority to decide whether such labels are 
warranted.   
Finally, while it is true that the rule of law may be harmed if invalid administrative 
action is enforced, it is equally true that the rule of law may be harmed if extant 
administrative action is ignored because it seems to be invalid.420  Jaftha J’s judgment 
fails to recognise this foundational conundrum at the heart of the rule of law.421  It also 
fails to recognised that Oudekraal was concerned with this conundrum.  And it fails to 
recognise that the court in Oudekraal tried to solve the conundrum by using the theory 
of the second actor.422 
In the premises, while Jaftha J may have purported to use a judicial method based 
on the theory of the second actor, his judgment did not indicate an appreciation for 
that theory’s rationale and aims. 
 
4 5 What Merafong City demonstrates 
 
Merafong City acutely demonstrates that judges use different judicial methods to 
adjudicate indirect-review cases.  The three courts that considered the matter used 
three different methods to adjudicate whether Merafong could raise a collateral 
challenge.  The High Court (per Kubushi J) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (per 
Maya JA) said “no” and used the categorical method to reach that conclusion.  In the 
Constitutional Court, Cameron J said “yes” after using a flexible and open-ended 
method.  Jafta J also said “yes”, but apparently endorsed the theory of the second 
actor. 
																																																						
418 See chapter 2 part 2 3 above. 
419 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 103. 
420 See chapter 1 part 1 2 above. 
421 L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” 
(2015) 7 CCR 1 11. 
422 See chapter 2 part 2 3 above. 
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It is instructive to consider the way Maya JA and Cameron J arrived at “no” and 
“yes” respectively, as this clearly illustrates the differences between the categorical 
method and the flexible method. 
Maya JA packed her reasoning on the collateral-challenge issue into three 
paragraphs.423  In these paragraphs her reasoning was terse,424 deductive, and 
syllogistic.  She did not cite the Constitution or foreign jurisprudence. 
Cameron J, by contrast, devoted many pages to the collateral-challenge issue.425  
His reasoning was wide-ranging: he considered the pre-constitutional law on indirect-
review,426 the impact of the Constitution on this body of law,427 the ambit of key 
indirect-review cases,428 foreign law on indirect review,429 and the practical 
consequences that his ruling may engender.430 
While Maya JA expressed herself dispassionately, Cameron J used more colourful 
language: he held that Maya JA’s judicial method “squeeze[d]”431 collateral challenges 
into only applying to private citizens, that this dealt a “knockout blow”432 to Merafong’s 
case, and that there was no justification for “straight-jacketing”433 collateral challenges 
in this way. 
The premise of Maya JA’s reasoning was a classic expression of the categorical 
method: 
 
“It is established in our law that a collateral challenge to the validity of an 
administrative action is a remedy available to a person threatened by a public 
authority with coercive action precisely because the legal force of the coercive 
																																																						
423 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) paras 16-18. 
424 See, for instance, para 17: “The notion that an organ of State can use this shield against 
another organ of State is simply untenable.  These findings dispense with the need to deal 
with the substantive issues raised in this matter.  The appeal must fail.” 
425 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 23-58.  
426 Paras 26-30. 
427 Paras 31-38. 
428 Paras 39-44. 
429 Para 30 n 38. 
430 Paras 65-68. 
431 Para 25. 
432 Para 25 
433 Para 55. 
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action will most often depend upon the legal validity of the administrative action in 
question.”434 
 
Maya JA seemed to treat this proposition as a definitive statement of the law, 
consisting of discrete elements, each of which had its own settled legal definition.  Only 
one element of the definition was relevant in Merafong, namely that of “a person 
threatened by a public authority”.  Maya JA treated this element as if it denoted a fixed 
category of persons and considered it self-evident that an organ of state fell outside 
the category.435 
Cameron J, by contrast, did not start his reasoning by asking whether Merafong’s 
attempted collateral challenge satisfied a fixed rule.  Instead he asked whether it would 
be just to allow Merafong to raise a collateral challenge in the circumstances of the 
case.436  According to him, the answer to this question depended on a variety of 
factors, “invoked with a ‘pragmatic blend of logic and experience’”.437  Although 
Cameron J recognised that collateral challenges “in the first instance, and perhaps in 
origin, protect private citizens from state power”,438 he did not treat this fact as a 
definitive statement of the law.  Rather, he held that “practical sense and the call for 
justice” demand that collateral challenges be applied in a wider range of 
circumstances.439 
Maya JA and Cameron J’s respective judicial methods correspond to different 
adjudicative tasks.  Using the categorical method, Maya JA’s adjudicative task was to 
determine whether Merafong fell within the category of persons the law allows to use 
collateral challenge.  The task was simple: her point of departure was that a collateral 
challenge can only be used by a private citizen, so the only remaining step was to 
decide whether Merafong was indeed a private citizen, and it was self-evidently not.  
Cameron J’s adjudicative task was more complex.  As he did not use the categorical 
method, he could not rely on ostensibly settled concepts to provide him with an answer 
to the legal question.  Using a flexible, open-ended method, he had to decide – with 
																																																						
434 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) para 17. 
435 Para 17. 
436 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 55. 
437 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 56, citing Bengwenyama 
Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) para 85. 
438 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 55. 
439 Para 55. 
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reference to law, logic, and the facts of the case – what would be just in the case 
before him. 
Does Cameron J’s expression of the flexible method amount to “gold-plait 
doctrine”?440  In other words, has Merafong City put an end to the law on indirect 
review’s methodological ambiguity?  That is the question I consider in the next part of 
this chapter. 
 
4 6  Merafong City’s legacy 
 
4 6 1 Introduction 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgement in Oudekraal was a coherent, thoughtful 
treatment of indirect review.  By basing its decision on Forsyth’s theory of the second 
actor, the court endowed the law on indirect review with a judicial method based on 
rigorous theory.441  Whatever its faults,442 the theory seemed, at least, to provide a 
sound point of departure for the adjudication of subsequent indirect-review cases. 
However, we have now seen that judges in subsequent indirect-review cases rarely 
used the theory of the second actor to guide their decision making.  They mostly relied 
on the categorical method and the flexible method instead.  These judicial methods 
differ materially from the theory of the second actor and from each other, leading to 
methodological discord. 
It is doubtful whether Merafong City halted this entropy.  There are at least two 
aspects of the majority judgment that may provoke further uncertainty about the law 
on indirect review.  The first is the majority’s finding that there are certain collateral 
challenges that must be instituted without undue delay.  The second is the majority’s 
treatment of the flexible judicial method.  I will now discuss each of these aspects in 
turn. 
																																																						
440 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
2016 6 SA 596 (CC) para 135; Jordaan v Tswane Metropolitan Municipality 2017 6 SA 287 
(CC) para 44. 
441 K Saller “When Worlds Collide: Implications of the Constitutional Court’s Decision in Jaftha 
v Schoeman when Viewed Through the Lens of the Second Actor Theory Accepted in 
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town (2005) 122 SALJ 725 725. 
442 See chapter 6 part 6 2 below. 
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4 6 2  Time-bound collateral challenges 
 
Merafong City was not a classic443 indirect-review case where a citizen sought to raise 
a collateral challenge against an organ of state.  It dealt with the peculiar situation of 
an organ of state seeking to raise a collateral challenge. 
Both the minority444 and the majority445 held that Merafong’s status as an organ of 
state did not preclude it from collaterally challenging the Minister’s decision.  This 
finding appears to be justifiable: it is conceivable that one organ of state may try, 
through unjust legal proceedings, to coerce another organ of state into compliance 
with an invalid administrative act.446  It seems reasonable to treat the coerced organ 
of state like a subject in this scenario and to allow it to repel the coercive action through 
a collateral challenge.447 
But there are cogent, widely-recognised reasons why an organ of state should not 
be treated like a private-party litigant, but should be held accountable to more onerous 
procedural standards.448  These reasons all stem from the fact that the state exercises 
public power when it engages in litigation,449 and must therefore litigate within powers 
conferred upon it by law.450 
																																																						
443 On the use of the word “classic” as an adjective in this context, see Merafong City v 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 69-72; Department of Transport v Tasima 
(Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) para 135 n 62. 
444 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 97-106. 
445 Para 55. 
446 Para 55. 
447 Para 55. 
448 M du Plessis, G Penfold & J Brickhill Constitutional Litigation (2013) 3; A Klaasen “The 
Duty of the State To Act Fairly in Litigation” (2017) 3 SALJ 616 616.  See, generally, State 
Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC). 
449 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 
(SCA) paras 14-15; M du Plessis, G Penfold & J Brickhill Constitutional Litigation (2013) 3. 
450 Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 
SA 415 (CC) paras 73, 93; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State 
Province v Welkom High School 2014 2 SA 228 (CC) paras 1, 76, 79, 105; MEC for Health, 
Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) 
paras 65, 103.  For the general principle that the exercise of public power must be authorised 
by law, see Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
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The state must, for instance, respect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.451  When it litigates, it should be particularly sensitive to its opponents’ right of 
access to courts;452 the rights of arrested, detailed and accused persons;453 the right 
to have legal standing;454 and the right of access to information.455 
It must also “assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, 
dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts”.456  It must, for instance, freely 
disclose all material to the court that may have a bearing on the case before it,457 
honour any assurances it gives to the court,458 and – where it anticipates that it will 
break its promises – immediately inform the court that this may happen.459  It may not 
																																																						
451 S 7(2) of the Constitution. 
452 S 34 of the Constitution gives everyone the right “to have any dispute that can be resolved 
by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, 
another independent and impartial tribunal or forum”. 
453 S 35 of the Constitution. 
454 S 38 of the Constitution gives specific persons the right “to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened”.  The section further 
provides that “the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights”.  See 
further Ferreira v Levin NO and Others v Vryenhoek v Powell NO and Others 1996 1 SA 984 
(CC). 
455 S 32(1)(a) of the Constitution gives everyone the right of access to any information held by 
the state.  On the implications of this right for the state’s participation in litigation, see G 
Penfold & J Brickhill Constitutional Litigation (2013) 3-4; Van Niekerk v Pretoria City Council 
1997 3 SA 839 (T) 850. 
456 S 165(4) of the Constitution. 
457 Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2006 5 SA 47 (CC) paras 
84, 107, 109, 110; M du Plessis, G Penfold & J Brickhill Constitutional Litigation (2013) 3-4; 
Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa 2017 3 ALL SA 124 (GP) 
paras 35-36. 
458 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 5 BCLR 543 (CC) paras 10-11, 
42. 
459 Paras 10-14, 61, 72-75. 
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abuse court proceedings by using “procedural tricks”,460 obstructionist stratagems,461 
“non-arguments”,462 and other self-serving ploys.463 
There is tension between the fact that established collateral-challenge doctrine 
allows the state to raise a collateral challenge, while the law obliges the state to be a 
model litigant.464  The doctrine, as canonically expressed in Oudekraal, would permit 
the state to “ignore [an] unlawful act with impunity and justify [its] conduct by raising…a 
‘collateral’ challenge”.465  But the Constitution places “a higher duty on the state to 
respect the law, to fulfil procedural requirements and to tread respectfully when dealing 
with rights”.466 
This tension is evident in Merafong City.  The majority recognised that one organ 
of state may use a collateral challenge to ward off the unjust coercion of another.  Yet 
it also recognised that, precisely because Merafong was an organ of state, it should 
“either have accepted the Minister’s ruling as valid, or gone to court to challenge it 
head-on”.467 
The majority apparently tried to resolve this tension by creating a new type of 
collateral challenge, one that requires “scrutiny in regard to delay”.468  It explained: 
 
																																																						
460 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) paras 83. 
461 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African 
Social Security Agency 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 75. 
462 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 
(SCA) para 14. 
463 State Information Technology Agency v Gijima Holdings 2016 4 All SA 842 (SCA) paras 
30, 32, 35. 
464 Klaasen proposes that the rules of civil procedure and professional ethics be supplemented 
by a “model-litigant obligation”, which obligation the state will bear.  The purpose of this 
obligation is to prevent the state litigant from failing to meet its constitutional obligations (A 
Klaasen “The Duty of the State To Act Fairly in Litigation” (2017) 3 SALJ 616 635-637). 
465 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 69. 
466 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 82. 
467 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 59. 
468 Paras 69-72.  It thus remitted the matter to the High Court, and made Merafong’s collateral 
challenge conditional on whether it could explain to that court why it had delayed in seeking 
legal recourse.  See also Department of Transport v Tasima (Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 622 (CC) 
paras 142-144. 
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“First, we must note that Merafong’s reactive challenge has distinctive attributes.  
These render it different from those a subject raises when the state threatens 
imprisonment or coerces payment.  In those cases, which we may call “classical” 
collateral challenges, delay plays no role.  The subject is entitled, as of right, to 
scrutinise the lawfulness of coercive action because the rule of law requires that 
official power not be exercised against the liberty or property of a subject unless it 
is lawfully sourced.”469 
 
The majority made it clear that this type of collateral challenge – one that requires 
“scrutiny in regard to delay” – was not simply a tailor-made solution for the dispute in 
Merafong.470  Although it did not explain in which circumstances a collateral challenge 
will be subject to the delay rule, it suggested that this will “be developed in the case 
law”.471  This implies that the time-bound collateral challenge is not something peculiar 
to Merafong City, but is now a part of the positive law at the disposal of litigants and 
judges in indirect-review cases.472  Indeed, the Constitutional Court again allowed a 
time-bound collateral challenge in Tasima,473 and it has subsequently been 
appreciated as a distinct legal mechanism by the High Court.474 
On the surface, this may seem like a welcome development, as the time-bound 
collateral challenge apparently dissolves the tension that arises when an organ of state 
seeks to raise a collateral challenge: it both enables an organ of state to use a 
collateral challenge and it obliges an organ of state to act proactively, in accordance 
with its stringent constitutional obligations. 
But the time-bound collateral challenge achieves this result at a cost: it disturbs the 
way collateral challenges have been conceived in our law.  A collateral challenge is 
usually thought to be different from a direct challenge precisely because it is not 
subject to the rule against delay.475  Stated differently, if a collateral challenge were 
																																																						
469 Para 69. 
470 Compare Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 335 (CC) para 51. 
471 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 81. 
472 Freund and Price appear to share this view.  See D Freund & A Price “On the legal effects 
of unlawful administrative action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 191. 
473 Department of Transport v Tasima (Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 622 (CC). 
474 Lornavision (Pty) Ltd v South African Broadcasting Corporation SOC Ltd 2017 JDR 1325 
(GJ). 
475 See, for instance, National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical 
Industry v Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 2 SA 245 (C) 251J-254D; Oudekraal Estates (Pty) 
Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 32, 36; 3M South Africa (Pty) 
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subject to the delay rule, it could not possibly be an exception to the Oudekraal 
principle: if the subject had to challenge the impugned decision within a reasonable 
time, he would obviously not be able to “ignore the unlawful act with impunity and 
justify his conduct by raising…a ‘collateral’ challenge to the validity of the 
administrative act”.476 
The reason our courts have held collateral challenges to be exempt from the delay 
rule is because “they attack the legal basis of the coercion in question whenever it is 
later brought to bear”.477  The rationale, in other words, is that when the state seeks to 
rely on the validity of an administrative act to coerce a subject, the subject may not be 
time-barred from arguing that the administrative act is, in fact, invalid.478  If the subject 
were time-barred in these circumstances, “it would be akin to a defence to a claim 
becoming prescribed before the claim itself, which would be untenable”.479 
So it flows from the very idea of a collateral challenge that it is not bound by the rule 
against delay.  Its immunity from the time bar is one of its defining traits.480  It is 
therefore difficult to see how the time-barred collateral challenge – which is bound by 
the rule against delay – can be a collateral challenge. 
The majority in Merafong City did not attempt to answer these questions but left 
them to “be developed in the case law”.481  While such judicial minimalism may have 
its virtues on occasion,482 its pitfalls are, in my view, illustrated by Merafong City: the 
																																																						
Ltd v CSARS 2010 3 All SA 361 (SCA) paras 31-33; Kouga Municipality v Bellingan 2012 2 
SA 95 (SCA) paras 15-18; C Hoexter Administrative Law (2012) 549. 
476 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
32. 
477 D Freund & A Price “On the legal effects of unlawful administrative action” (2017) 134 SALJ 
184 190. 
478 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 69. 
479 National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical Industry v 
Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 2 SA 245 (C) 253C (references excluded). 
480 Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd 2013 4 
ALL SA 639 (SCA) para 40. 
481 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 59. 
482 See, for example, I Currie “Judicious Avoidance” (1999) 15 SAJHR 138-165.  But compare, 
Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) para 41; 
C Roederer “Judicious Engagement: Theory, Attitude and Community” (1999) 15 SAJHR 486-
512; R Cachalia “Botching Procedure, Avoiding Substance: a Critique of the Majority 
Judgment in My Vote Counts” (2017) 33 SAJHR 138-153. 
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majority introduced a judge-made rule – that some collateral challenges must be made 
without undue delay – without convincingly explaining to whom, and when, this rule 
applies. 
 
4 6 3  The majority’s preferred judicial method 
 
As explained above, in Merafong City the majority of the Constitutional Court favoured 
the flexible judicial method.  It said, for instance, that a collateral challenge should be 
allowed “where justice requires it to be” available; that this “will depend, in each case, 
on the facts”;483 and that “it would be imprudent to pronounce any inflexible rule” on 
the availability of collateral challenge.484  This flexible approach enabled the majority 
to produce a bespoke solution to the dispute in Merafong City.  But the majority did 
not provide coherent guidance on how courts should use the flexible method to decide 
future indirect-review cases. 
As we have seen, the majority held that courts should assess the competence of 
collateral challenges by considering justice and the facts of the cases before them.485  
This is self-evidently not instructive, as courts presumably engage in these activities 
whenever they adjudicate disputes. 
The majority further suggested that the approach in Bengwenyama “offers practical 
guidance” on assessing the competence of a collateral challenge.486  This seems like 
concrete instruction.  But there are two reasons why it is not. 
First, as explained above, Bengwenyama has been criticised for its lack of 
conceptual clarity.  It is therefore not an attractive source of practical guidance.  
Indeed, on the topic with which it was concerned – the apparent anomaly that an 
invalid administrative act can produce legally effective consequences – it did not 
provide much direction: it said that the issue should be resolved by examining “the 
circumstances of each case”, as it would not be “wise to attempt to lay down inflexible 
rules” to resolve the topic.487 
																																																						
483 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 55. 
484 Para 56. 
485 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 55. 
486 Para 56. 
487 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) para 
85. 
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Second, the passage in Bengwenyama from which the majority in Merafong City 
sought to take “practical guidance” was concerned with a materially different issue: 
the remedy that should follow upon a declaration of invalidity.488  In the immediately 
preceding paragraph, the court in Bengwenyama said: 
 
“It would be conductive to clarity, when making the choice of a just and equitable 
remedy in terms of PAJA, to emphasise the fundamental constitutional importance 
of the principle of legality, which requires invalid administrative action to be declared 
unlawful.  This would make it clear that the discretionary choice of a further just and 
equitable remedy follows upon that fundamental finding.  The discretionary choice 
may not precede the finding of invalidity.  The discipline of this approach will enable 
courts to consider whether relief which does not give full effect to the finding of 
invalidity, is justified in the particular circumstances of the case before it.”489 
 
In this paragraph, the Constitutional Court established a two-stage sequence for 
administrative-law adjudication.490  In the first stage, the court considers whether the 
impugned decision is invalid.  If it finds the decision invalid, it must make a declaration 
of invalidity.  A declaration of invalidity triggers the second stage.  Here the court 
considers what would be a just and equitable remedy.  It is only at the latter stage that 
a court has a discretion to decide what would be equitable in the case before it.  After 
Bengwenyama, the Constitutional Court reiterated and entrenched this basic 
adjudicative sequence.491  This was expressly recognised by the majority in Merafong 
City.492 
Given that the passage in Bengwenyama dealt with the remedy that should follow 
a declaration of invalidity, it was clearly concerned with the second, discretionary stage 
of the adjudicative sequence.  But when a court considers whether a litigant may raise 
a collateral challenge, it has not yet reached that juncture.  It is still engaged in a 
																																																						
488 Para 85. 
489 Para 84 (emphasis added). 
490 J Bleazard & S Budlender “Remedies in Judicial Review Proceedings” in G Quinot (ed) 
Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction (2015) 240. 
491 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African 
Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) paras 25-26, 56; AllPay Consolidated Investment 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency 2014 4 SA 
179 (CC) paras 29-32; Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 3 SA 335 
(CC) paras 42-51. 
492 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 35. 
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preliminary question: whether the litigant may contest the validity of administrative 
action in the proceedings before the court.493 
The collateral-challenge enquiry is twice removed from the remedy stage of the 
adjudicative sequence.  It is therefore doubtful whether the approach discussed in the 
relevant passage of Bengwenyama is well-suited to provide guidance on the collateral-
challenge enquiry.  In the premises, Bengwenyama does not instruct a judge how to 
use the flexible method to adjudicate an indirect case. 
This is not problematic per se.  Discretion plays an essential role in any legal 
system494 and many important questions in our law are adjudicated by pure judicial 
discretion.  For example, a superior court decides whether it should regulate its own 
process if that would be “in the interests of justice”;495 the Constitutional Court decides 
whether it should grant an application for leave to appeal by considering “the interests 
of justice”;496 and, most pertinently for present purposes, a court decides whether it 
should condone a contravention of the PAJA’s delay rule by considering whether “the 
interests of justice so require”.497  The advantage of such broad standards is that, 
unlike narrower rules, they enable courts to achieve just outcomes in anomalous 
cases.498 
But the majority in Merafong City made remarks which, on the face of it, displace 
the idea that the flexible method is a broad standard.  These remarks are contained in 
two successive paragraphs, which I quote in full for ease of reference: 
 
“The virtue of “classical” reactive challenges lies precisely in the fact that they 
provide a defence to parties who face the enforcement of the law but who never 
previously confronted it.  And it is for this reason that they may sometimes be 
disallowed.  Where a statue provides for an appeal or other remedy, and the 
																																																						
493 Gillyfrost 54 v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality 2015 4 All SA 58 (ECP) paras 
73-77. 
494 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister 
of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 53; Shuttleworth v South African Reserve Bank 
2013 All SA 625 (GNP) para 79. 
495 S 173 of the Constitution. 
496 S 167(6)(b) of the Constitution. 
497 S 9(2) of the PAJA. 
498 See, for instance, K Sullivan “Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards” (1992) 106 
Harvard Law Review 22 67. 
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disputed decision was specifically directed to the challenging party, our courts have 
forbidden a collateral challenge. 
The point of these cases is that the ruling or decision was not directed to the world 
at large.  It was specific.  It was known to the subject.  They stand in contrast to 
instances where the law is of general application, and is possibly unknown to the 
person against whom it is sought to be enforced.  There, delay cannot be a 
disqualifying consideration.”499 
 
Here the majority seems, finally, to express guidelines for assessing the 
competence of a collateral challenge.  The challenge should be allowed where it would 
provide a defence to someone who faces the enforcement of an administrative act he 
has not yet had the opportunity of challenging.  Correlatively, it should not be allowed 
where the challenger already had an opportunity to impugn the administrative act. 
But it is difficult to determine how these guidelines – if that is indeed what they are – 
integrate with the majority’s stated preference for the flexible judicial method.  As 
discussed above, the majority initially said that “[c]ategorical exclusions” should be 
avoided.500  Yet here it implies that there are two categories of litigants that should be 
excluded from using collateral challenges: first, litigants that failed to use available 
internal remedies; and, second, litigants that challenge administrative action that was 
directed at them specifically.  Moreover, the majority initially said that the competence 
of collateral challenges should be assessed through a flexible, fact-sensitive, and 
pragmatic method.501  Yet here it implies that courts should use the categorical method 
– which is characterised by its lack of flexibility – to adjudicate the competence of 
collateral challenges. 
The problem, then, is that although the majority eventually provided concrete 
guidance on the adjudication of indirect-review cases, this guidance contradicted what 
it had said previously.  In the result, it is not clear exactly what the flexible method is, 
whether courts are obliged to use it to adjudicate indirect-review cases, and – if they 
are obliged to use the method – what this obligation means in practical terms. 
 
4 7 A concluding conundrum 
																																																						
499 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 70-71. 
500 Para 55. 
501 Paras 30, 37, 44,  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		80	
 
4 7 1  Introduction 
 
We have now seen that there are at least three different methods our courts use to 
adjudicate the competence of collateral challenges.  We have also seen that the law 
on indirect review does not indicate, clearly, which method courts should use.  This 
creates two legal problems. 
The first problem is that it is unclear when, and on what grounds, a court will upset 
the notional parity between the principle of legality and the principle of restraint.  As 
explained in chapter 1, it is unavoidable that the principles will occasionally conflict.  
But because the rule of law is a founding value of our constitutional dispensation,502 
the justification for this compromise should be overt and well-founded.  The law on 
indirect review permits the compromise: by allowing a collateral challenge, it allows 
the principle of certainty to be subordinated to the principle of legality.  But it fails to 
explain, in a coherent way, on what grounds this compromise should be permitted. 
The second problem is that the current law on indirect review is incapable of 
indicating, with reasonable certainty, when a litigant may ignore administrative action 
and justify his inaction by raising a collateral challenge.  Because the law on indirect 
review is not reasonably clear and accessible, it fails to achieve one of the core 
purposes of law: to regulate and guide the behaviour of those bound by it.503  The rule 
of law demands that law achieve this purpose: “[l]aw cannot ‘rule’ unless it is 
reasonably predictable”,504 as the Constitutional Court has put it. 
Both problems indicate that, as far as the indirect review of administrative action is 
concerned, courts have not yet fulfilled their obligation to develop coherent principles 
																																																						
502 S 1(c) of the Constitution. 
503 Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
para 14; Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) para 1.  The idea that 
the law should be reasonably clear and certain is manifested by, among other things, the 
doctrine of precedent and the doctrine of vagueness.  On the former, see Gcaba v Minister for 
Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC).  On the latter, see President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 102; Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister 
of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) para 108; South African Liquor Traders’ 
Association and Others v Chairperson, Gauteng Liquor Board, and Others 2009 (1) SA 565 
(CC) paras 25 – 28. 
504 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) para 62. 
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under which cases should be adjudicated.  The Constitutional Court forcefully 
articulated this duty in Misty v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa:505 
 
“Cases fall to be decided on a principled basis.  Each case that is decided adds to 
the body of South African constitutional law and establishes principles relevant to 
the decision of cases which may arise in the future…It is…the duty of the Courts of 
this country to develop a constitutional jurisprudence based on principle and to 
decide cases in the light of principles that have been established”.506 
 
The two problems are problems of a theoretical nature.  They show that the law on 
indirect review does not have a unified theoretical basis.  But they are not merely 
theoretical problems.507  They also have consequences for “warm-bodied human 
beings”.508  To illustrate, I conclude by considering the legal position of a motorist that 
drives through electronic toll plazas (“e-tolls”) on one of the seven main roads in 
Gauteng.509 
First, some background.  After receiving the approval of the Minister of Transport 
(“the Minister”), the South African National Roads Agency Ltd (“SANRAL”) declared 
these toll roads in 2008.510  It made the declarations under the Roads Act.511  They 
provoked “unprecedented public and political debate”.512 
																																																						
505 1998 4 SA 1127 (CC). 
506 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 4 SA 1127 (CC) para 3.  
See also Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 (5) SA 367 (SCA) para 14. 
507 On the distinction between theoretical and practical relevance in law, see for instance, 
Weenen Transitional Local Council v van Dyk 2002 4 SA 653 (SCA) para 13; KwaZulu-Natal 
Joint Liaison Committee v Member of the Executive Council, Department of Education, 
KwaZulu-Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) para 79. 
508 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 
(CC) para 18. 
509 Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd 2013 4 
ALL SA 639 (SCA) para 1. 
510 Para 1. 
511 Para 1.  S 27(1)(a)(i) of the Roads Act empowers SANRAL – with the Minister’s approval 
– to declare any road, or part thereof, to be a toll road. 
512 Para 1. 
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They also provoked litigation.  Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance513 (“OUTA”), a 
voluntary association, instituted a two-part challenge against the e-tolls.514  The first 
part was an application for an order interdicting SANRAL from levying and collecting 
tolls, pending the outcome of the second part.  The latter was an application for the 
judicial review of SANRAL’s decision and the Minister’s decision on which it was 
predicated.515 
OUTA’s application failed.  The interdict was ultimately dismissed by the 
Constitutional Court.516  The judicial review was dismissed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.517 
The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed OUTA’s review-application because it 
contravened the delay rule: OUTA instituted the application well outside PAJA’s 180-
day deadline and failed to show that it would be in the interests of justice to condone 
its delay.518  The court held, however, that a collateral challenge to the validity of the 
toll-road declaration would not be similarly time-barred.519 
This brings us back to indirect review.  Is a motorist obliged pay the e-tolls?  Or may 
he ignore them and justify his impunity by collaterally challenging their validity? The 
answer to this question depends on whether the competence of a collateral challenge 
is determined by the theory of the second actor, the categorical method, or the flexible 
method. 
 
4 7 2 Theory of the second actor 
 
If one applies the theory of the second actor, it seems plain that the motorist may 
ignore the toll and later raise a collateral challenge.  If he is charged under section 
																																																						
513 Now known as “Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse”.  See Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse 
v National Energy Regulator of South Africa 2016 JDR 0682 (GP) para 51. 
514 Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd 2012 JOL 
29370 (GNP). 
515 Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd 2013 4 
ALL SA 639 (SCA) paras 2, 16. 
516 National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 6 SA 224 (CC). 
517 Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd 2013 4 All 
SA 639 (SCA). 
518 Para 41. 
519 Para 40. 
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27(5) of the Roads Act with the offence of failing or refusing to pay toll fees,520 the 
prosecution will depend on the substantive validity, and not the mere factual existence, 
of the toll-road declaration.  That is what the High Court asserted in S v Smit.521  This 
means that, like Mr Smit, the motorist in our hypothetical case will be allowed to raise 
the invalidity of the toll-road declaration as a defence in his criminal trial, should the 
state seek to enforce the toll upon him. 
 
4 7 3  Categorical method 
 
The categorical method yields the same outcome.  The motorist neatly fits the 
collateral-challenge archetype.  He is a “subject”; the prosecution is “a public 
authority”; the criminal charge amounts to “coercion”; and that this coercion is 
ultimately based on the toll-road declaration, which is administrative action. 
There is also substantial common-law authority that an accused may raise the 
invalidity of administrative action as a defence to the charge against him.522  In many 
of these cases, the accused repelled the enforcement of repugnant apartheid by-laws 
and regulations.523  Although these cases were decided in a different context, they 
are, arguably, still authority for the general idea that an accused in a criminal trial is 
																																																						
520 S 27(5) of the Roads Act provides that, should a person be liable to pay a toll, and should 
that person fail to pay the toll when instructed to do so, he will, firstly, be guilty of an offence, 
and, secondly, be liable to pay SANRAL a fine. 
521 S v Smit 2007 (2) SACR 335 (T) 378I-379A. 
522 See, for instance, R v Padsha 1923 AD 281 at 304 (dissenting minority judgment of Innes 
CJ); R v Carelse 1943 CPD 242; R v Abdurahman 1950 3 SA 136 (A); S v Gwala 1966 4 SA 
523 (N); S v De Wet 1978 2 SA 515 (T); S v Botha 1999 2 SACR 261 (C).  Compare S v Brand 
1973 2 SA 469 (RA); S v Adams, S v Werner 1981 1 SA 187 (A).  See further, M Wiechers 
Administratiefreg 2nd ed (1984) 303-304; J Taitz The Inherent Review Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court LLD thesis Cape Town (1983) 319-321; L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 
705-706; G Devenish, K Govender, D Hulme Administrative Law and Justice in South Africa 
(2001) 438-439; JR de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2005) 
389-393; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 525. 
523 On the relationship between administrative law and apartheid, see generally, C Hoexter 
The Transformation of South African Administrative Law Since 1994 with Particular Reference 
to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 LLD thesis University of the 
Witwatersrand (2009) 10-13; K O’Regan “Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic 
Shift in our Administrative Law” (2004) 121 SALJ 424-429. 
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entitled to challenge the administrative action on which the charge against him is 
founded.524 
 
4 7 4 The flexible method 
 
But the flexible method invites the opposite conclusion.  There are several practical 
and institutional reasons why motorists should not be given latitude to challenge the 
e-tolls collaterally. 
The primary reason is that the state may suffer irreparable harm if it cannot recoup 
what it expended on the e-tolls.  SANRAL paid 20 billion rand to have the e-tolls 
installed.  It did not have this money in reserve, but loaned it.525  It planned to repay 
the loan through the toll it would collect from motorists.  But it may find it impossible to 
do so if the motorists are entitled to indirectly challenge the e-tolls.  In that scenario, 
SANRAL will not even be able to repay the interest on the loan, let alone the capital.  
Then the fiscus will then be burdened with yet further obligations, given that the South 
African government guaranteed repayment of SANRAL’s loan.526 
SANRAL needs revenue from the e-tolls not only to repay its 20-billion-rand loan, 
but also simply to do its job.  This includes maintaining the national road network.  
SANRAL needs at least 15 billion rand a year for 10 years to do so.  Without adequate 
revenue from the e-tolls, it will not obtain this funding, maintenance costs will increase, 
the maintenance backlog will grow, and the road network will deteriorate.527 
So it may be economically damaging – not only to SANRAL but to the country 
generally – if motorists may ignore the tolls because they consider them to be invalid.  
Moreover, given the amount of money that is at risk, and given that government shares 
that risk, the economic damage could send adverse consequences rippling throughout 
the public administration.528 
																																																						
524 Y Burns Administrative Law 4th ed (2013) 570. 
525 Technically, SANRAL did not conclude a loan agreement; it sold sovereign bonds to 
investors.  But these bonds were, in the words of the Supreme Court of Appeal, “effectively 
repayable loans, repayment of which was guaranteed by the South African Government 
through Treasury.”  See Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads 
Agency Ltd 2013 4 All SA 639 (SCA) para 13. 
526 Paras 13, 31-33. 
527 Para 32. 
528 Paras 31-33, 44. 
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4 7 5  Summation 
 
This practical example illustrates that our courts could coherently reach different 
conclusions to important indirect-review cases, depending on the judicial method that 
they use.  This creates legal uncertainty for litigants, legal advisors, the judiciary, the 
state and the public generally.  Hence the necessity of imposing a uniform judicial 
method upon the law of indirect review. 
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CHAPTER 5: TRANSFORMATIVE ADJUDICATION 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters I argued that courts have used different methods to 
adjudicate indirect-review cases.  I further argued that this methodological diffusion 
has been harmful to the rule of law and that the law on indirect review is accordingly 
in need of doctrinal reform. 
Such reform requires clarity on the judicial method judges should use to adjudicate 
the competence of collateral challenges.  This calls for the existing judicial methods to 
be evaluated against an ideal type of judicial method.  The purpose of this chapter is 
to propose transformative adjudication as that ideal. 
 
5 2 The idea of transformative adjudication 
 
5 2 1 Introduction 
 
In S v Makwanyane,529 Mahomed J held: 
 
“In some countries the Constitution only formalises, in a legal instrument, a 
historical consensus of values and aspirations evolved incrementally from a stable 
and unbroken past to accommodate the needs of the future.  The South African 
Constitution is different: it retains from the past only what is defensible and 
represents a decisive break from, and a ringing rejection of, that part of the past 
which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and repressive, and a vigorous 
identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and 
aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly articulated in the Constitution.  The 
contrast between the past which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to 
commit the nation is stark and dramatic.”530 
 
Here Mahomed J poignantly expressed the idea that, unlike some constitutions that 
are preservative in nature,531 our Constitution is transformative.  The transformative 
																																																						
529 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
530 Para 262. 
531 F Michaelman “The Rule of Law” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 11-24.  Michaelman mentions the Constitution of the 
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nature of our constitutional dispensation has been recognised by our courts on 
numerous occasions,532 has been a fertile topic for academic discussion,533 and is 
evident from the text of the Constitution itself.534  The preamble to the Constitution, for 
instance, declares that the Constitution is adopted to “heal the divisions of the past 
and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
																																																						
United States of America, particularly as interpreted by Scalia J in Michael H v Gerald D 491 
US 110 141 (1989), as an example of a preservative constitution. 
532 See, for instance, Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) para 157; Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) paras 73-74; 
Minister of Finance v van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 142; Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & Another 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 81; Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 8; Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd; In re: Hyandai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 21; Tshwane City v Afriforum 2016 6 
SA 279 (CC) para 14. 
533 The academic literature on this topic is vast.  Some of the most influential contributions are: 
E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31-
48; K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146-188; 
H Botha “Metaphoric Reasoning and Transformative Constitutionalism (part 1)” (2002) TSAR 
612-627; H Botha “Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2) TSAR 
20-36; D Moseneke “The fourth Bram Fisher memorial lecture: Transformative adjudication” 
(2002) 18 SAJHR 309-319; AJ van der Walt “Transformative constitutionalism and the 
development of the South African property law (part 1)” (2005) TSAR 655-689; AJ van der 
Walt “Transformative constitutionalism and the development of the South African property law 
(part 2)” (2006) TSAR 1-31; M Pieterse “What do we mean when we talk about transformative 
constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SA Public Law 155-166; P Langa “Transformative 
constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351-360; D Davis & K Klare “Transformative 
constitutionalism and the common and customary law” (2010) 26 SAJHR 403-509; D Davis 
“Transformation: the constitutional promise and reality” (2010) 26 SAJHR 85-101. 
534 The Interim Constitution expressed its transformative aim through a vivid metaphor.  The 
first paragraph of its epilogue stated: “This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the 
past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, 
and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, 
class, belief or sex”.  Mureinik was one of the first to engage with the bridge metaphor.  In 
what has become a very influential article, he argued that the Interim Constitution was a bridge 
from a culture of authority to a culture of justification.  See, E Mureinik “A bridge to where? 
Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 32. 
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human rights”,535 while the application section536 obliges every court, when applying a 
provision of the Bill of Rights to a person, to “apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extant that legislation does not give effect to that right”.537 
Klare was one of the first to consider how judges should adjudicate under our 
transformative Constitution.538  He framed this topic as follows: 
 
“The Constitution invites a new imagination and self-reflection about legal method, 
analysis and reasoning consistent with its transformative goals.  By implication, new 
conceptions of judicial role and responsibility are contemplated.  Judicial mindset 
and methodology are part of the law, and therefore they must be examined and 
revised so as to promote equality, a culture of democracy and transparent 
governance…[T]he drafters cannot have intended dramatically to alter substantive 
constitutional foundations and assumptions, yet to have left these new rights and 
duties to be interpreted through the lens of classical legalist methods.”539 
 
Klare made these remarks in a famous article that considered whether 
“transformative constitutionalism” is a viable project for South-African lawyers.540  In 
this article he argued that the viability of this project would depend largely on whether 
South-African lawyers could develop “transformative adjudication”, 541 ie a mode of 
adjudication congruent with the Constitution’s transformative goals.542  Klare’s idea of 
transformative constitutionalism has “inspired a cottage industry in constitutional 
																																																						
535 On the transformative nature of the preamble, see particularly, Tshwane City v Afriforum 
2016 6 SA 279 (CC). 
536 S 8 of the Constitution, headed “Application”. 
537 S 8(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
538 K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146-188.   
539 149 (original emphasis).  See also, A Cockrell “Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 
1 3; H Botha “Freedom and constraint in constitutional adjudication” (2004) 20 SAJHR 249 
249-252. 
540 K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150.  
He described transformative constitutionalism as “a long-term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed…to transforming a country’s political 
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theory”.543  Although his related idea of transformative adjudication has not been met 
with an equally voluminous response, it has also engendered a burgeoning 
literature.544 
 
5 2 2 Formal and substantive reasoning 
 
A central proposition of the abovementioned literature is that there is a distinction 
between formal and substantive reasoning.545  This distinction is sourced from Atiyah 
																																																						
543 AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 
1 CCR 77 91 n 56. 
544 D Moseneke “The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture: Transformative Adjudication” 
(2002) 18 SAJHR 309 309-319; C Hoexter “Contracts in administrative law: life after 
formalism?” (2004) 121 SALJ 595 598-599; JC Froneman "Legal reasoning and legal culture: 
our “vision” of law” (2005) 16 Stell LR 3 3-20; C Hoexter “Judicial policy revisited: 
transformative adjudication in administrative law” (2008) 24 SAJHR 281 281-299; G Quinot 
“Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 111-139; C 
Hoexter “The enforcement of an official promise: form, substance, and the Constitutional 
Court” (2015) 132 SALJ 207-229. 
545 Cockrell was one of the first to make this point in the South-African context.  See, A Cockrell 
“Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 1-38.  Cockrell assessed the performance of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence during 1995, the first year of its existence.  He noted that 
the Constitutional Court appeared to be pre-occupied with “values”, and argued that “the 
explicit intrusion of constitutional values into the new adjudicative process signals a transition 
from a ‘formal vision of law’ to a ‘substantive vision of law’ in South Africa.” (3)  According to 
Cockrell, this transition forced judges accustomed to formal reasoning to engage with 
substantive reasons in the form of moral and political values.  Cockrell’s main point was that 
this transition had been “traumatic” (4), as the Constitutional Court had struggled to engage in 
coherent substantive reasoning. Cockrell’s article appeared before the term “transformative 
adjudication” had been coined, but his article undoubtedly engages with the idea underlying 
the term, and has been influential in the transformative-adjudication literature.  See, for 
instance, JC Froneman "Legal reasoning and legal culture: our “vision” of law” (2005) 16 Stell 
LR 3 4; C Hoexter “Judicial policy revisited: transformative adjudication in administrative law” 
(2008) 24 SAJHR 281 285; G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law 
adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 111.  To be clear, I am not saying that Cockrell and Klare 
made the same argument (cf T Roux “Transformative constitutionalism and the best 
interpretation of the South African Constitution: Distinction without a difference” (2009) 20 Stell 
LR 258 n 4).  I am saying that both authors, in their own way, considered how substantive 
considerations should inform adjudication under the Constitution. 
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and Summers’ comparative study of English and American legal systems.546  In this 
study the authors describe a substantive reason as a “moral, economic, political, 
institutional, or other social consideration”,547 and a formal reason as a “legally 
authoritative reason on which judges and others are empowered or required to base 
a decision or action…which overrides…any countervailing substantive reason”.548 
These definitions can be explained by way of two examples.  A substantive reason 
for the delay rule is that it promotes legal certainty, while a formal reason for the rule 
is that section 7 of the PAJA says that judicial-review proceedings must be instituted 
without unreasonable delay and within 180 days.  A substantive reason for enforcing 
a speeding ticket is that it discourages reckless driving and promotes safe road 
transport, while a formal reason is that the motorist in question failed to adhere to a 
sign that obliged him to drive at a speed of less than 120 kilometres per hour. 
A formal reason removes a decision-maker’s discretion to impose substantive 
considerations on the situation.  For example, the 180-day rule removes the discretion 
to decide that a delay of 181 days is reasonable in the circumstances of the case,549  
while the 120-kilometres-per-hour rule removes the discretion to decide that it was 
safe and orderly to drive 121 kilometres per hour in the circumstances of the case.550   
Formal and substantive reasons are justified by “second-level substantive 
reasons”.551  The justification for substantive reasons is self-evident: they articulate 
moral, political, economic, and institutional convictions.552  The justification for formal 
reasons is less obvious but no less compelling: they make for cost-effective decision-
																																																						
546 PS Atiyah & RS Summers Form and substance in Anglo-American Law: A comparative 
study of legal reasoning, legal theory, and legal institutions (1987) 5-11; cited in, A Cockrell 
“Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 5; JC Froneman "Legal reasoning and legal 
culture: our “vision” of law” (2005) 16 Stell LR 3 4; C Hoexter “Judicial policy revisited: 
transformative adjudication in administrative law” (2008) 24 SAJHR 281 285; G Quinot 
“Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 111. 
547 PS Atiyah & RS Summers Form and substance in Anglo-American Law (1987) 1. 
548 2. 
549 Unless the judge condones the delay in terms of s 9 of the PAJA. 
550 2. 
551 PS Atiyah & RS Summers Form and substance in Anglo-American Law (1987) 1 21. 
552 21. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		91	
making, promote legal certainty, and curb capricious and irrational interpretations of 
the law.553 
Based on the distinction between formal and substantive reasoning, Atiyah and 
Summers propose two “visions” of law: a formal vision and a substantive vision.554  
Under a formal vision, formal reasoning is privileged over substantive reasoning; 
conflicts of laws are resolved by recourse to rules of hierarchical priority; law is seen 
as mainly as a collection of hard and fast rules; and the adjudicative task is to apply 
the rules without much recourse to substantive considerations.555  Under a substantive 
vision, substantive reasoning is privileged over formal reasoning; conflicts of laws are 
resolved mainly with recourse to moral and political reasons; law is seen as mainly 
consisting of flexible standards, the exact content of which is derived from 
interpretation; and the adjudicative task is to “examine and improve upon the 
substantive quality of the law.”556 
Drawing from Atiyah and Summers’ analysis, Cockrell,557 Moseneke DCJ,558 
Froneman J,559 Hoexter,560 and Quinot,561 have argued that the start of the 
constitutional era – and the advent of a transformative Constitution in particular – 
marked a shift from a formal to a substantive vision of the law.  This new vision of our 
																																																						
553 21-28.  See also A Cockrell “Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 5-6; F Schauer 
Playing by the rules: A philosophical examination of rule-based decision-making in law and in 
life (1991) 135-162. 
554 PS Atiyah & RS Summers Form and substance in Anglo-American Law (1987) 411-415.  
They define a “vision of law” as “a set of inarticulate and perhaps even unconscious beliefs 
held by the general public at large and, to some extent, also by politicians, judges, and legal 
practitioners, as to the nature and functions of law – how and by whom it should be made, 
interpreted, applied and enforced.” 
555 413-414. 
556 413-414. 
557 A Cockrell “Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 7-9. 
558 D Moseneke “The fourth Bram Fisher memorial lecture: transformative adjudication” (2002) 
18 SAJHR 309 316. 
559 JC Froneman "Legal reasoning and legal culture: our “vision” of law” (2005) 16 Stell LR 3 
3-5. 
560 C Hoexter “Judicial policy revisited: transformative adjudication in administrative law” 
(2008) 24 SAJHR 281 285-286. 
561 G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 
111-112. 
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law sees adjudication differently: it is no longer mainly concerned with the application 
of formal reasons; it is now mainly concerned with substantive reasoning. 
 
5 3 Transformative adjudication in practice 
 
5 3 1  Introduction 
 
The law’s “vision” is an arresting metaphor.  But for what is it a metaphor, exactly?  
Adjudication is ultimately a practical matter,562 and cannot function on the basis of 
metaphor alone.  Fortunately, there are several principles of substantive reasoning 
that resonate throughout the transformative-adjudication literature and explain what 
substantive reasoning means in practice.  I will now briefly discuss three of these 
principles I consider to be primary. 
 
5 3 2  Variability 
 
The first principle is that of variability.563  Variability essentially entails that the rules of 
administrative justice should not be applied in an all-or-nothing manner, but that their 
manner of application may vary according to the context in which they are applied.564 
The principle of variability has influenced our administrative law in several ways.  
Our courts have long recognised, for instance, that the rules of procedural fairness are 
																																																						
562 See, for instance, JC Froneman "Legal reasoning and legal culture: our “vision” of law” 
(2005) 16 Stell LR 3 15: “The study and practice of law is a practical discipline.  We do law in 
order to arrive at solutions of practical issues.  We do not have the luxury of postponing 
conclusions.  The practice of law demands the making of decisions, sometimes quickly and 
urgently.” 
563 G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 
115-116. 
564 C Hoexter “The future of judicial review in South African administrative law” (2000) 117 
SALJ 484 502; C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa (2012) 151, 404-405. 
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context-sensitive.565  More recently our courts have recognised that the rules of 
reasonableness vary from context to context.566 
Yet in order to advance the substantive vision of the law it is not enough to simply 
frame legal rules in open-ended terms, or in terms of a list of factors that guide their 
application.  It is also crucial that “these sorts of distinctions should not be made in a 
formalistic, heavy-handed or mechanical way”.567  Otherwise something like the 
classification-of-functions approach,568 which was itself a “perverse” kind of 
variability,569 will be the result. 
 
5 3 3  Anti-formalism 
 
This leads to the second principle of substantive reasoning: anti-formalism.  In 
considering anti-formalism it is necessary first look at formalism specifically, as this is 
a troublesome word.570  It is troublesome because it escapes precise definition, as any 
																																																						
565 H Corder “The content of the audi alteram partem in South African administrative law (1980) 
43 THRHR 156; L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 541; C Hoexter Administrative law in 
South Africa (2012) 151, 404-405.  The variability of the rules of procedural fairness is also 
encoded in the PAJA.  S 3(2)(a) of the PAJA says that “[a] fair administrative procedure 
depends on the circumstances of each case”.  See further, Joseph v City of Johannesburg 
2010 4 SA 55 (CC) para 29. 
566 The locus classicus is Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) para 45.  Here O’Regan J enumerated a list of “factors” to guide the variable 
application of reasonableness.  O’Regan J seemingly drew these factors from: C Hoexter “The 
future of judicial review in South African administrative law” (2000) 117 SALJ 484 503.  
Hoexter’s article was not only concerned with the variable application of reasonableness, but 
more generally with a theory of “defence” to navigate a court’s involvement in polycentric 
issues.  This is an intricate topic that cannot be explored in detail here.  For a critical overview 
of the topic see, PJ Maree & G Quinot “A decade and a half of deference (part 1)” (2016) 
TSAR 268-280; PJ Maree & G Quinot “A decade and a half of deference (part 2)” (2016) TSAR 
447-466. 
567 C Hoexter “The future of judicial review in South African administrative law” (2000) 117 
SALJ 484 503. 
568 See part 5 3 3 below. 
569 C Hoexter “The future of judicial review in South African administrative law” (2000) 117 
SALJ 484 504. 
570 F Schauer “Formalism” (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 509 509-511; C Hoexter “Contracts in 
administrative law: life after formalism?” (2004) 121 SALJ 595 597; C Forsyth “Showing the 
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effort to neatly circumscribe the word’s meaning leads to a performative 
contradiction.571  I therefore propose the following description of formalism not 
because it is the definite statement on the matter, but because it has been judicially 
endorsed.572  According to Hoexter, formalism is: 
 
“[A] judicial tendency to attach undue importance to the pigeonholing of a legal 
problem and to its superficial or outward characteristics; and a concomitant judicial 
tendency to rely on technicality rather than substantive principle or policy, and on 
conceptualism instead of common sense…In cases displaying formalistic legal 
reasoning the merits often seem strangely divorced from the outcome of the case, 
so that it is difficult and perhaps even embarrassing to explain the case to a 
layperson.  There is often a reliance on what one might call code: legalistic 
shorthand that lawyers may understand, however dimly, but that others will find 
impenetrable and altogether mystifying”.573 
 
Anti-formalism, then, is a commitment to steer away from this type of reasoning, 
and above all to subordinate code to substantive reasoning.574  But although the 
proponents of transformative adjudication clearly seek to subordinate formal 
reasoning to substantive reasoning, they are not critical of formal reasoning as such.  
What they categorically reject is formalistic reasoning.  There is only a five-letter 
difference between “formal reasoning” and “formalistic reasoning”.  Yet the semantic 
difference is large. 
Formal reasoning is an indispensable part of judicial decision-making.  It is the 
logical scaffolding on which reasoned outcomes are built.  Transformative adjudication 
																																																						
way out of the flybottle: the value of formalism and conceptual reasoning in administrative law” 
(2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 325 326-327. 
571 Robert Alexy explains that a performative contradiction is “provoked by someone who, 
while carrying out a speech act, presupposes, claims or implies something which contradicts 
the contents of the same speech act.”  See, R Alexy “Discourse theory and human rights” in 
R Martin & G Sprenger (eds) Challenges to the law at the end of the 20th century: Rights 
(1997) 81 86.  The performative contradiction I wish to avoid is to advocate for anti-formalism 
in a formalistic way. 
572 See KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC, Department of Education, KwaZulu-
Natal 2013 6 BCLR 615 (CC) para 80. 
573 C Hoexter “Contracts in administrative law: life after formalism?” (2004) 121 SALJ 595 597. 
574 D Davis & K Klare “Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law” 
(2010) 26 SAJHR 403 407-408. 
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therefore does not call for the abandonment of this mode of thinking.575  Instead, it 
asks judges to bear in mind that formal rules are ultimately justified by second-level 
substantive reasons,576 and that instead of mechanically applying the rules as if they 
are their own justification, they should openly acknowledge the substantive reasons 
that informs their decision-making.577 
Formalistic reasoning is perhaps best illustrated by “conceptualism”,578 which has 
been described as “the fallacious belief that it is possible to solve problems 
syllogistically by the mere application of concepts to them”.579  The most notorious 
example of conceptualism is the “classification-of-functions” approach used by courts 
in pre-Constitutional administrative law.580   
According to this approach, the courts grouped all administrative acts into simple 
categories.581  Once an administrative act was classified according to one of these 
categories, the law regulating the act was thought to be clear.582  For instance, if an 
act was classified as a “legislative” administrative act, it was considered non-
delegable.583  If the act was classified as “purely administrative”, it was considered to 
																																																						
575 G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 116. 
576 5-7. 
577 5-7. 
578 C Hoexter “Judicial policy revisited: transformative adjudication in administrative law” 
(2008) 24 SAJHR 281 287. 
579 287.  In giving this description Hoexter draws particularly on the work of Roscoe Pound 
and Rudolf von Jhering.  She further cites HLA Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(1983) 267 269.  See also, J Froneman “Legal reasoning and legal culture: Our ‘vision’ of law” 
(2005) 16 Stell LR 3 16.  Davis and Klare call this type of reasoning a “formalist error”.  
According to them it “occurs when a lawyer believes…that a particular authoritative legal norm 
(or concept or rule or principle) entails a specific legal result or conclusion, when, in fact, a 
qualified legal practitioner using accepted tool and canons of legal reasoning can generate 
one or more alternative results or conclusions that are also compatible with the norm”.  See, 
D Davis & K Klare “Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law” 
(2010) 26 SAJHR 403 407. 
580 C Hoexter “The future of judicial review in South African administrative law” (2000) 117 
SALJ 484 502; G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 
CCR 111 115. 
581 L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 344. 
582 344. 
583 346, 440. 
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be immune from natural justice.584  In this way, difficult questions of administrative law 
were answered in an automatic fashion, as if by a “jurisprudential slot-machine”.585 
One finds similar conceptualism586 in the way some courts treat PAJA’s definition 
of “administrative action”.587  They are prone to parse each element of the 
administrative-action definition narrowly, instead of reasoning substantively about 
what administrative justice means in the context of the case at hand.588 
 
5 3 4  The back-to-front approach 
 
But if we are to steer away from formalism, in which direction should we be going?  
The third principle of substantive reasoning provides a destination.  Froneman J has 
called this principle the “back-to-front” approach.589  Froneman J borrows this term 
from Madala J’s judgement in Du Plessis v De Klerk,590 where Madala J starts his 
reasoning by stating that his analysis of the matter would be “back-to-front” by first 
considering the Constitution’s underlying values.591 
																																																						
584 347. 
585 D Davis “To Defer and When?  Administrative Law and Constitutional Democracy” (2006) 
Acta Juridica 13 34. 
586 C Hoexter “‘Administrative Action’ in the Courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303 306; G Quinot 
“Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 111 117. 
587 The PAJA defines “administrative action” in s 1(i).  This definition is widely criticised for 
being – among other things – cumbersome, contradictory, imprecise, narrow, and convoluted 
(see, for instance: Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 6 SA 313 
(SCA) para 21; Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 5 SA 69 (CC) para 
33; C Hoexter “‘Administrative Action’ in the Courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303 306).  Our courts 
have attempted to impose some order by splitting the definition into several elements.  See, 
for instance, Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 5 SA 69 (CC) para 33.   
588 C Hoexter “‘Administrative Action’ in the Courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303 312. 
589 JC Froneman "Legal reasoning and legal culture: our “vision” of law” (2005) Stell LR 3 3.  
It is revealing that the approach is described as “back-to-front” rather than “front-to-back”.  It 
shows, as all the authors on transformative adjudication point out, that South African legal 
culture has traditionally embraced a very formal vision of the law.  This formal legal culture is 
so entrenched that it inhibits the development of a substantive vision of the law.  See further, 
D Davis & K Klare “Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law” 
(2010) 26 SAJHR 403 405-408. 
590 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC). 
591 Para 156. 
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The back-to-front approach requires jurists to take the Constitution as the point of 
departure to the solution of a legal problem, even if the problem is not, on the face of 
it, a constitutional issue.  Hence in solving legal questions judges should ultimately be 
reasoning congruently with the values underlying the Constitution, regardless of the 
question’s apparent degree of specificity.  This does not mean that judges should 
simply abandon the crystallised rules of specific fields of law.  It means that they should 
view those rules in the light of the second-order substantive reasons underlying them, 
and candidly acknowledge which reasons they relied on to reach their conclusions.592 
 
5 4 The blind spot 
 
If the back-to-front provides a destination to reason towards, the next question is 
simply: how does one get there?  This question has been asked since the start of the 
constitutional era,593 it has been asked repeatedly,594 and it has been asked in a 
seemingly “increasing order of indignation”.595  If substantive reasoning gives the law 
a vision, we may think of this question as the blind spot in that vision. 
The basic problem underlying this question is that the open-ended, variable nature 
of substantive reasoning – if left unchecked – may vitiate legal coherence, established 
doctrine, and the rule of law.  In Cockrell’s memorable words, if substantive reasoning 
lacks rigour it produces “rainbow jurisprudence” – propositions that “flit before our eyes 
like rainbows, beguiling us with their lack of substance”.596  A key feature of such 
rainbow jurisprudence is that it treats constitutional values as incommensurable and 
assumes “competing values can, mysteriously, be accommodated within the embrace 
of a warm, fuzzy consensus”.597 
																																																						
592 G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 116. 
593 See, for instance, A Cockrell “Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 1-38. 
594 See, for instance, S Woolman “The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 SALJ 
762-794; J Lewis “The Constitutional Court of South Africa” (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 
440; JJ Gauntlett “The sounds of silence?” (2011) 2 TSAR 226-233; L T C Harms “The Puisne 
Judge, the Chaos Theory and the Common Law (2014) 131 SALJ 3-10. 
595 L Boonzaier “Good Reviews, Bad Actors: The Constitutional Court’s Procedural Drama” 
(2015) 7 CCR 1 24 n 134. 
596 See, for instance, A Cockrell “Rainbow Jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 1-38. 
597 12. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		98	
It is perilous to ignore this blind spot.  When the law’s vision is unclear the rule of 
law suffers.598  This is because the rule of law includes the doctrine of vagueness,599 
which expresses the idea that, for the law to fairly regulate the conduct of those bound 
by it, it must be clear and accessible.600  This does not mean that the law must be 
unequivocal.  It means that the law must indicate with reasonable certainty what those 
bound by the law should do or not do.601  This obligation of clarity rests on the judiciary 
as much as it rests on the legislature, as the courts play a crucial role in determining 
the content of the law.602  As Quinot puts it: 
 
“As much as it is the Constitutional Court’s role to act as final interpreter of what the 
Constitution means in substance and how legal rules are to comply with those 
substantive standards, the Court must also provide guidance to other courts on the 
appropriate adjudicate method under the Constitution.  Such guidance should not 
only flow from the Court’s express instructions on adjudicative method, but also 
(and perhaps most importantly) from its own example.”603 
 
Although the back-to-front approach shows us where substantive reasoning should 
go, we need directions to get there.  If courts reason without direction they imperil the 
rule of law.  In this regard, the single-system-of-law principle may provide direction.  I 
briefly introduce the principle in the next section. 
 
																																																						
598 JJ Gauntlett “The sounds of silence?” (2011) 2 TSAR 226 227. 
599 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 
(CC) para 108. 
600 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 
(CC) para; Kruger v President of the Republic of South African and Others 2009 (1) SA 417 
(CC) para 65; HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Others 2007 (5) SA 438 (SCA) para 9; South African Liquor Traders’ Association and Others 
v Chairperson, Gauteng Liquor Board, and Others 2009 (1) SA 565 (CC) paras 25 – 28. 
601 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 
(CC) para 108 (emphasis added). 
602 G Quinot “Substantive reasoning in administrative-law adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 118. 
603 118. 
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5 5 A single system of law 
 
5 5 1  Introduction 
 
Under the Interim Constitution there was a cleft between the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court and the Appellate Division.  The Constitutional Court was the 
court of final instance in constitutional matters while the Appellate Division was the 
court of final instance in non-constitutional matters.604  Due to this jurisdictional 
division, the appellate courts had equal status: a litigant could not appeal to the 
Constitutional Court against a decision of the Appellate division, and vice versa.605 
The Supreme Court of Appeal initially held that administrative law would reflect this 
bifurcated system of jurisdiction.  In Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container 
Logistics (Pty) Ltd (“Container Logistics”),606 a case decided under the Interim 
Constitution,607 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it could review administrative 
action in terms of the common law and without recourse to the Constitution.608  The 
court reasoned that judicial review under the Constitution and under the common law 
are “different concepts”: constitutional judicial review is concerned with whether 
administrative action coheres with the Constitution; common-law judicial review, on 
the other hand, is concerned with whether administrative action coheres with the 
empowering statute and with the requirements of natural justice.609 
The Constitutional Court considered this proposition in Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa (“Pharmaceutical Manufacturers”).610  The legal question in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers was whether the court had the power to review and set aside a decision 
of the President to bring an Act into force.611  Relying on Container Logistics, counsel 
for the applicants argued that this question did not raise a constitutional issue because 
																																																						
604 Ss 101(5) and 168(3) of the Interim Constitution. 
605 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 111. 
606 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd 1999 3 SA 771 (SCA). 
607 Para 7. 
608 Para 20. 
609 Para 20. 
610 2000 2 SA 674 (CC). 
611 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		100	
it could be decided under the common law, without recourse to the Constitution.612  
The Constitutional Court rejected this argument.  Chaskalson P, for a unanimous 
court, held: 
 
“I cannot accept this contention, which treats the common law as a body of law 
separate and distinct from the Constitution.  There are not two systems of law, each 
dealing with the same subject-matter, each having similar requirements, each 
operating in its own field with its own highest Court.  There is only one system of 
law.  It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including 
the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to 
constitutional control.”613 
 
According to Hoexter, “[t]he importance of this dictum can hardly be overestimated, 
and the idea of ‘one system of law’ continues to have significant implications for South 
African administrative law”.614  The most significant implications of the dictum for this 
thesis is that it forms the basis of an adjudicative approach615 that could give 
substantive reasoning the rigour it deserves. 
The single-system-of-law idea can be used as a point of departure to determine 
which source of law – the Constitution, legislation, or the common law – should apply 
to a dispute when two or all three of the sources seem to apply at the same time. 616  
																																																						
612 Para 21. 
613 Para 44. 
614 C Hoexter Administrative Law 2 ed (2012) 28. 
615 What I mean by “adjudicative approach” is more fully described by van der Walt as follows: 
“In addition to the identification of the applicable source of law, research on the single-
system-of-law principle (together with the subsidiary principles) has also produced results 
that might have a significant impact on the methodology of adjudication, in the sense of 
guidelines that could provide an ‘angle of approach’, a possible sequence of questions to 
be asked, to guide the adjudication of property disputes in a single but complex 
constitutional system.” 
See, AJ van der Walt “Property law in the Constitutional Democracy” (2017) 28 Stell LR 8 12 
(footnotes omitted). 
616 See, in particular, AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 
2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-128; AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012); AJ van 
der Walt “Property law in the Constitutional Democracy” (2017) 28 Stell LR 8 9-13.  Van der 
Walt drew particularly from, F Michelman “The rule of law legality and supremacy of the 
Constitution” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed, OS, 2005) 
34-44. 
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The idea therefore has a unifying, organising goal.617  But it does not indicate, on its 
own terms, precisely how the Constitution, legislation, common law, and customary 
law should interact in the single system of law in a case before a court.  These 
directions are provided by the principles of subsidiarity, which have been developed 
by our courts in a series of judgments.618 
 
5 5 2  Subsidiarity 
 
Subsidiarity entails a hierarchical configuration of institutions, norms, principles, or 
remedies.  It denotes the idea that a higher, more general norm should only be invoked 
where a lower, more specific norm is not applicable.619  Simply put, subsidiarity 
encourages a “bottom-to-top” approach.620 
The idea of subsidiarity manifests in several different ways in our law.621  One of its 
manifestations is a pair of rules that determine the source of law a litigant should 
invoke to protect his constitutional rights where more than one of source of law could 
																																																						
617 AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 
1 CCR 100-128; AJ van der Walt “Property law in the Constitutional Democracy” (2017) 28 
Stell LR 8 10. 
618 AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 
1 CCR 77 105-128; AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 35; M Murcott & W van 
der Westhuizen “The Ebb and Flow of the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity – Critical 
Reflections on Motau and My Vote Counts” (2015) 7 CCR 43-53. 
619 My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 1 SA 132 (CC) paras 46, 
121; L du Plessis “‘Subsidiarity’: What’s in the Name for Constitutional Interpretation and 
Adjudication” (2006) 17 Stell LR 207 209-211. 
620 M Murcott & W van der Westhuizen “The Ebb and Flow of the Application of the Principle 
of Subsidiarity – Critical Reflections on Motau and My Vote Counts” (2015) 7 CCR 43 46. 
621 See, for example, S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC) para 59 (subsidiarity dictates that, 
where possible, a court should decide a case without reaching a constitutional issue), but 
compare Jordaan v Tswane Metropolitan Municipality 2017 6 SA 287 (CC) para 8 
(“constitutional approaches to rights determination must generally enjoy primacy”).  See also 
Ex parte Minister of Safety & Security: In re: S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 22 
(subsidiarity dictates that force should only be used to effect an arrest where there are no 
lesser means of doing so); Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 4 BCLR 
(CC) para 50 (subsidiarity dictates that, where the Constitution contains both a specific right 
and a more general right, it is appropriate first to invoke the specific right). 
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potentially apply.622  The first rule regulates the relationship between the Constitution 
and legislation that has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right.  The 
second rule regulates the relationship between such legislation and the common law.  
For ease of reference, I will refer to the former as the “Constitution/legislation rule” and 
to the latter as the “Constitution/legislation/common-law rule”. 
 
5 5 2 1 The Constitution/legislation rule 
 
Several Acts give effect to rights in the Bill of Rights.  The Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000, for instance, gives effect to the right of access to 
information.623  The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 gives effect to constitutional 
labour-law rights.624  And the PAJA similarly gives effect to the right to just 
administrative action.625 
Where legislation has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, 
subsidiarity determines that a litigant should rely on the legislation to protect the right.  
The litigant may not bypass the legislation and rely directly on the constitutional right 
itself.626  This is because the legislation is the specific, local norm, while the 
constitutional right is the general, abstract norm.  In terms of subsidiarity’s “bottom-up” 
approach, the specific norm must be exhausted before the general norm may be 
used.627 
																																																						
622 AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 
1 CCR 77 105-128; AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 35; M Murcott & W van 
der Westhuizen “The Ebb and Flow of the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity – Critical 
Reflections on Motau and My Vote Counts” (2015) 7 CCR 43-53; My Vote Counts NPC v 
Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 1 SA 132 (CC) paras 50, 121. 
623 S 32 of the Constitution; My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 1 
SA 132 (CC) paras 50, 121. 
624 S 23 of the Constitution. 
625 Long title of the PAJA; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 25. 
626 See, for instance, South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 
400 (CC) para 51; MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 40; 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 73. 
627 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) para 
51; AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 
1 CCR 77 100-103. 
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The Constitutional Court proposed628 this rule of subsidiarity in Minister of Health v 
New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd.629  Here a pharmaceutical company challenged the 
validity of medicine-pricing regulations the Minister of Health had made under the 
Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965.  The High Court held that both 
the Minister’s decision to make the regulations, and the recommendations on which 
that decision was based, were not administrative acts and could therefore not be 
reviewed under the PAJA.630  The court held that the regulations could be reviewed 
under the principle of legality and under section 33 of the Constitution.631  But the court 
apparently held that it was immaterial which source of law it used to scrutinise the 
validity of the regulations.632  In the event, it elected to follow the section-33 pathway 
to review.633 
The Supreme Court of Appeal took a similar approach.634  It held that it was 
immaterial whether the decision should be reviewed under PAJA, as the decision was 
reviewable under the principle of legality.635 
The Constitutional Court rejected this “free alternative”636 approach.  In a concurring 
minority judgment, Chaskalson CJ held that the PAJA gives effect to the rights 
contained in section 33 of the Constitution, and that it “was clearly intended to be, and 
																																																						
628 According to van der Walt ((2008) CCR 100 fn 104), the Constitution/legislation rule was 
formulated by the High Court in NAPTOSA v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 1 SA 
112 (C) 123I-J, mooted by the Constitutional Court in Minister of Health v New Clicks South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC), and finally confirmed by that court in South African 
National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC) paras 51-52.  See further 
My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 1 SA 132 (CC) paras 55-56. 
629 2006 2 SA 311 (CC). 
630 New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tsabalala-Msimang NO 2005 2 SA 530 (C) paras 43, 
49. 
631  
632 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 132. 
633 New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Tsabalala-Msimang NO 2005 2 SA 530 (C). 
634 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang NO 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA); 
C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 132. 
635 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang NO 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA) 
para 94. 
636 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 132. 
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in substance is, a codification of these rights”.637  This means, Chaskalson CJ 
explained, that a litigant may not circumvent the PAJA by seeking to rely directly on 
section 33 of the Constitution where the PAJA regulates the impugned decision. 
This does not mean that a litigant may not rely directly on section 33 of the 
Constitution under any circumstances.  A litigant may directly invoke the right to argue 
that the PAJA,638 other legislation,639 or the common law640 unjustifiably limits his right 
to administrative justice. 
 
5 5 2 2 The relationship between the principle of legality and the PAJA 
 
Litigants often ask courts to review the exercise of public power against the principle 
of legality.641  The principle of legality is an even more abstract, general norm than the 
right to administrative justice enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution,642 and is thus 
a more abstract norm that the PAJA.  Accordingly, in terms of the 
Constitution/legislation rule, if the exercise of public power amounts to “administrative 
action” under the PAJA, it should be reviewed by way of that Act and not by way of 
the principle of legality.643 
The principle of legality should, in other words, function as a “safety net”.644  It 
should provide a means of reviewing the exercise of public power that does not 
amount to “administrative action” under the PAJA.645 
																																																						
637 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 95, citing 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 25. 
638 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 648-649. 
639 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) paras 99-
103. 
640 See, for example, Trustees, Bellocchio Trust v Engelbrecht NO & Another 2002 JOL 9365 
(C). 
641 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 133-137. 
642 Murcott & van der Westhuizen (2015) CCR 50. 
643 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 132; Murcott & van der Westhuizen 
(2015) CCR 50-52. 
644 C Hoexter “The Enforcement of an Official Promise: Form, Substance and the 
Constitutional Court” (2015) 132 SALJ 207 219; State Information Technology Agency SOC 
Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2017 2 SA 63 (SCA) para 38. 
645 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 137. 
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This safety net is vital.  Because the PAJA’s definition of “administrative action” is 
limiting and confusing,646 the Act often fails to apply to governmental conduct that 
should be subject to some form of judicial oversight.  The principle of legality ensures 
that these public actions are susceptible to judicial scrutiny, even if they are not 
regulated by the PAJA.647  When it works as a safety net, the principle of legality does 
“at least some of the work that administrative law would ordinarily do”.648 
The relationship between the principle of legality and the PAJA is clear in theory.  
But it is unsettled in practice.649  Our courts have, for instance, occasionally ignored 
the hierarchy between the principle of legality and the PAJA by using a “free 
alternative” approach.650  They have also occasionally inverted the hierarchy by 
preferring the principle of legality to the PAJA in cases where the impugned decision 
possibly amounted to administrative action.651 
The relationship between the principle of legality and the PAJA was recently at issue 
in State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
(“Gijima”).652  In this matter the State Information Technology Agency (“SITA”), an 
organ of state, impugned its own decision to conclude a contract with Gijima Holdings, 
a private company.653  The litigants agreed that SITA’s decision contravened section 
217 of the Constitution.654 
																																																						
646 Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 6 SA 313 (SCA) para 21. 
647 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 137. 
648 137. 
649 L Kohn “Our curious administrative law love triangle: The complex interplay between the 
PAJA, the Constitution and the common law” (2013) 28 SA Public Law 22 23, 30. 
650 See, for example, Valuline CC v Minister of Labour 2013 4 SA 326 (KZP); Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Tourism 
and Environmental Affairs: KwaZulu-Natal; Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting 
Corporation SOC Ltd 2017 2 BLLR 153 (WCC) paras 165-166.  See further, D Brand & M 
Murcott “Administrative Law” (2014) Annual Survey of South African Law; D Brand, M Murcott 
& W van der Westhuizen “Administrative Law” (2016) 4 JQR 2.1.1. 
651 See, for instance, Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 
293 (CC) para 80.  For commentary, see C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 
137; Murcott & van der Westhuizen (2015) CCR 50-52. 
652 2017 ZACC 40. 
653 Para 3. 
654 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 All SA 
842 (SCA) para 1. 
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SITA asked the court to review its decision under the principle of legality.  Both the 
High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal refused to do so.655  They found that 
SITA’s decision to contract with Gijima amounted to administrative action,656 and that 
SITA should therefore have sought review under the PAJA, not the principle of legality.  
The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal thus adhered to the doctrine of 
subsidiarity and, more specifically, to the Constitution/legislation rule.657 
But the Constitutional Court held that an organ of state must invoke the principle of 
legality, and not the PAJA, when it seeks the judicial review of its own decisions.658  
The court reasoned that the rights in PAJA accrue to natural and juristic persons; that 
these rights are enforceable against the state; that the state cannot enforce rights 
against itself; and that the rights in the PAJA do not vest in the state when it challenges 
its own decisions.659 
The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal thus reached opposite 
conclusions.  This may create the impression that the Constitutional Court disregarded 
the Constitution/legislation rule.  But that impression would, in my view, be incorrect. 
The Constitutional Court based its reasoning on whether the PAJA applied or not.  
The court implied that SITA would have been obliged to rely on the PAJA, had that 
Act been applicable.  So, unlike the minority of the Supreme Court of Appeal Gijima, 
the Constitutional Court did not support a free-alternative approach to the principle of 
legality and the PAJA.660  And unlike in its judgment in Albutt v Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation,661 the court did not hold that the PAJA should be 
subordinated to the principle of legality.662  The Constitutional Court thus seems to 
have upheld the doctrine of subsidiarity in Gijima. 
 
5 5 2 3 The Constitution/legislation/common-law rule 
																																																						
655 Para 1. 
656 Paras 16-21. 
657 Paras 38, 44. 
658 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 23 
(CC) paras 18-37. 
659 Paras 18-37. 
660 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2016 4 All SA 
842 (SCA) paras 47, 55-65. 
661 2010 3 SA 293 (CC). 
662 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 80. 
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The second rule flowing from the doctrine of subsidiarity regulates the relationship 
between the Constitution, legislation, and the common law.  According to this rule, if a 
litigant seeks to protect a right in the Bill of Rights, and if Parliament has made 
legislation to give effect to the right, the litigant must have recourse to that legislation, 
and not the common law, to protect the right.663  This rule recognises that the common 
law a is more abstract and indirect norm than legislation giving effect to a constitutional 
right.664 
The Constitutional Court formulated this rule in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs.665  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd, the applicant in this case, held 
a commercial fishing license that entitled it to catch a fixed annual quota of hake.  It 
asked government for a larger quota.  Government obliged but was not nearly as 
generous as Bato Star thought it should have been.  So Bato Star went to court, 
seeking the judicial review of government’s quota-allocation decision.666 
The parties agreed that the quota-allocation decision was “administrative action” in 
terms of the PAJA.667  But it was unclear what Bato Star’s cause of action was, as it 
did not mention the PAJA in its notice of motion or founding affidavit.668 
The Constitutional Court held that Bato Star’s cause of action derived from the 
PAJA and that the courts below had erred in not recognising this.669  O’Regan J, who 
wrote the majority judgment, reasoned as follows: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
established that administrative action is regulated by a single system of law; the core 
of this system is section 33 of the Constitution, not the common-law doctrine of ultra 
vires; the PAJA gives effect to section 33 of the Constitution; section 6 of the PAJA 
states the grounds upon which a court may review administrative action; and section 
																																																						
663 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 
25; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 23; van der Walt (2008) CCR 103. 
664 Murcott & van der Westhuizen (2015) CCR 44, 48-49. 
665 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 25; confirmed in Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 
23. 
666 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) paras 
1, 11, 16. 
667 Para 24. 
668 Paras 20-21. 
669 Para 26. 
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6 of the PAJA thus provides the ordinary cause of action for the judicial review of 
administrative action.670 
O’Regan J thus held that, where an impugned act or decision amounts to 
“administrative action” under the PAJA, the act or decision should be challenged by 
way of the PAJA and not by way of the common law.  This does not mean that the 
common law is irrelevant, however.  It provides guidance on the meaning of the 
PAJA’s provisions.671  It also performs a “gap-filling” function by governing areas of 
administrative law that the PAJA fails to govern, such as the regulatory decisions of 
private bodies.672 
 
5 6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has proposed transformative adjudication as the ideal judicial method.  It 
has been explained that this method adheres to a substantive vision of the law.  It 
takes the back-to-front approach as its point of departure; establishes rules and 
principles of a variable nature; avoids conceptualism and other forms of formalistic 
reasoning; and is organised around the single-system-of-law principle. 
This ideal method provides a basic structure for cogently and systematically 
comparing the different methods our courts have used to adjudicated indirect-review 




670 Paras 22-26. 
671 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 45. 
672 National Horseracing Authority of Southern Africa v Naidoo 2010 3 SA 182 (N) para 4 
(judgment of Levinsohn DJP); I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 650; 
C Hoexter Administrative Law (2012) 127-128.  Compare A Breitenbach “The Place of the 
Common Law in ‘Constitutional’ Administrative Law” in H Corder & L van der Vijver (eds) 
Realising Administrative Justice (2002) 37 44.  The regulatory decisions of private bodies have 
long been subject to common-law administrative law.  See, for example, Turner v Jockey Club 
of South Africa 1974 3 SA 633 (A); Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in 
Suid Afrika 1976 2 SA 1 (A). 
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CHAPTER 6: ASSESSMENT  
 
6 1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter proposed transformative adjudication as the ideal judicial 
method.  We have seen that this method consists of three essential elements that are 
buttressed by the single-system-of-law principle.  The first element is variability, being 
the practise of applying legal rules in a way that is sensitive to the context in which 
they are applied.673  The second element is anti-formalism, which is a policy of 
avoiding the mechanical, unreflective application of the law.674  The third element is 
the “back-to-front” approach, which is a commitment to taking the Constitution as the 
point of departure to the adjudication of a dispute.675 
The aim of this chapter is to measure the second-actor method, the categorical 
method, and the flexible method against the ideal of transformative adjudication.  I will 
do this by considering, in respect of each method, whether it is variable, encourages 
anti-formalism, and embraces the back-to-front approach.  The purpose of this 
exercise is to ultimately recommend a judicial method that courts should use to 
adjudicate indirect-review cases, which is the aim of chapter 7. 
 
6 2 Second-actor method 
 
6 2 1 Introduction 
 
The main advantage of the second actor method is that it is based on Forsyth’s theory 
of the second actor, which, as we have seen, is nuanced and coherent.676  However, 
I will argue below that this theory is less variable than it appears to be, lends itself to 
be used in a formalistic way, and originates from a jurisdiction that does not encourage 
the back-to-front approach.  As a result, the second actor method fails to meet the 
ideal of transformative adjudication. 
																																																						
673 See chapter 5 part 5 3 2 above. 
674 See chapter 5 part 5 3 3 above. 
675 See chapter 5 part 5 3 4 above. 
676 See chapter 2 part 2 3 above. 
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6 2 2 Variability 
 
A judge that uses the second-actor method must determine whether the second 
actor’s powers depend on the factual existence or the legal validity of the initial 
administrative act.677  According to the theory of the second actor, the judge must 
make this determination by interpreting the empowering provision that is the source of 
the second actor’s powers.678 
A defining trait of administrative action is that it is based on an empowering 
instrument.679  As the second-actor method is directed at the meaning of such 
instruments, it seems that all administrative action could be analysed through the 
second-actor method.  It would seem, then, that the second-actor method is highly 
variable. 
But, in my submission, it is not.  Although administrative action is axiomatically 
based on some empowering instrument, very few of these instruments express what 
the second actor’s powers are.680  The second-actor method will accordingly find little 
traction in most empowering instruments. 
Forsyth would certainly disagree.  He acknowledges that most empowering 
instruments do not expressly articulate second actors’ powers.  But he argues that 
these powers are discernible even where the empowering instrument does not say, 
expressly, what they are.681  He argues that they can be discerned by the following 
principles of interpretation: 
 
																																																						
677 See chapter 2 part 2 3 2 above. 
678 See chapter 2 part 2 3 2 above. 
679 G Quinot & P Maree “Administrative Action” in G Quinot (ed) Administrative Justice in South 
Africa: An Introduction (2015) 86.  This defining trait of administrative law is captured by the 
definition of “administrative action” in s 1 of the PAJA.  According to this definition, a decision 
will only be “administrative action” if it was made in terms of the Constitution, legislation or 
another empowering provision.  This is underscored by the fact that, in terms of s 1 of the 
PAJA, “administrative action” entails a “decision”, and a “decision” means “any decision of an 
administrative nature made…under an empowering provision” (emphasis added).  See further, 
C Hoexter Administrative Law (2012) 205-206. 
680 Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 219. 
681 220-221. 
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(i) If the impugned administrative act was directed at a specific person, and not 
to the world at large, then the person at whom the act was directed should 
have less scope for challenging the act collaterally.682 
(ii) If the empowering instrument provides for internal remedies against the 
impugned administrative action, then it would be contrary to the scheme of 
the instrument to allow a collateral challenge to the impugned act or 
decision.683 
(iii) The more the empowering instrument seeks to promote the principle of 
certainty, the less scope there should be for raising a collateral challenge to 
an act or decision based on the empowering instrument.684 
(iv) The powers of the second actor should be interpreted congruently with 
human rights: allowing a collateral challenge may violate the human rights 
of persons who have acted on the assumption that the impugned act or 
decision is valid; and disallowing a collateral challenge may violate the 
human rights of the person seeking to make the challenge.685 
 
Forsyth stresses that these principles are tools of statutory interpretation, not free-
standing criteria for assessing the competence of a collateral challenge.  In his view, 
this is because judges should decide indirect-review cases by interpreting the relevant 
empowering instruments, and not by simply using their discretion.686 
In my view, there are two problems with this claim.  First, it is doubtful whether 
courts have, in fact, used the principles as interpretative tools and not as free-standing 
criteria.  As Daly argues, many of the cases that produced these principles were 
																																																						
682 Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 220, citing Boddington v British Transport Police 1999 2 AC 
143 (HL) at 653D. 
683 HWR Wade & C Forsyth Administrative Law 11ed (2014) 237, 252, citing R v Wicks 1998 
AC 92. 
684 Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 220-221, citing Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape 
Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) paras 32-34. 
685 Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 220-221, citing the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998. 
686 Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 221-222; HWR Wade & C Forsyth Administrative Law 11 ed 
(2014) 237. 
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decided by way of policy and pragmatism, and not, as Forsyth contends, by way of 
statutory interpretation and conceptual analysis.687 
Second, it is doubtful whether courts in South Africa will use the principles simply 
as tools of statutory interpretation.  As we have seen, in its majority judgment in 
Merafong City, the Constitutional Court determined that courts should use the flexible 
method to decide indirect-review cases.688  Under this fact-sensitive and discretionary 
method, the proper role of the principles would be to assist a judge in deciding whether 
it would be just to allow a collateral challenge in the circumstances of the case, not 
simply to aid in the interpretation of the relevant empowering instrument. 
The second actor method therefore has a low degree of variability.  Although it 
purports to apply to all administrative action, it can only be usefully applied in limited 
cases where the empowering instrument is clear on the second actor’s powers.  This 
might explain why our courts have only infrequently used the second actor method to 
adjudicate indirect-review cases, notwithstanding Oudekraal’s venerated status in our 
law.689 
 
6 2 3  Formalism 
 
It seems obvious that the theory of the second actor is formalistic, as Forsyth himself 
says that it is.690  But the theory’s true nature, which is obscured by the polyvalence of 
the word “formalism”, is more nuanced. 
Unlike the authors of the transformative adjudication literature, Forsyth considers 
“formalism” to be a virtue, not a vice.691  Notably, Forsyth uses the word “formalism” 
to refer to that which Atiyah and Summers call “formal reasoning”, which is something 
transformative adjudication encourages.692  So, while Forsyth and the authors of the 
transformative adjudication literature may use the word “formalism” in different ways, 
																																																						
687 P Daly “Voidness and voidability” (03-03-2017) Administrative Law in the Common Law 
World < https://adminlawblog.org/2017/03/03/2 > (accessed 1-10-2017). 
688 See chapter 4 above. 
689 See chapter 3 above. 
690 Forsyth (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 326-327. 
691 327. 
692 See chapter 5 part 5 5 3 above. 
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they seem to agree that formal reasoning is indispensable to just administrative law 
adjudication.693 
It would therefore be incautious to assume that the theory of the second actor is 
formalistic per se.  However, given that the theory focuses exclusively on statutory 
interpretation, avoids pragmatic considerations, and seeks to limit the range of judicial 
discretion as much as possible, it is clear the theory could easily be used in a 
formalistic manner.694 
 
6 2 4  The back-to-front approach 
 
The theory of the second actor originated in the United Kingdom.  While our 
administrative law has been greatly influenced by the administrative law of that 
jurisdiction,695 the two legal systems differ in material respects.  I will now briefly 
discuss one such difference and explain how it prevents the second actor theory from 
encouraging a back-to-front approach. 
In the United Kingdom, the traditional justification for judicial review is the ultra vires 
doctrine.  According to this doctrine, the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that 
administrators do not exceed the powers given to them by Parliament.  Judicial review 
aims to ensure that administrators do not act ultra their vires, in other words.696 
The ultra vires doctrine, as classically formulated by Dicey, is an incident of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,697 a central feature of public law in the United 
Kingdom.  At its simplest, this doctrine expresses the idea that Parliament has 
																																																						
693 See, for instance, C Hoexter The Transformation of South African Administrative Law Since 
1994 with Particular Reference to The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 DPhil 
thesis Witwatersrand (2009) 37-39. 
694 K Saller “When Worlds Collide: Implications of the Constitutional Court’s Decision in Jaftha 
v Schoeman when Viewed Through the Lens of the Second Actor Theory Accepted in 
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town” (2005) 122 SALJ 725 740. 
695 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 14-15. 
696 Boddington v British Transport Police 1999 2 AC 143 at 164; HWR Wade & C Forsyth 
Administrative Law 11ed (2014) 237; C Forsyth & L Whittle “Judicial Creativity and Judicial 
Legitimacy in Administrative Law” (2002) 8 Canterbury Law Review 453 453. 
697 L Ringhand “Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional Foundations: Debating Judicial 
Review in Britain” (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 865-904; C Hoexter 
Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 115. 
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unlimited law-making power and that no person or institution other than Parliament 
may undo its laws.698  Because Parliament is the supreme authority, the function of 
the judiciary is to ensure that the intention of Parliament is obeyed.  The judiciary 
performs this function by invalidating actions and decisions that are ultra vires.699   
Under the Diceyian view of the ultra vires doctrine, judicial review is empowered by, 
and serves to protect, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.700  Wade and Forsyth 
put it as follows: 
 
“Parliamentary sovereignty…profoundly affects the position of the judges.  They are 
not guardians of constitutional rights, with power to declare statutes 
unconstitutional…Subject only to the overriding law of the European Union, they 
can only obey the latest expression of the will of Parliament.  Nor is their own 
jurisdiction sacrosanct.  If they fly too high, Parliament may clip their wings.”701 
 
The validity of the ultra vires doctrine is the subject of a protracted debate.702  
Forsyth, an important voice in this debate, is a firm defender of the doctrine against its 
critics.703  One argument he makes in support of the doctrine relates to collateral 
challenge. 
Forsyth argues that collateral challenges are only possible because of the doctrine 
of ultra vires.704  He illustrates this proposition by referring to the situation where a 
defendant in a criminal trial, adjudicated by a Magistrates’ court, raises a collateral 
																																																						
698 AV Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10 ed (1959) xxxiv. 
699 P Joseph “The Demise of Ultra Vires – a Reply to Christopher Forsyth and Linda Whittle” 
(2002) 8 Canterbury Law Review 463 463; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 
(2012) 115. 
700 L Ringhand “Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional Foundations: Debating Judicial 
Review in Britain” (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 865 874-875. 
701 HRW Wade & C Forsyth Administrative Law 11 ed (2014) 23. 
702 The intricacies of this debate are beyond the realm of this thesis.  For overviews of the 
copious literature the debate has produced, see C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (2000); L Ringhand “Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional Foundations: 
Debating Judicial Review in Britain” (2005) 43 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 865-
904. 
703 See, for instance, C Forsyth “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: the Ultra Vires Doctrine, the 
Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review” (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 122-140. 
704 C Forsyth “Collateral Challenge and the Rule of Law” (1999) 4 Judicial Review 165 167; C 
Forsyth & L Whittle “Judicial Creativity and Judicial Legitimacy in Administrative Law” (2002) 
8 Canterbury Law Review 453 458. 
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challenge to the validity of a bylaw.  The court has no jurisdiction to declare the bylaw 
invalid.  But according to the doctrine of ultra vires, if the author of the bylaw 
contravened his empowering instrument when he made the bylaw, the bylaw will be 
void, “[f]or acts are non-existent when the decision-maker has no power to make the 
decision in question”.705  If the bylaw is void, the magistrate will be entitled to disregard 
it, as there will be nothing in law to enforce or to invalidate.  If the bylaw were merely 
voidable, by contrast, it would necessarily found a conviction, since the Magistrate 
would have no jurisdiction to set it aside.706 
According to Forsyth, the doctrine of ultra vires enables the magistrate to consider 
the collateral challenge to the bylaw’s validity.  Conversely, “if ultra vires disappears, 
then so too would collateral challenge”.707  One reason for not abandoning the ultra 
vires doctrine, then, is that this would deprive certain accused persons of a defence to 
the charges against them.  This, in turn, would undermine the principle of legality.708 
But the ultra vires doctrine faces the problem we considered in the beginning of 
chapter 2: although invalid acts may be theoretically void, they often have legally 
effective consequences before being declared invalid by a court.709  As we have seen, 
Forsyth proposes the theory of the second actor as the solution to this problem.  In his 
view, the theory explains how a void act could have legally effective consequences.710 
Forsyth argues that the theory of the second actor emanates from, and supports, 
the ultra vires doctrine: while the ultra vires doctrine makes collateral challenges 
possible in principle, it is the theory of the second actor that determines whether a 
collateral challenge is permissible in a particular case.711  The theory does this by 
illuminating whether a collateral challenge accords with the relevant empowering 
instrument; in other words, whether it would accord with the will of Parliament to allow 
a collateral challenge to be made.  Under the theory of the second actor, then, a judge 
does not use his own discretion to decide whether it would be just to permit a collateral 
																																																						
705 C Forsyth “Collateral Challenge and the Rule of Law” (1999) 4 Judicial Review 165 167. 
706 167. 
707 C Forsyth & L Whittle “Judicial Creativity and Judicial Legitimacy in Administrative Law” 
(2002) 8 Canterbury Law Review 453 458. 
708 C Forsyth “Collateral Challenge and the Rule of Law” (1999) 4 Judicial Review 165 165. 
709 168. 
710 See chapter 2 part 2 3 2 above. 
711 C Forsyth “Collateral Challenge and the Rule of Law” (1999) 4 Judicial Review 165 165 
168. 
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challenge.  He rather determines whether, in terms of the will of Parliament, the 
collateral challenge should be countenanced.712 
The theory of the second actor therefore serves the twin doctrines of ultra vires and 
parliamentary sovereignty.  It falls beyond the scope of this thesis to consider whether 
it does so successfully, as that would require a detailed discussion of the English law 
on point.713  For the purposes of this thesis it suffices to note that the theory of the 
second actor serves two doctrines that have been supplanted by the Constitution in 
the South African context. 
The Constitution determines that South Africa’s legal order is founded on 
constitutional supremacy714 and not on parliamentary supremacy as in the past.715  
Accordingly, our courts do not derive their judicial-review powers from the doctrine of 
ultra vires716 or only from their inherent jurisdiction,717 but from the Constitution itself.718 
This transition from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy was 
profound.719  The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty limited our court’s power to 
review administrative action and to protect fundamental rights.  It enabled Parliament 
																																																						
712 168. 
713 For a critique of Forsyth’s argument from the perspective of English law, see T Adams “The 
Standard Theory of Administrative Unlawfulness” (2017) 76 Cambridge Law Journal 289 303-
304. 
714 Ss 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution.  For an analysis of the doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy in general, see F Michaelman “The Rule of Law” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J 
Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 11-34 – 11-42. 
715 See L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 30; M Wiechers Administratiefreg 2 ed (1984) 17; 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 
1 SA 374 (CC) paras 28-32; Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 37-38. 
716 Compare L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 307-312. 
717 Compare Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd v Johannesburg Town Council 
1903 TS 111 at 115; Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) paras 23, 28. 
718 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 
22; K O’Regan “Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in Our Administrative 
Law (2004) 121 SALJ 424 431; C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 114-118. 
719 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 32; Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 40. 
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to make laws as it deemed fit720 and to instruct administrators to enforce iniquitous 
policies.721  The Constitution, on the other hand, contains a justiciable Bill of Rights722 
which is binding on all persons, entities, and branches of government.723 
Under a dispensation of constitutional supremacy, the role of the judiciary is not to 
apply the will of the Parliament.  It is to apply the Constitution and other law 
independently, impartially, and without “fear, favour, or prejudice”.724  Within the 
boundaries of the doctrine of separation of powers,725 the judiciary is thus obliged to 
ensure that all arms of government, including the legislature, act consistently with the 
Constitution.726 
Given that the theory of the second actor serves the twin doctrines of ultra vires and 
parliamentary sovereignty, and given that these doctrines are at odds with our 
constitutional dispensation, it is doubtful whether the theory could accommodate a 
back-to-front approach.  That is the fundamental reason why the second-actor method 
falls short of the ideal of transformative adjudication. 
 
6 3 The categorical method 
 
6 3 1 Introduction 
 
The categorical method has two attractive features.  The first is that the content of the 
method is clear and readily ascertainable.  The second is that the method provides 
																																																						
720 Under the erstwhile dispensation of parliamentary sovereignty, Acts of Parliament were 
substantially immune from judicial review.  A court could only review an Act if it had not been 
passed in conformity with the prescribed procedure.  See Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 
2 SA 428 (A); I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 3-4. 
721 C Hoexter Administrative Law (2012) 14-15. 
722 Ss 7 and 8 of the Constitution. 
723 Ss 2 and 8 of the Constitution. 
724 S 165(2) of the Constitution. 
725 See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 98.  For an 
overview of the doctrine of separation of powers in general, see S Seedorf & S Sibanda 
“Separation of Powers” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 12-1 – 12-94. 
726 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
1999 1 SA 374 (CC) paras 28, 32. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		118	
robust protection to the principle of legality and thus protects at least one aspect of the 
rule of law.727 
However, as I will explain below, the categorical method obtains these attractive 
features at a cost.  Because it is premised on a fixed rule, the method fails to achieve 
variability and anti-formalism.  And because it seeks to protect only one aspect of the 
rule of law, it fails to adopt a balanced back-to-front approach. 
 
6 3 2  Variability and anti-formalism 
 
The categorical method is premised on the rule that a collateral challenge will only be 
allowed where a “subject is sought to be coerced by a public authority into compliance 
with an unlawful administrative act”.728  The method entails determining whether this 
rule is satisfied by the facts of the case at hand.  This determination usually takes the 
form of one of two questions.  The first is whether the challenger is “coerced by a 
public authority”.  The second is whether the challenger is “a subject”.729 
Rules are, by their very nature, over-inclusive or under-inclusive.730  A rule is over-
inclusive when it applies to more states of affairs than it was intended to regulate, and 
it is under-inclusive if it fails to apply to states of affairs it was intended to regulate.731 
Consider the example of a legislature that intends to reduce noise in public spaces, 
and, to achieve that purpose, makes a rule prohibiting pets from public parks.  While 
this rule reduces noise by prohibiting boisterous pets from parks, it is over-inclusive to 
the extent that it also bars pets that are unlikely to cause a disturbance.  And while the 
rule removes the noise created by pets, it is under-inclusive to the extent that it does 
not remove the noise created by other things that may be found in parks, such as 
portable music players or electric toys.732 
The categorical method is similarly over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-
inclusive because it allows all “subjects” to raise collateral challenges, even though 
																																																						
727 See chapter 3 part 3 3 above. 
728 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 35. 
729 See chapter 3 part 3 3 above. 
730 F Schauer Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life (1991) 31-34. 
731 31-34. 
732 Compare HLA Hart The Concept of Law 3rd ed (2012). 
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there are some subjects who should arguably not be given this opportunity.  And it is 
under-inclusive because it only permits “subjects” to collaterally challenge 
administrative action, even though the rule of law may require a public authority to use 
a collateral challenge on occasion. 
The method’s over-inclusiveness is demonstrated by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Nature’s Choice.  As discussed in chapter 3, in this case a 
municipality declined a company’s request for permission to install a boiler.  The court 
ruled that the company could collaterally challenge the municipality’s decision even 
though the company had, on two prior occasions, flouted the municipality’s measures 
to protect the environment. 
This was arguably an over-inclusive ruling.  If the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted 
the High Court’s reasoning in Khabisi,733 it would not have tolerated the company’s 
collateral challenge at all.  The fact that the company was being coerced by a public 
authority would have been outweighed by the fact that the company had previously 
flouted that authority’s instructions.  In other words, although the company was a 
“subject”, it would not have been given an opportunity to make a collateral challenge. 
The method’s under-inclusiveness is demonstrated by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s judgments in Kwa Sani, Merafong City, and Tasima.734  Here the court used 
the categorical method to hold that, because organs of state are not “subjects”, they 
may not challenge administrative action collaterally.735  By contrast, in its judgment in 
Merafong City, the Constitutional Court explained that organs of state might justifiably 
require the protection given by collateral challenges even though they are not 
“subjects” in the concept’s conventional sense.736 
Two implications can be drawn from the categorical method’s under-inclusiveness 
and over-inclusiveness.  The first is that the method has a low degree of variability: it 
only permits a collateral challenge in a limited range of fixed circumstances.  The 
second implication is that courts have mainly used the method in a formalistic way: 
they have generally assumed that the competence of a collateral challenge can be 
																																																						
733 See chapter 3 part 3 4 2 above. 
734 See chapter 3 part 3 3 2 above. 
735 Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association 2015 2 All SA 
657 (SCA) para 14; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) paras 15-
17; Tasima v Department of Transport 2016 1 All SA 465 (SCA) 476I-477C. 
736 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 55-56. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		120	
determined by mechanically applying a rule, ie that a collateral challenge is 
permissible where a “subject is sought to be coerced by a public authority into 
compliance with an unlawful administrative act”.737 
 
6 3 3  The back-to-front approach 
 
The categorical method determines that a subject may use a collateral challenge to 
resist being coerced into compliance with unlawful administrative action.  This is 
because “[i]t would be a fundamental departure from the rule of law if an individual 
were liable for contravention of some rule which is itself liable to be set aside by a 
court as unlawful”.738  The categorical method thus gives effect to the principle of 
legality,739 which expresses the idea that the exercise of public power must be 
authorised by law.740 
Because the categorical method gives effect to the principle of legality, it embraces 
the back-to-front approach to a limited extent.  This is because the principle of legality 
is an incident of the rule of law, a foundational value of our constitutional 
dispensation.741 
But the categorical method’s alignment with the Constitution is incomplete and 
oversimplified.  The method does not adequately account for the fact that the rule of 
law also consists of the principle of certainty and that this principle is often at cross-
purposes with the principle of legality.742  Moreover, the method fails to provide 
grounds on which a judge can subordinate one of these principle to the other, should 
they be in conflict in a case before the court.  The categorical method therefore only 
partially encourages a back-to-front approach. 
 
																																																						
737 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 35. 
738 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
26, quoting Boddington v British Transport Police 1999 2 AC 143 (HL) 153H-154A. 
739 J Bleazard & S Budlender “Remedies in Judicial Review Proceedings” in G Quinot (ed) 
Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction (2015) 246-247 
740 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
741 See chapter 1 above. 
742 See chapter 1 above. 
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6 4 The flexible method 
 
6 4 1  Introduction 
 
As I will explain below, while the categorical method promotes legal certainty at the 
cost of variability and non-formalism, the flexible method promotes variability and non-
formalism at the cost of legal certainty.  What both methods have in common is that 
they fail to present a coherent and balanced back-to-front approach.  The flexible 
method therefore also falls short of the ideal of transformative adjudication. 
 
6 4 2  Variability 
 
The flexible method is highly variable.  Unlike the theory of the second actor and the 
categorical method, it does not prescribe any typical or ideal cases in which a collateral 
challenge should be allowed.  On the contrary, it can be applied in any conceivable 
case in which “justice requires”743 a collateral challenge to be permitted, which “will 
depend, in each case, on the facts”.744 
 
6 4 3  Formalism 
 
It is also doubtful whether the flexible method could be used in a formalistic way.  This 
is because the method does not prescribe a fixed set of criteria that courts must take 
into account when considering the competence of a collateral challenge.  Courts using 
the method are accordingly left with little option but to engage in substantive 
reasoning. 
But although the method’s lack of prescriptive criteria engenders substantive 
reasoning, it also produces uncertainty about the legal position.  This is illustrated by 
Cameron J’s judgment in Merafong City.  As discussed in chapter 4, while the 
judgment may have produced a bespoke solution to the dispute before the court, it 
failed to provide guiding principles which courts could use in the adjudication of future 
																																																						
743 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 55. 
744 Para 55. 
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indirect-review cases.745  In the result, even though the judgment may have given the 
litigants in Merafong City more certainty about their dispute, it has failed to provide 
clarity about the law on indirect review. 
The flexible method’s lack of prescriptive criteria also exposes the method to the 
risk of being used in an entirely ad hoc and unorganised way, at odds with the 
prescripts of formal reasoning.  The flexible method could therefore engender “rainbow 
jurisprudence”.746  Such jurisprudence is not only antithetical to the ideal of 
transformative adjudication, but harmful to the rule of law.747 
 
6 4 4  The back-to-front approach 
 
Perhaps the greatest failing of the flexible method is that it does not entail a coherent 
back-to-front approach.  The method does not explain which aspects of the 
Constitution should be taken into account when considering the competence of a 
collateral challenge.  Nor does it explain how the principle of legality and the principle 
of certainty should interact in the law on indirect review. 
In my view, the Constitutional Court’s majority judgment in Merafong City 
exemplifies this failing.  As explained in chapter 5, our courts have developed the 
principles of subsidiarity to determine how the Constitution, the common law, and 
legislation should interact in a single system of law.748  Yet the judgment failed to use 
these principles to explain how the Constitution interfaces with the common law on 
indirect review, on the one hand, and with the PAJA, on the other.749  As a result, 
although the judgment was ostensibly “grounded in the Constitution”,750 it failed to 
provide coherent guidance on how a court should use the Constitution to decide 
whether a litigant should be permitted to raise a collateral challenge. 
 
																																																						
745 See chapter 4 part 4 6 3 above. 
746 See chapter 5 part 5 4 above. 
747 Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) 
para 14; Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) para 1. 
748 See chapter 5 part 5 5 2 above. 
749 Although the judgment was ostensibly based on section 172(1) of the Constitution, it is not 
clear that this section of the Constitution should be used to decide the competence of a 
collateral challenge.  See chapter 4 above. 
750 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 55. 
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6 5 Conclusion 
 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that courts should not use the theory of the 
second actor, the categorical method, or the flexible method to adjudicate the 
competence of a collateral challenge.  This is because, notwithstanding their 
meritorious features, all these methods fall short of the ideal of transformative 
adjudication in significant respects.  A common problem of all the methods is that they 
fail to provide a coherent back-to-front approach. 
This conclusion implies that courts should use a new method to adjudicate the 
competence of a collateral challenge.  The purpose of the next chapter is to provide a 
basic framework through which such a new method could be developed. 
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CHAPTER 7: PROPOSAL 
 
7 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter concluded that the second-actor method, the categorical 
method, and the flexible method all fall short of the ideal of transformative adjudication, 
and that courts should therefore not use these methods to adjudicate indirect-review 
cases.  The purpose of this final chapter is to propose a new method that courts might 
use instead. 
This chapter does not aim to provide the definitive method for the adjudication of 
indirect-review cases.  This is because the task of crafting such a method is large, 
complex, and warrants sustained and dedicated attention exceeding the scope of this 
thesis.  However, should the proposed method prove to have potential, it could be 
refined and developed in further academic contributions. 
The purpose of this chapter is rather to suggest an “angle of approach”,751 ie a 
possible series of questions that can be asked to guide the adjudication of indirect-
review cases in a “single but complex constitutional system”.752  Should this angle of 
approach prove to be meritorious, it could serve as a paradigm upon which the law on 
indirect review could be structured. 
The argument in this chapter has the following seven premises: 
 
(i) The doctrine of precedent obliges courts to use the flexible method as the 
point of departure. 
(ii) Whenever a court uses the flexible method to adjudicate an indirect-review 
case, it will develop the common law of indirect review. 
																																																						
751 I use the phrase “angle of approach” in the sense it is used by van der Walt in, among 
places, AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” 
(2008) 1 CCR 77 99; AJ van der Walt “Property law in the constitutional democracy” (2017) 
28 Stell LR 8 12.  The phrase was conceived by Njabulo Ndebele (see N Ndebele The Cry of 
Winnie Mandela: A Novel (2003) 82) and imported into legal scholarship by Henk Botha (see 
H Botha “Refusal, Postapartheid Constitutionalism, and The Cry of Winnie Mandela” in K van 
Marle (ed) Refusals, Transitions, and Postapartheid Law (2009) 37). 
752 AJ van der Walt “Property law in the constitutional democracy” (2017) 28 Stell LR 8 12. 
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(iii) When a court develops the common law of indirect review, it must, in terms 
of section 39 of the Constitution, promote “the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights”.753 
(iv) A litigant that seeks to raise a collateral challenge seeks to exercise the right 
of access to courts. 
(v) Should a court preclude a litigant from raising a collateral challenge, the court 
will limit the litigant’s right of access to courts. 
(vi) It order to promote the “spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”, a court 
should only preclude a litigant from raising a collateral challenge if it would, 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, be reasonable and justifiable to 
limit that litigant’s right of access to courts. 
(vii) Courts should accordingly use a limitations analysis under section 36 of the 
Constitution to determine the competence of a collateral challenge. 
 
I will now defend each of these premises in turn.  I start by explaining why the doctrine 
of precedent obliges courts to use the flexible method as the point of departure. 
 
7 2 The doctrine of precedent obliges courts to use the flexible method 
 
The doctrine of precedent754 is an incident of the rule of law755 and an essential part 
of our legal system.756  It promotes “certainty, predictability, reliability, equality, 
uniformity, convenience”757 and the idea that like cases should be treated alike.758 
																																																						
753 S 39(2) of the Constitution. 
754 The doctrine is often expressed by the Latin maxim stare decisis, meaning “to stand by 
decisions previously taken” (Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents’ Association v Harrison 
2011 4 SA 42 (CC) para 28). 
755 Daniels v Campbell NO an Others 2004 5 SA 331 (CC) para 94. 
756 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Amended 
Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 2 SA 97 (CC) para 8; 
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) paras 58-62.  See also M Wallis 
“Whose decisis must we stare” (2018) 135 SALJ 1 2-5. 
757 HR Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) 215. 
758 Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd 2002 4 SA 317 (CC) para 39; F du Bois “Sources of 
law: Common law and precedent” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 
ed (2007) 78. 
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The doctrine obliges a court to follow the rationales, or ratio decidendi,759 underlying 
the judgments of courts that are superior to it in the hierarchy of courts.760  It also binds 
courts to follow their own prior decisions unless those decisions are clearly wrong.761 
Because the Constitutional Court is our apex court,762 its decisions bind all other 
courts.763  The Constitutional Court should be circumspect to deviate from its own prior 
decisions, as “a single source of consistent, authoritative and binding decisions is 
essential for the development of a stable constitutional jurisprudence”.764 
In its majority judgment in Merafong City, the Constitutional Court held that the 
competence of a collateral challenge should be determined by way of the flexible 
method.765  In my submission, this ruling was part of the court’s ratio and was not a 
mere obiter dictum.766  This is because the ruling satisfies what has become the classic 
test for distinguish between ratio and obiter dicta,767 established by Schreiner JA in 
Pretoria City Council v Levinson.768 
According to this test, a holding is part of the court’s ratio if it was necessary for the 
court’s decision, in the sense that the decision would have been different but for the 
ruling.769  The Constitutional Court’s ruling on the flexible method meets this test: had 
																																																						
759 On the exact meaning of “ratio decidendi”, see Pretoria City Council v Levinson 1949 3 SA 
305 (A) 317; Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality 2014 6 SA 592 (CC) paras 61-
62. 
760 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents’ Association v Harrison 2011 4 SA 42 (CC) para 
28. 
761 Para 28. 
762 S 3 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act 2012; Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 
777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) para 90. 
763 Ex Parte President of the RSA: In Re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) 
para 8. 
764 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 238 (CC) para 62. 
765 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 55-56. 
766 For a discussion of this difficulty, see P Olivier “Deriving the ratio of an over-determined 
judgment: the law after Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality” (2016) 133 SALJ 522-
544.  An obiter dictum is statement made “by the way”.  Such statements may be persuasive 
but they are not binding (Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison 2011 
4 SA 42 (CC) para 30). 
767 F du Bois “Sources of law: Common law and precedent” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles 
of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 78. 
768 1949 3 SA 305 (AD) at 317. 
769 Pretoria City Council v Levinson 1949 3 SA 305 (AD) at 317. 
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the court adopted the categorical method, it would likely have found, like the court 
below, that Merafong’s status as an organ of state precluded it from raising a collateral 
challenge. 
The doctrine of precedent now obliges courts to use the flexible method to 
adjudicate indirect-review cases.  But because the flexible method does not prescribe 
any guiding rules or criteria for deciding cases, it is not clear exactly what this 
obligation means in practical terms.  In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that 
the Constitution contains principles which could fill this gap and guide courts to use 
the flexible method in a practical, useful way.  The first such principle is contained in 
section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
 
7 3 The common law of indirect review will be developed whenever a court 
uses the flexible method 
 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution obliges a court to “promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights” when “developing” the common law.770  While this section 
makes it clear that a court must align the common law with the Constitution’s 
“objective, normative value system”,771 it is not yet settled how courts should do so.772 
In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,773 the Constitutional Court held that 
courts must develop the common law if it fails to promote the spirit, purport and objects 
																																																						
770 S 39(2) of the Constitution states that, “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. 
771 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 983 (CC) para 54. 
772 Commentators have given may conflicting interpretations of the section, leading to a 
protracted (and sometimes heated) debate.  A useful compendium of the standpoints in the 
debate is S Woolman “Application” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 31-136 – 31-158.  A vivid example of the (sometimes 
heated) debate is that between Davis and Fagan: A Fagan “The secondary role of the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the common law’s development (2010) 127 SALJ 
611-627; D Davis “How many positivist legal philosophers can be made to dance on the head 
of a pin: A reply to Professor Fagan” (2012) 129 SALJ 59-72; A Fagan “A straw man, three 
red herrings, and a closet rule-worshipper: A rejoinder to Davis JP” (2012) 129 SALJ 788-798; 
D Davis “The importance of reading – A rebutter to the jurisprudence of Anton Fagan” (2013) 
130 SALJ 52-59. 
773 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 983 (CC) para 39. 
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of the Bill of Rights.  A court must therefore first ask whether the common law requires 
development.  Only if the answer is in the affirmative, the court must develop the 
common law to accord with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.774  The 
court held, in effect, that “if the common law is bad, use the Bill of Rights to make it 
better”.775 
I agree with Friedman that this is an erroneous interpretation of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.776  In truth, as recognised by the Constitutional Court on at least two other 
occasions,777 section 39(2) of the Constitution does not say when the common law 
should be developed.  It says that whenever the common law is being developed, that 
development should promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.778 
When do courts develop the common law?  The Constitutional Court answered this 
question in K v Minister of Safety and Security.779  Here O’Regan J explained that 
courts develop the common law in three different scenarios.  The first is where a court 
completely changes or replaces a common law rule.780  The second is where a court 
introduces a new rule.781  The third is where a court applies an extant common law 
rule to a novel set of facts “not on all fours with any set of facts previously 
adjudicated”,782 and thereby develops the common law by clarifying the “precise 
ambit” of an extant rule.783 
The third type of common-law development is ubiquitous784 and will in my view 
occur whenever courts use the flexible method to adjudicate the competence of a 
																																																						
774 Para 40. 
775 N Friedman “The South African Common Law and the Constitution: Revisiting Horizontality” 
(2014) 30 SAJHR 75. 
776 75. 
777 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 16; Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Pretoria 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) para 31. 
778 N Friedman “The South African Common Law and the Constitution: Revisiting Horizontality” 
(2014) 30 SAJHR 75. 
779 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
780 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 16. 
781 Para 16. 
782 Para 16. 
783 Para 16. 
784 Para 16.  See also L Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa 
(2012) 259-260.  For a contrasting view, see A Fagan “The Secondary Role of the Spirit, 
Purport and Objects of the Bill of Rights in the Common Law’s Development (2010) 127 SALJ 
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collateral challenge.  This is because there are no facts that will be “on all fours with 
any set of facts previously adjudicated” when courts use the flexible method.  As 
determined by the Constitutional Court in Merafong City, the permissibility of a 
collateral challenge will “depend, in each case, on the facts”.785 
The common law will thus be developed whenever the flexible method is applied.  
And the doctrine of precedent determines that the method must be applied whenever 
a court considers the competence of a collateral challenge.  It follows, in my view, that 
courts must develop the common law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution 
whenever they adjudicate the competence of a collateral challenge. 
 
7 4 A court must develop the common law of indirect review in a way that 
promotes the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights 
 
The fact that the common law will be developed whenever the flexible method is 
applied does not mean that courts should make sweeping changes to the law in every 
case.  On the contrary, courts should develop the common law cautiously786 and 
incrementally.787  They should be mindful that, according to the doctrine of separation 
of powers, it is the legislature and not the judiciary that should be the main “engine for 
law reform”.788 
Courts should also not take the task of common-law development lightly.  Before it 
develops the common law, a court is obliged to determine exactly what the common-
law position is and the reasons underlying that position.  It must also determine exactly 
how the common law should be amended.789 
																																																						
613.  For rejoinders to Fagan’s view, see D Davis “How many positivist legal philosophers can 
be made to dance on the head of a pin: A reply to Professor Fagan” (2012) 129 SALJ 59-72; 
AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 26-27, 33, 92-97. 
785 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 55 (emphasis added).  
Also see Metal and Allied Workers Union of SA v National Panasonic 1991 2 SA 527 (C) 
530G-H.   
786 Paulsen v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) para 57. 
787 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) para 31. 
788 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 983 (CC) para 36. 
789 Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Ltd 2016 1 SA 621 (CC) 
para 39; Minister of Justice v Estate Stransham-Ford 2017 3 SA 152 (SCA) para 5. 
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Once a court has ascertained precisely what the common-law rule is, it must 
enquire whether the rule “offend[s] the normative structure of the Constitution”.790  I 
agree with Van der Walt that the common law will only promote the Constitution’s 
“normative structure” if it reflects the “framework of systematic qualities” that the 
Constitution sets out in respect of a field of law.791  This does not mean that the 
common law should be avoided and that the Constitution should be applied directly.  
It means, rather, that the common law should be developed in the image of the 
Constitution, thereby promoting a single, unified system of law.792 
The question, then, is how courts should develop the common law of indirect review 
so that it reflects the Constitution’s “framework of systematic qualities”.  In the next 3 
parts, I will outline the basic systemic qualities of the Constitution that should, in my 
view, regulate the development of the common law of indirect review. 
 
7 5 The right of access to courts 
 
Section 34 of the Constitution guarantees the right of access to courts.  The section 
states: 
 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application 
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum”. 
 
The right of access to courts is central to our constitutional democracy.  It gives effect 
to a principle underlying the rule of law, namely “that any constraint upon a person or 
property shall be exercised by another only after recourse to a court recognised in 
terms of the law of the land”.793  Given that the right of access to courts is central to 
our constitutional democracy, it is crucial that courts consider this right when 
developing the common law under section 39(2) of the Constitution.794 
																																																						
790 MEC for Health and Social Development, Gauteng v DZ obo WZ 2018 1 SA 335 (CC) para 
36. 
791 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 26-27. 
792 AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 
1 CCR 77 91 n 56. 
793 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) para 16. 
794 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 5 SA 325 (CC) para 63. 
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The Constitutional Court has held that section 34 of the Constitution does not apply 
to criminal proceedings.795  This is because section 34 only applies to a “dispute that 
can be resolved by the application of law” and criminal proceedings are not “disputes” 
within the meaning of that section.796 
But this does not mean that accused persons do not have the right of access to 
courts.  Their right of access to courts is guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution, 
which entitles accused persons inter alia to be clearly informed of the charges against 
them,797 the right to adequately prepare a defence,798 the right to challenge and 
adduce evidence,799 the right to be presumed innocent,800 and the right “to a public 
trial before an ordinary court”.801 
In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the interpretation of 
constitutional rights, the right of access to courts should be interpreted in the way that 
is most favourable to beneficiaries of the right.802  Litigants are therefore, in the words 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal, “entitled to the benefits of a constitutional 
dispensation that promotes rather than inhibits access to courts of law”.803 
The right of access to courts has been interpreted as giving everyone at least three 
component rights: the right to challenge the legality of law or conduct; the right to be 
heard by a court or forum that is impartial and independent; and finally, the right to a 
hearing that is procedurally fair.804 
A litigant that seeks to raise a collateral challenge relies principally on the right to 
challenge the legality of law or conduct.  This is because a collateral challenge to 
administrative action is a means of challenging the legal validity of the administrative 
																																																						
795 S v Pennington 1997 4 SA 1076 (CC) para 46. 
796 Paras 46-47. 
797 S 35(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
798 S 35(3)(b) of the Constitution. 
799 S 35(3)(i) of the Constitution. 
800 S 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. 
801 S 35(3)(c) of the Constitution.  See further S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) para 12. 
802 S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) para 14, referring to Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v 
Fisher 1979 3 All ER 21; S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 9. 
803 Van Zijl v Hoogenhout 2005 2 SA 93 (SCA) para 7, quoted with approval in Paulsen v Slip 
Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 479 (CC) para 64.  See also, Helen Suzman 
Foundation v Judicial Service Commission (CC) 2018 4 SA 1 (CC) para 27. 
804 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 704. 
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action in question.805  As such, a litigant that seeks to raise a collateral challenge 
seeks, in effect, to enforce the right of access to courts.806 
 
7 6 Limiting the right of access to courts 
 
If the right to raise a collateral challenge is a manifestation of the right of access to 
courts, it follows as a matter of logic that a litigant’s right of access to courts will be 
limited where a court deprives the litigant of the opportunity to raise a collateral 
challenge.  This is not, however, the end of the enquiry, as the rights in the Bill of 
Rights are not absolute. 
 
7 7 The limitation analysis 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution permits the limitation of these right by law of general 
application, to the extent that the “limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.807  The right 
of access to courts may therefore be limited insofar as section 36 of the Constitution 
allows that limitation. 
The common law of indirect review permits the limitation of the right of access to 
courts.  It does this by disabling litigants from challenging administrative action 
collaterally unless the challenge is made “by the right person in the right 
proceedings”.808  Section 36 of the Constitution determines that the law may only 
permit such a limitation where it would be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.809  This means 
																																																						
805 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) 518 – 519; Merafong City v AngloGold 
Ashanti 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 92. 
806 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 705. 
807 S 36 of the Constitution. 
808 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
35, quoting Wade Administrative Law 6ed 331, as cited in Metal and Electrical Workers Union 
of South Africa v National Panasonic Co (Parow Factory) 1991 2 SA 527 (C) 530C-D & 
National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical Industry v 
Photocircuit SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 2 SA 245 (C) 253E-F. 
809 Section 36 of the Constitution also provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may only be 
limited “in terms of law of general application”.  While the ambit of the phrase “law of general 
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that a litigant should be allowed to raise a collateral challenge where it would not be 
constitutionally permissible to limit that litigant’s right of access to court. 
When a court determines whether a limitation of the litigant’s right of access to court 
would be constitutionally permissible, it must balance the harm that the limitation 
causes against the benefits it is designed to achieve.810  The court must ultimately 
weigh up competing constitutional values to perform this assessment.811  Where a 
litigant seeks to raise a collateral challenge, the primary competing constitutional 
values will be the principle of legality and the principle of restraint.812 
The court should weigh up these competing values by taking into account the 
“relevant factors” listed in section 36(1)(a) – (e) of the Constitution, namely the nature 
of the right being limited; the importance and purpose of the limitation; the nature and 
extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and whether 
there are less restrictive means to achieve that purpose.813 
 
7 7 1 The nature of the right 
 
Some rights in the Bill of Rights carry more weight than others. These rights are more 
important in an open and democratic society that the Constitution envisages.814  
Courts are less inclined to permit a limitation of such rights than rights carrying less 
																																																						
application” is not entirely settled, it is clear that it includes the common law.  See S v Thebus 
2003 6 SA 505 (CC) paras 64-65; cited in H Botha & S Woolman “Limitations” in S Woolman, 
M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-52. 
810 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104; Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: 
in re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 27. 
811 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104. 
812 See chapter 1 above. 
813 Section 36 of the Constitution; Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v Walters 
2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 27.  The factors listed in section 36 of the Constitution are not 
exhaustive.  They are rather “key considerations” that should be used in conjunction with any 
other factors that may be relevant to the overall determination of whether or not the limitation 
is justifiable (S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 33). 
814 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 178. 
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weight.  In deciding whether a limitation of a right is reasonable and justifiable, a court 
will therefore have to consider the weight of the right that is subject to the limitation.815 
The Constitutional Court has held that the right to life and the right to dignity are the 
fundamental rights with the most gravity.816  Because the rights in the Bill of Rights are 
interconnected,817 the rights to life and dignity will (in addition to the right of access to 
courts) occasionally be implicated in indirect review cases.  Where a litigant seeks to 
raise a collateral challenge as a defence to criminal prosecution, for instance, the 
litigant will necessarily seek to protect his dignity, as “[d]ignity is inevitably impaired by 
imprisonment or any other punishment”.818 
Accordingly, should a litigant seek to use a collateral challenge to protect his rights 
to life and/or dignity (or other comparably important rights), the court should be more 
inclined to allow the collateral challenge than in other circumstances.  This is because 
disallowing the collateral challenge would limit the most substantial fundamental 
rights.  Such a limitation would only be reasonable and justifiable in extraordinary 
circumstances.819 
 
7 7 2 The importance of the purpose of the limitation 
 
A limitation of a fundamental right will only be reasonable and justifiable if serves a 
purpose that is legitimate and important in the society that the Constitution 
envisages.820  This factor is unproblematic in indirect review cases.  It is well 
recognised that the availability of collateral challenge is limited in order to advance the 
																																																						
815 178. 
816 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144; Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: 
in re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) paras 5-6, 28. 
817 See, for instance, Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 64. 
818 Para 142. 
819 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security: in re S v Walters 2002 4 SA 613 (CC) para 28. 
820 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 178. 
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principle of certainty.821  This principle is an incident of the rule of law and is important 
in the society that the Constitution envisages.822 
The Constitutional Court has also intimated that there may “be a substantive and 
valid reason underlying the purported exclusion of other remedies in a matter with 
public law overtones”,823 notwithstanding that our law recognises that the same facts 
may give rise to different causes of action.824  This might provide authority for the view 
that the judicial review of administrative action should be limited to direct review 
proceedings under the PAJA, and that collateral challenges to administrative action 
should generally be avoided.  In the United Kingdom, by way of comparison, the 
general rule is that it would be contrary to public policy and an abuse of court to 
challenge public power in any proceeding other than an application for judicial 
review.825 
A collateral challenge to administrative action is, however, a recognised exception 
to this rule: it is an accepted means of challenging public power outside the ordinary 
procedure for judicial review.826  It would thus appear that the principle of certainty 
provides the most cogent justification for limiting a litigant’s right of access to courts 
by disallowing a collateral challenge. 
 
7 7 3 The nature and extent of the limitation 
 
A limitation of a fundamental right will only be reasonable and justifiable if the benefits 
the limitation seeks to achieve outweigh the harm the limitation causes.  Section 36 of 
the Constitution, in other words, “does not permit a sledgehammer to be used to crack 
																																																						
821 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 36; Merafong 
City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) para 32. 
822 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
26; Forsyth (2006) Acta Juridica 220; A Price & D Freund “On the Legal Effects of Unlawful 
Administrative Action” (2017) 134 SALJ 184 185. 
823 KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 2013 4 SA 
262 (CC) para 104 (concurring minority judgment of Froneman J). 
824 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 
496. 
825 O’Reilly v Mackman 1983 3 All ER 1124 at 285, cited in KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison 
Committee v MEC for Education, KwaZulu-Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) para 104. 
826 Wandsworth London Borough Council v Winder 1984 3 All ER 83 at 105. 
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a nut”.827  A court must therefore assess the degree to which a fundamental right is 
limited by the law or conduct in question.828 
This means that a court should be hesitant to disallow a collateral challenge if the 
challenge is the litigant’s only way of enforcing his right of access to courts.829  On the 
other hand, a court should more readily decline a collateral challenge where the litigant 
could use an internal remedy or a direct judicial review application to impugn the 
administrative action in question.  In the first scenario, the court will completely limit 
the litigant’s right of access to courts if it disallows the collateral challenge.  In the 
second scenario, the litigant retains a right of access to courts even if the court 
disallows his collateral challenge. 
 
7 7 4 The relation between the limitation and its purpose 
 
It will not be reasonable and justifiable to limit a fundamental right if the limitation does 
not achieve its intended purpose. 830  Section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution thus obliges 
a court to consider whether there is a rational connection between the purpose of the 
impugned law or conduct and the limitation that it produces. 
Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development831 provides an instructive example of how section 36(1)(d) of the 
Constitution may inform a court’s reasoning.  This case concerned the constitutionality 
of provisions in an Act that criminalised consensual sexual conduct between children 
aged 12 to 16.832  The respondents argued that the purpose of the contentious 
provisions was to protect adolescents from the risks attendant upon sexual 
behaviour.833  But the court held that there was no evidence to indicate that the 
provisions would achieve that purpose.  On the contrary, the evidence showed that 
																																																						
827 S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 34. 
828 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 182. 
829 The Constitutional Court appears to have endorsed this proposition in Merafong City v 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 70-71. 
830 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 182-183. 
831 2014 2 SA 168 (CC). 
832 Part 1 of Chapter 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 32 of 2007. 
833 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 85. 
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the provisions increased the probability that adolescents would engage in risky sexual 
behaviour.  According to the court, this meant that the impugned provisions did not 
achieve their purpose and that they could accordingly not limit fundamental rights in 
reasonable and justifiable way.834 
When a court disallows a collateral challenge it limits the challenger’s right of access 
to court.  The purpose of such a limitation is to protect the principle of certainty.  
Section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution determines that it would be unjustifiable to limit the 
right of access to courts if a purported collateral challenge does not threaten the 
principle of certainty: in such a case there would be a diminished connection between 
the limitation (disallowing a collateral challenge) and its purpose (protecting the 
principle of certainty). 
In my view, there are at least two factors a court could consider to decide whether 
a collateral challenge threatens the principle of certainty.  The first is the extent to 
which members of the public have acted on the assumption that the impugned 
administrative action is valid.  The second is the amount of time that has passed since 
the impugned administrative act came into being. 
If the act is recent and few people have acted on the assumption that it is valid, 
there is a small likelihood that a successful collateral challenge would upset vested 
interests and settled relations, and the principle of certainty is accordingly not 
imperilled.  By contrast, where the administrative action has matured and many have 
acted on the assumption that it is valid, vested interests and settled relations would 
likely be upset if the action is set aside.835 
 
7 7 5 Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose of the limitation 
 
A limitation of a fundamental right will not be reasonable or justifiable if the costs of 
the limitation outweigh its benefits.836  When considering whether law or conduct 
																																																						
834 Para 87. 
835 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 46; Millennium 
Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 2 SA 481 
(SCA) para 23; MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer 
Institute 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 103. 
836 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 183-184. 
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unjustifiably limits a fundamental right, a court must therefore consider whether the 
law or conduct could achieve its purpose in a less restrictive way.837 
It is not clear what this factor means in the context of the indirect review of 
administrative action.  It could perhaps be understood as obliging a court to consider 
whether, instead of denying a collateral challenge altogether, it should rather permit 
the challenge and use its remedial discretion to ameliorate any harm this may cause 
to the principle of certainty.838  In this way the court will thus use “less restrictive 
means” to protect the principle of certainty, as the principle will be protected while the 
challenger’s right of access to court will be left intact. 
Even though the Constitutional Court appears to have endorsed such an approach 
in Merafong City,839 it is questionable whether the approach is sound.  This is because 
the approach tends to collapse the distinction between two stages in the judicial 
decision-making process: the initial stage where the court considers whether the 
litigant may present the case to the court, and the final stage where the court considers 
what relief would be just and equitable.  As each stage deals with a distinct question 
and attracts different policy considerations, it is not jurisprudentially sound, in my view, 
to collapse both stages into one.840 
 
7 7 6 Other factors 
 
The factors in section 36(1)(a) – (e) of the Constitution do not form a closed list.  A 
court is free to consider any other factor that is “relevant”.841  There are several factors 
a court may consider relevant to determining the competence of a collateral challenge.  
These factors must now be seen in the context of the general limitation analysis.  
Accordingly, while each factor may inform the court’s assessment, no individual factor 
should be determinative of that assessment.  I will now briefly discuss the four factors 
that are most likely to be considered relevant by our courts. 
 
																																																						
837 S 36(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
838 On our superior courts’ wide remedial discretion, see chapter 2 part 2 3 2 above. 
839 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 55-56. 
840 See chapter 4 part 4 6 3 above. 
841 S 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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7 7 6 1 The empowering instrument 
 
All administrative action is founded on an empowering instrument.842  A court should 
naturally consider whether the instrument permits or prohibits a collateral challenge to 
the administrative act in question.  In Khabisi, for example, the court held that “the 
clear and peremptory letter” of the NEMA precluded the respondents from raising a 
collateral challenge.843  In S v Smit, by contrast, the court held that the Roads Act did 
not prohibit Mr Smit from collaterally challenging the validity of a contentious toll-road 
declaration.844 
Most empowering instruments do not expressly determine the permissibility of 
collateral challenges.845  However, in the unlikely event that an instrument 
unequivocally prohibits a collateral challenge, the court will be bound by the doctrine 
of separation of powers to give effect to the intention of the legislature.  It is only then 
that the content of the empowering instrument should be a determinative factor in the 
court’s assessment of the permissibility of a collateral challenge. 
 
7 7 6 2 The nature of the impugned administrative action 
 
A collateral challenge is traditionally seen as a mechanism that protects persons from 
coercive public power.846  A court may therefore be minded to disallow a collateral 
challenge where the challenger faces no threat of coercion.  In Maxime Hotel,847 for 
example, the High Court disallowed a collateral challenge because the challenger did 
not face any threat of coercion, but merely sought to ensure – by way of a collateral 
challenge – that it was awarded a commercially valuable gambling licence.848 
 
																																																						
842 See chapter 6 part 6 2 2 above. 
843 Khabisis v Aquarella Investment 83 (Pty) Ltd 2008 4 SA 195 (T) para 18. 
844 S v Smit 2007 2 SACR 335 (T) 378I-J. 
845 See chapter 6 part 6 2 2 above. 
846 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 32 
847 See chapter 2 part 2 3 above. 
848 Maxime Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson: National Gambling Board 2014 JDR 0657 (GNP) 
paras 29-31. 
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7 7 6 3 The person attempting to raise the collateral challenge 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, our courts previously held that a collateral challenge is only 
available to a “subject” threatened with coercive public power and that an organ of 
state cannot be such a subject.849  The Constitutional Court overruled this line of 
authority in Merafong City, holding that an organ of state may also avail itself of a 
collateral challenge.850 
A court should therefore not disallow a collateral challenge merely because the 
challenger is an organ of state.  But a court should bear in mind that a challenger’s 
status as an organ of state has two important consequences. 
The first consequence is that the organ of state’s collateral challenge may be 
subject to the rule against delay.851  This is because an organ of state has an enhanced 
duty to proactively seek the judicial review of administrative action, particularly where 
it impugns its own prior administrative action.852 
The second consequence is that, should an organ of state’s collateral challenge be 
directed at its own prior decision, and should the challenge be allowed to proceed, the 
challenge must be made under the principle of legality and not the PAJA.  According 
to the Constitutional Court, the PAJA was intended to protect “warm-bodied human 
beings primarily against the state”853 and does therefore not protect the state against 
its own prior decisions.  This is because the fundamental right to just administrative 
action, enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution, does not accrue to the state.854 
 
																																																						
849 Kwa Sani Municipality v Underberg/Himeville Community Watch Association 2015 2 All SA 
657 (SCA) paras 5-8; Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2016 2 SA 176 (SCA) paras 15-
17; Tasima v Department of Transport 2016 1 All SA 465 (SCA) 476I-477C. 
850 See chapter 4 above. 
851 Merafong City v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2017 2 SA 211 (CC) paras 59;  
852 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 
2014 3 SA 481 (CC) para 82. 
853 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 23 
(CC) para 18. 
854 Para 27. 
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7 7 6 4 The person whose decision is being challenged 
 
The purpose of a collateral challenge is to avoid the enforcement of unjust public 
power.  A court may therefore be minded to disallow a collateral challenge where the 
challenger seeks to avoid the enforcement of private-law rights.  In V & A,855 for 
instance, the Supreme Court of Appeal disallowed a collateral challenge because it 
was not aimed at preventing the enforcement of administrative action by a public 
authority, but was rather aimed at preventing the enforcement of a lease by a private 
party.856 
 
7 8 Conclusion 
 
7 8 1 Conspectus 
 
When should a court allow a litigant to challenge administrative action indirectly by 
means of a collateral challenge?  The central aim of this thesis has been to address 
this question in a systematic and critical way.  It is submitted that the thesis has made 
five novel findings in pursuit of that aim. 
The first finding is that, notwithstanding Oudekraal’s venerated status in our law, 
courts have not consistently appreciated the full import of the reasoning underlying the 
judgment.  In Oudekraal, the Supreme Court of Appeal used the theory of the second 
actor to mediate the tension between the Oudekraal principle and the collateral-
challenge exception.857  However, in Oudekraal’s wake, some courts have invoked the 
Oudekraal principle without recognising that the principle is subject to the collateral-
challenge exception, while other courts have ignored or misapplied the theory of the 
second actor.858 
The second finding flows from the first: instead of using the theory of the second 
actor to assess the competence of a collateral challenge, courts have been inclined to 
																																																						
855 See chapter 3 part 3 3 1 1 above. 
856 V & A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd v Helicopter & Marine Services (Pty) Ltd 2006 1 SA 
252 (SCA) paras 10-14. 
857 See chapter 2 part 2 3 above. 
858 See chapter 2 part 2 4 above. 
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use two other judicial methods instead.859  Some courts have preferred what this thesis 
has termed the categorical method.  This method is premised on the view that a 
collateral challenge may only be made by a subject that is coerced by a public 
authority.860  Other courts have preferred what this thesis has termed the flexible 
method.  This method assumes that a collateral challenge should be permitted where 
it would be in the interest of justice, taking into account the exigencies of the case 
before the court.861 
The third finding is that the proliferation of judicial methods has not resulted in 
harmony, but in discord.  The same dispute could be resolved in materially different 
ways, depending on which method the court employs.  And there is an absence of 
guidelines indicating which method a court will use in any given case.  This 
undermines legal certainty and harms the rule of law.862 
The fourth finding is that Merafong City, arguably the most authoritative current 
judgment on indirect review, has failed to harmonise this branch of the law and has 
instead underscored the need for doctrinal reform.863  While the judgment apparently 
endorsed the flexible method, its reasoning was questionable and failed to provide 
guidance on how this method should be used to decide other cases.864 
The fifth finding is that such doctrinal reform should not be based on the theory of 
the second actor, the categorical method, or the flexible method.  This is because all 
three methods fall short of the ideal of transformative adjudication in significant 
respects.865 
 
7 8 2 Proposal 
 
In the light of the abovementioned findings, the central proposal of this thesis is that 
the competence of a collateral challenge should be determined by way of a judicial 
method that is grounded on section 36 of the Constitution.  As explained at the start 
																																																						
859 See chapter 3 above. 
860 See chapter 3 part 3 3 above. 
861 See chapter 3 part 3 4 above. 
862 See chapter 4 part 4 7 above. 
863 See chapter 4 above. 
864 See chapter 4 above. 
865 See chapter 5 above. 
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of this chapter, the proposed method is still in nascent form, and is presented in this 
thesis merely as an “angle of approach”.  It is submitted that, should the proposed 
method be developed to maturity, it would be more congruent with the ideal of 
transformative adjudication than the theory of the second actor, the categorical 
method and the flexible method respectively.  This is so for three reasons. 
Firstly, the proposed method attains a high degree of potential variability.  This is 
because it is established law that the section-36 analysis invariably entails a fact-
bound inquiry, which cannot be performed in an abstract way that is insensitive to the 
exigencies of the case before the court.866  The variability of a section-36 analysis is 
compounded by the fact that the scope of the analysis itself, and not only the 
application of the analysis, theoretically varies from case to case.867  This is perhaps 
most clearly illustrated by considering that the factors in section 36(1)(a) – (e) of the 
Constitution do not form a closed list, and that a court is free to use any other factor 
that is relevant to the determination of the case before it. 
Secondly, the proposed method, properly applied, also encourages substantive, as 
opposed to formalistic, reasoning.  From the outset, the Constitutional Court has 
emphasised that the section-36 analysis does not call for the rote application of 
ossified rules, but instead calls for “the weighing up of competing values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality”.868 According to Botha and 
Woolman, because section 36 obliges courts to weigh up competing values: 
 
“Courts cannot, and do not, simply apply the requirements of the text of the limitation 
clause mechanically.  Courts need to explain how they understand the demands of 
the text and why those demands have certain consequences for the disposition of 
a case.  As a result, judges themselves are subject to the demand for justification.  
They must be able to explain why they have given the standards the content that 
they have, and why they have applied them in a given fashion”.869 
 
																																																						
866 See, for instance, S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104; De Lange v Smuts 1998 
3 SA 785 (CC) paras 86-87, 163. 
867 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 177. 
868 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104. 
869 H Botha & S Woolman “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-7. 
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Finally, the proposed method embraces a workable back-to-front approach.  Unlike 
the theory of the second actor and the categorical method,870 the proposed method 
centres on the provisions of the Constitution.  And unlike the flexible method,871 the 
proposed method provides guidance on how a court should use the provisions of the 
Constitution to determine the competence of a collateral challenge.  While the 
limitation analysis may itself call for further jurisprudential development and 
clarification,872 it is nonetheless a well-known and constitutionally mandated 
mechanism for resolving the conflict between competing constitutional ideals.  In my 
view, the limitation analysis therefore offers a promising basis upon which the conflict 
between the Oudekraal principle and the collateral-challenge exception may be 
mediated.  As explained in chapter 1, the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between 
these two ideals lies at the heart of the law on indirect review, and forms the rationale 
of this thesis.873 
A potential problem with the proposed method is that it may appear, on the face of 
it, to contravene the principles of subsidiarity outlined in chapter 5.874  This is because 
the Constitution/legislation/common-law rule determines that, where a litigant seeks 
to protect the right to just administrative action, he may not circumvent the PAJA by 
relying directly on the common law.875  The proposed method does not involve the 
PAJA at all, and is instead based squarely on the development of the common law 
through the Bill of Rights. 
However, the Constitution/legislation/common-law rule is only effective where the 
PAJA is applicable.876  And, according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the PAJA does 
not apply when a court must determine the competence of a collateral challenge.877  
																																																						
870 See chapter 6 above. 
871 Id. 
872 See, for instance, H Botha & S Woolman “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-93 – 34-127. 
873 See chapter 1 part 1 2 above. 
874 See chapter 5 part 5 5 2 above. 
875 See chapter 5 part 5 5 2 3 above. 
876 C Hoexter Administrative Law (2012) 134.  Compare M Murcott & W van der Westhuizen 
“The Ebb and Flow of the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity – Critical Reflections on 
Motau and My Vote Counts” (2015) 7 CCR 43 49. 
877 Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance v South African National Roads Agency Ltd 2013 4 All 
SA 639 (SCA) paras 39-40.  The court did not express any view on whether the PAJA 
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Accordingly, the proposed method does not unjustifiably displace the PAJA with the 
common law, but rather uses the common law to govern an area of administrative law 
that the PAJA fails to regulate.  And, as explained in chapter 5, the principles of 
subsidiarity allow the common law to perform such a “gap-filling” function.878  It is 
accordingly submitted that the proposed method coheres with the principles of 
subsidiarity and is congruent with the ideal of a single-system-of-law.879 
A further problem with the proposed method is its rather idiosyncratic use of section 
36 of the Constitution.  Ordinarily, this section is only triggered once a litigant asks a 
court to find that law or conduct limits a right in the Bill of Rights and the court indeed 
makes that finding. 
The proposed method does not rely on this trigger being present.  Instead it invites 
a court to use section 36 much earlier, and more generally, in its decision-making 
process.  Section 36 has so far been used to decide whether apparently invalid law or 
conduct is constitutionally justifiable.  But the proposed method uses the section to 
ensure that judicial reasoning conforms with the Bill of Rights. 
In my view, there are two reasons why this idiosyncratic use of section 36 is 
warranted.  First, there is nothing in the text of section 36 of the Constitution or in the 
rest of the Bill of Rights that precludes courts from employing that text in new, 
previously unimagined ways.  Of course, such developments must be consistent with 
the Constitution and the positive law generally.  And it is submitted that the proposed 
method meets that test.  But a legal development can surely not be criticised simply 
for being novel. 
Second, there is textual support for the proposed method in the Constitution itself. 
Section 8 of the Constitution reads: 
 
“(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to 
the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
																																																						
regulates the merits of a collateral challenge to administrative action, once a court determines 
that the collateral challenge may indeed be raised. 
878 See chapter 5 part 5 5 2 3 above. 
879 See chapter 5 part 5 5 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
		146	
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person 
in terms of subsection (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, of if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that 
the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1)” (my emphasis). 
 
It falls beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a discussion of how our courts 
have interpreted section 8 of the Constitution.  It suffices to point out that, on the face 
of it, section 8(3)(b) contemplates section 36 being used in the way the proposed 
method asks courts to use the section.  Clearly, section 8(3)(b) does not contemplate 
section 36(1) being used to do its normal job as a justificatory mechanism.  Instead, 
like the proposed method, it contemplates section 36(1) being used as a lodestar in 
the judicial development of the common law. 
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